Why it may be difficult to make one's voice heard

What are the possible causes of difficulty in making one's voice heard? The causes may be divided into those that are related to limitations of receptive capacity on the part of others and those that are related to limitations of expressive capacity on the part of oneself. An example of the former is deafness on the part of the listener or audience. An example of the latter is aphonia (loss or lack of voice) on the part of oneself.

      The deafness of others to the sounds of one's voice (and to the significance of whatever one wants to say) may be literal or figurative. Figurative deafness on the part of the listeners or audience may in some cases be due to their preoccupation with other matters or their lack of interest in whatever one is saying. It may in other cases be due to their lack of understanding or their unwillingness to listen to whatever one is saying. It may in still other cases be due to their narrow-mindedness, rigidity, biased or intolerant attitudes, or tendency to make prejudgments about things.

      Aphonia may similarly be literal or metaphorical. Physical causes of (complete or partial) aphonia include laryngitis, vocal cord nodules or polyps, vocal cord paralysis, laryngeal cancer, laryngectomy, spasmodic dysphonia, voice tremor, and neurological conditions such as myasthenia gravis, Parkinson's disease, and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). Other causes of speech impairment include speech fluency disorders (such as stuttering), speech articulation disorders (such as lisps), dysarthria (which can cause slurring of speech), dysprosody (which can cause disruption in the intensity, rhythm, and intonation of speech), speech apraxia (which can cause difficulty producing sounds and syllables in correct sequence), and expressive aphasia (which can cause decreased fluency of speech, decreased spontaneous speech, difficulty finding words in order to make verbal responses, difficulty naming objects, and difficulty producing complete sentences). Metaphorical aphonia, on the other hand, may be a socially-determined loss of voice that is caused by (psychological, moral, religious, professional, or legal) inhibitions, prohibitions, and deterrents against being able to make one's voice heard by others.    

      When one wants to say something and no one is willing to listen, one may in some cases be confronted by one's own unimportance, lack of social standing, lack of recognizable impact on the attitudes of others, and powerlessness to make one's voice heard. 

      Other people may in some cases refuse to acknowledge one's right to speak and may feel that their being allowed to speak is more important. They may in some cases have a vested interest in refusing to allow others to speak, or they may intrude on others' turns to speak, or they may simply refuse to listen, or they may be too busy to listen, or they may want to speak first and keep others waiting for their turns to speak. 

      There may also in some cases be socially or institutionally imposed silence (which may determine, to varying degrees, when and where a person is allowed to speak, and what she is allowed to say). A person may be silenced by implicitly or explicitly being told that her opinions don't matter or that a particular decision that affects her livelihood or well-being cannot be changed or revoked. She may be told that an undesirable state of affairs is a fait accompli, and that she shouldn't "rock the boat" or "make a scene" about it. 

      One may also be silenced by being held to a professional or vocational code of silence, by being made subject to a legal injunction against speaking publicly, by being subjected to censorship (political, religious, corporate, or professional), by being refused publication of one's views in print, visual, or broadcast media, and by not being allowed to read books, journals, newspapers, and magazines. 

      One may also be silenced by the effect of social norms that discourage one's speaking about particular subjects, feelings, and experiences. One may be deterred from speaking about particular subjects because of verbal and nonverbal cues provided by others regarding the topics that they desire, or do not desire, to discuss. One may also be silenced by having one's voice drowned out by louder voices or by a flood of other voices.

      In some cases one may not be able to put one's thoughts into words or may not consider oneself to occupy a position of sufficient status for one's words to be taken seriously by others. One may not consider oneself sufficiently qualified to contribute something meaningful to public discourse, or one may not be used to speaking in public. One may have to (literally or figuratively) strain to make one's voice heard, or one may be reluctant or unwilling to expose oneself to the possible ridicule, humiliation, or embarrassment that one may be subjected to whenever others reject or disagree with whatever one has to say. One may be reluctant to raise one's voice sufficiently in order to make oneself heard if the audience appears to be distracted, uninterested, disorderly, hostile, threatening, or agitated.

      Being unable to make one's voice heard may also in some cases be merely a matter of being unable to find someone willing to listen. Finding someone to listen may often be more difficult than actually voicing one's thoughts and feelings, given that one may need to address a listener or audience of some kind in order for the utterance of one's thoughts and feelings to mean anything to someone other than oneself.

      One may be able to make oneself heard by calling attention to oneself (through styles of speech, styles of clothing, nonverbal behaviors, behavioral mannerisms, etc.), and by lobbying, demonstrating, protesting, campaigning, and demanding that others address one's needs and concerns. One may also be able to call attention to oneself by engaging in public debate and by making public appearances in person or via broadcast media. Another way of making one's voice heard is to enlist the help of someone more recognized and well-known than oneself (such as a legislator, journalist, lobbyist, celebrity, public spokesman, or human rights organization) in order to give voice to one's needs and concerns.

Ideal Moral Agency

Various approaches (deontological, consequentialist, virtue-oriented, and pragmatic) may be taken toward establishing the criteria for an ideal moral agent. Various approaches may also be taken toward establishing the principles that should guide an ideal moral agent.

      Presumably, the ideal moral agent will be an ideal observer (an impartial, fully informed, and competent observer) of situations in which moral decisions must be made. The ideal moral agent will also be an ideal moral observer (an observer who observes from a moral, but not moralistic, viewpoint, and who can fully recognize, understand, and respond to the moral implications of whatever she observes). Thus, she will be an ideal evaluator of (and if necessary, an ideal participant in) those situations with which she is confronted. If the ideal moral agent is truly moral, then she will also embody all the moral virtues (such as wisdom, understanding, empathy, compassion, honesty, integrity, impartiality, diligence, discipline, and humility) that should belong to an ideal moral agent.

       Any moral judgment made by an ideal moral agent will, of course, be an ideal judgment (impartial, correct, apt, adroit, and fully justified). An apt judgment may be one that is suited to the agent's own interpretive and judgmental skills and to the particular situation. An adroit judgment may be one that is deft, resourceful, nimble, and skillful. According to Kantian ethics, any moral judgment made by an ideal moral agent will also be capable of being universalized (being taken as a universal guide for moral conduct). 

       If we accept the ideal moral agent as a role model for our own conduct as moral agents, then any decisions that we make should be those that would be made by an ideal moral agent if she were acting in the same situation. In examining the rightness or wrongness of our own moral conduct, we may ask ourselves if our actions were the same as those that would have been performed by an ideal moral agent if she were acting in the same situation. Such comparisons between ourselves and the ideal moral agent, of course, presuppose that there is an ideal mode of moral conduct for (or an ideal moral response to) a given situation. If there is no ideal mode of moral conduct for a given situation, or if no such mode of conduct is possible in a given situation, then adherence to a moral ideal (or conformity to the moral standards that would be fulfilled by an ideal moral agent) may require that we perform the best (or most right) action that we are capable of performing in that situation.

      If we attempt to emulate an ideal moral agent, we will, of course, set ourselves up for the possibility of failure. But the willing acceptance of our own moral imperfections and of the resultant possibility of our failure to meet an ideal standard of moral conduct is, in itself, a morally virtuous action. It may be the case that only by attempting to do what an ideal moral agent would do in a particular situation can we ever hope to transcend our own moral faults and imperfections.

      The ideal moral agent may also be conceptualized as an ideal speaker of a moral language. The ideal speaker of a moral language will, of course, be fully competent in the rules and usage of that language (she will have a full command of the vocabulary and syntax of that language, and she will be fully proficient in the use of that language for social and communicative purposes). The ideal speaker's use of the moral language will also be commensurate with her knowledge of the language, and she will have an ideal knowledge without any perceptible faults or deficiencies (no lack of correspondence will be seen between her knowledge of the rules and usage of the language and her ability to use the language for social and communicative purposes). 

      If we share a moral language, then the ideal speaker of that language may be seen as a role model for our moral conduct as communicators. Insofar as we share a moral language, we also share a means of moral expression, and we become members of a linguistic (expressive and interpretive) community.

      An objection that may be made to the concept of an ideal moral agent is that moral decisions may be more appropriately made by adopting the viewpoint of a real, rather than an ideal, observer. If the ideal moral agent is merely an abstract model, of what use is that model for moral decision-making in real situations? Presumably, our moral conduct will be truly virtuous when it conforms to moral standards or expectations that are both real and ideal.

Some preliminary definitions of meta-ethical terms

amoralism - 1. a mode of thought or behavior that disregards all moral concepts, principles, or values. 2. a denial of the existence of morality. 3. an indifference to, or disregard of, moral principles or norms

meta-ethics - 1. the study of the origin, nature, and meaning of moral judgments, attitudes, properties, and values. 2. the study of the methods, language, and modes of reasoning that are employed in ethics

moral absolutism - the theory that there are absolute moral truths that are not relative to the individual moral agent or the sociocultural context in which moral judgments are made

moral anti-realism (or irrealism) - the theory that moral properties or values do not exist independently of our perceptions of them

moral cognitivism - 1. the theory that there are moral facts, and that moral statements express propositions (which can be shown to be true or false). 2. the theory that moral judgments are cognitive evaluations of facts, and that they have the same cognitive status as beliefs. 3. the theory that moral judgments are beliefs that have propositional content.
      Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons (2000) explain that moral cognitivism may be descriptivist or non-descriptivist, insofar as there may or may not be moral evaluative beliefs that are reducible to, or a species of, moral descriptive beliefs.¹

      Alfred Mele (1996) explains that moral cognitivism may also be internalist or externalist with regard to its analysis of moral motivation (depending on whether it regards an individual's own moral judgments as necessarily or only contingently motivating him/her to perform a particular action).² 

moral coherentism - the theory that moral judgments are justified insofar as they cohere with other moral judgments that are held to justified

moral constructivism - the theory that moral truths are (psychologically, rationally, or socially) constructed

moral contextualism - the theory that moral truths are context-sensitive, and that the validity of moral judgments depends on the context in which they are made

moral descriptivism - the theory that moral judgments describe facts

moral discourse - language that occurs within a specific (situational, sociocultural, or historical) context, and that concerns moral perceptions, feelings, emotions, concepts, attitudes, judgments, or values

moral emotivism - the theory that moral judgments do not express propositions, and that they instead express emotions or feelings

moral epistemic foundationalism - the theory that there are justified moral beliefs or judgments that are basic and foundational elements of moral knowledge, insofar as they do not have to be inferred from, or justified by, other justified moral beliefs or judgments. Epistemic foundationalism is therefore a solution to the problem of infinite regress in epistemic justification (the problem of an infinite number of inferences being required to justify any belief or judgment, unless there are some beliefs or judgments that are self-evidently justified and that do not require inferential justification).

moral epistemic reliabilism - the theory that a moral judgment is epistemically justified if the method by which the judgment was made is epistemically reliable.

moral epistemology - the study of the origin, nature, and limits of moral knowledge. Various approaches to moral epistemology (including intuitionism, coherentism, constructivism, and reliabilism) may be taken in order to explain how moral knowledge is possible.

moral error theory - 1. the theory that all moral beliefs are false, because they ascribe moral properties to things that have no moral properties.³ 2. the theory that all moral beliefs are false, because there are no moral facts or properties that could enable them to be true.⁴ Moral error theory may be compatible with moral subjectivism and moral fictionalism. It may also be compatible with moral anti-realism, but it may not be compatible with the epistemological claim made by moral non-cognitivism that moral statements cannot be shown to be true or false.

moral expressivism - the theory that moral judgments do not express propositions, and that they are instead expressions of feelings or emotions

moral externalism (or motivational externalism) - the theory that the moral motivation for an individual's actions is (or may be) provided by factors other than his/her own moral reasoning, attitudes, and judgments.

moral fictionalism - the theory that moral properties are not literally present in things, and that they are merely fictions created for the sake of convenience or expediency

moral functionalism - as described by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit (1995), a theory of moral content according to which the evaluative content of moral judgments supervenes upon their descriptive content and thus functions to provide the motivation for moral action.⁵

moral generalism - the theory that there are general moral principles that can be used to guide moral conduct in particular situations

moral identity - the aspect of a person's social identity that is defined by his/her moral perceptions, feelings, reasoning, emotions, attitudes, and behavior 

moral imagination - the ability to imagine alternative moral actions, principles, and values, and to consequently engage with, and have a fuller conception of, the moral capacities of the individual, group, or society

moral internalism (or motivational internalism) - the theory that the moral motivation for an individual's actions is provided by his/her own moral reasoning, attitudes, and judgments. The theory may have strong and weak forms, depending on whether an individual's own moral reasoning, attitudes, and judgments are seen as determining or merely contributing to his/her actions. 

moral intuitionism - the theory that some justified moral judgments can be made intuitively, without having to be justified by other judgments. Moral intuitionism may be a kind of foundationalism, insofar as intuitively-made justified judgments may be considered to be foundational for other judgments.⁶

moral language - 1. the language of morality. 2. language that employs moral concepts, terms, and arguments. 3. language that has moral meaning, aims, and content. 4. language that presupposes (or advocates for) a particular set of moral values or norms

moral naturalism  - the theory that there are moral facts or properties in the natural world (or that moral properties are determined by natural properties)⁷

moral nihilism - 1. rejection of any concept of morality. 2. rejection of any mode of moral judgment. 3. denial of the existence of any objective moral truths, values, properties, or facts

moral non-cognitivism - 1. the theory that there are no moral facts, and that moral statements therefore do not express propositions.⁸ 2. the theory that moral judgments do not have the same cognitive status as beliefs, because there are no moral facts about which moral judgments can be made. Moral non-cognitivism may be a kind of non-objectivism.

moral non-descriptivism -  the theory that moral judgments do not describe facts

moral non-naturalism - the theory that there are no moral facts or properties in the natural world 

moral non-objectivism - the theory that there are no objective moral truths or facts

moral normativity - 1. the ability or tendency of something to be morally normative. 2. the ability or tendency of something to establish a moral norm or standard of behavior

moral objectivism - the theory that there are objective moral truths, properties, or values

moral particularism - the theory that there are no general moral principles that can be used to guide moral conduct in particular situations

moral philosophy - 1. the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of morality, and that explores the nature of right and wrong. 2. the branch of philosophy that investigates the origin and nature of moral reasoning, principles, values, and conduct. 3. the branch of philosophy that examines the applications of moral norms to human behavior. 

moral prescriptivism - the theory that moral judgments have prescriptive rather than descriptive content

moral projectivism - the projection of moral properties, attitudes, or values onto persons or things

moral psychology - the study of mental states and processes as they relate to moral reasoning, judgment, and conduct. Moral psychology may include the study of moral identity, moral development, moral motivation, and the neuroscience of cognition as it relates to moral thinking, attitudes, and behavior.

moral quasi-realism - as described by Simon Blackburn (1993), the theory that moral judgments do not express propositions, and that they merely express or project feelings (or attitudes) as if the latter were about actual facts. Quasi-realism is compatible with non-cognitivism, expressivism, projectivism, and anti-realism.⁹

moral queerness - a property described by J.L. Mackie (1977), who argues that there are no objective moral facts or values, and that if there were, they would be facts or values of a very strange and queer sort, unlike anything else in the universe. They would require some special faculty of intuition or perception, unlike any other kind of human perception, in order to be recognized.¹⁰ Mackie calls this argument against moral objectivism "the argument from queerness."

moral rationalism - the theory that the truth or falsehood of moral judgments can be determined by reason alone

moral realism - the theory that there are moral facts, attributes, or values that exist independently of our perception of them

moral relativism - the theory that there are no moral truths, properties, or values that are not relative to the judgment of the individual moral agent or to the sociocultural setting in which moral judgments are made

moral skepticism -  an attitude of doubt regarding the existence of any objective moral truths or facts, and doubt regarding the validity of any moral judgments that presuppose such truths or facts

moral subjectivism - the theory that all moral judgments, properties, or values are subjective. Moral subjectivism may be a kind of anti-realism or skepticism.¹¹

moral supervenience - a relation whereby moral properties supervene on non-moral properties, so that a given set of moral properties is found wherever a given set of non-moral properties is found. Moral anti-realists argue that moral realists have not provided any convincing argument for why moral supervenience should hold.¹²

moral understanding - 1. the understanding of moral principles and reasoning. 2. the ability to combine moral reasoning with other kinds of reasoning

moral vision - a particular moral viewpoint, perspective, or way of looking at the world

¹Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, "Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic" in Philosophical Papers 29 (2000), 121-53.

²Alfred R. Mele, "Internalist Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness," in Ethics, Vol. 106, No. 4 (1996), pp. 727-753.

³Bart Streumer, "Can We Believe the Error Theory?" (2012), forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophy.

⁴Richard Joyce, "Error theory," International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. by Hugh LaFollette (Wiley-Blackwell), 2013.

⁵Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, "Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation" in The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 178 (Jan., 1995), pp. 20-40.

⁶Mark van Roojen "Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments" in Intuitions, edited by Anthony Booth and Darrell P. Rowbottom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

⁷Nick Zangwill, "Against Analytic Moral Functionalism" in Ratio XIII 3 September 2000, p. 275.

⁸Mark van Roojen, "Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2009), online at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-cognitivism/.

⁹Simon Blackburn, Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

¹⁰J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 38.

¹¹Ibid., p. 18.

¹²Nick Zangwill, "Moral Supervenience," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy, XX (1995), p. 240.

Conditions for having the Moral Right to Speak for Others

When does one have the moral right to speak for others? The substantiation and validation of this right may require the fulfillment of a number of conditions. Each condition, when fulfilled, may contribute toward the substantiation of this right, but it is only a conditional right (it is only conditionally capable of being substantiated and validated).

      The conditions for having the moral right to speak for others are each in their own way "necessary conditions," insofar as if it is possible for each of them to be fulfilled, they must be fulfilled. The question of what are the "sufficient conditions" that may, alone and of themselves, validate the moral right to speak for others is open to debate.

      It may be helpful to compose a tentative list of all the conditions that must be satisfied in order for the moral right to speak for others to be fully substantiated and validated. Thus, the moral right to speak for others may be said to exist only

• when those for whom one is speaking have voluntarily given their consent. In other words, one has the moral right to speak for others only if they have willingly given their informed consent, permission, or approval. If they are not in a position to give their voluntary and informed consent, then one's moral right to speak for them must be established on some other grounds, such as one's being their closest family relative, or one's being their legal representative, guardian, or trustee, or one's having been chosen to speak by their family members, guardians, or legal representatives, or one's being in a position of recognized and legitimate authority to speak for them. 

      It should be noted that those for whom one is speaking may either implicitly or explicitly agree that one may speak in their behalf. If their agreement or consent is only implicit, then one must assume the burden of proof if it becomes necessary to demonstrate that they have given their voluntary consent and that one has not unjustifiably taken upon oneself the task of speaking for them.

      The moral right to speak for others may also be said to exist only

• when those for whom one is speaking cannot speak for themselves
• when one can speak in such a way that the dignity, well-being, and self-fulfillment of those for whom one is speaking are enhanced, and are not diminished in any way
• when one has sufficient knowledge of, and familiarity with, the interests of those for whom one is speaking, and this knowledge and familiarity has been accepted and recognized by those for whom one is speaking
• when one is able to reliably and knowledgeably articulate the interests and concerns of those for whom one is speaking 
• when one is able to represent those for whom one is speaking in such a way that their interests, concerns, and well-being are served by one's being able to speak for them
• when one is in a better position, or is more qualified, than some other person to represent the interests of those for whom one is speaking
• when one is not adopting or speaking from a position of supposed superiority in relation to those for whom one is speaking
• when those for whom one is speaking are not diminished in their right and capacity to speak for themselves, whenever they choose to exercise this right 
• when those for whom one is speaking are aware of, are informed of, or can anticipate whatever one intends to say in their behalf, or when they have (implicitly or explicitly) given their consent to whatever one intends to say in their behalf
• when one's speaking for others does not jeopardize their safety, interests, and well-being
• when those for whom one is speaking are aware of, are informed of, and can anticipate, the possible risks or disadvantages of one's speaking for them
• when one's speaking for others is not a means of selfishly serving one's own interests
• when one does not have a potential conflict of interest that would call into question one's motivation for speaking for others, e.g. an interest in their not being able to speak for themselves or in their not being able to advance their own interests and well-being
• when one's speaking for others is not, in effect, benefiting one's own interests more than the interests of those for whom one is speaking
• when one is open and honest toward those for whom one is speaking, so that they are able to understand one's true motives for volunteering or consenting to speak for them
• when speaking for others does not violate their privacy or confidentiality, and
• when one is ready and willing to relinquish the right to speak for others as soon as they are able to speak for themselves.

      Given the number of conditions that must be satisfied in order to validate the moral right to speak for others, one must be very careful about assuming this responsibility. The moral right to speak for others is a very limited one (in scope and duration), given the number of conditions that must be satisfied in order to validate it.

      If one is speaking for a community of which one is a member, then one has the moral right to say that one speaks for oneself as a member of that community, but one does not have the moral right to say that one speaks for every member of that community, unless one has obtained the voluntary consent or approval of every member. 

      If one is speaking for a community of which one is not a member, then one's moral right to speak for that community may depend on a variety of factors, such as whether the members of that community are able to speak for themselves, whether one has been chosen by the members of that community to speak for them, whether one is in a position of recognized authority to speak for the members of that community, whether one has special expertise regarding (or familiarity with) the interests and concerns of that community, and other factors or conditions as described above. 

      The mere fact that one shares the interests and concerns of a community of which one is not a member does not give one the moral authority to speak for that community. One may have the moral authority to speak for a community of which one is or is not a member if one has been recognized by that community as a spokesperson or if one has been elected by that community to speak for (advocate for, or represent) their interests and concerns. However, the community for which one has been given the moral authority to speak still has the right to withdraw their consent for, or approval of, one's continuing to act as their representative or spokesperson.

      If one has chosen or elected oneself to be a spokesperson for a particular community, then the legitimacy of one's speaking for that community depends, in part, on whether one's speaking for its members actually promotes their interests and well-being, as judged by them. One may gain the moral authority to speak for the members of a community if one's speaking for them actually promotes their well-being and is approved by them. However, if one's speaking for them does not promote, or is detrimental to, their interests and well-being, and one is not accepted by them as a spokesperson, then one has no moral right to say that one is speaking for them.

      

The Art of Recitation

In what sense is recitation an art? Recitation is an art in the sense that it may be judged according to aesthetic criteria, such as beauty, sublimity, originality, imagination, spontaneity, eloquence, expressiveness, etc. It's also an art in the sense that it involves the practice of a craft, discipline, or skill that is artistic, as well as technical, in nature.

      Is it possible for the recitation of a text to be creative and flexible in its approach to the text, and yet remain faithful to all linguistic aspects of that text? Indeed, every act of recitation may, to some extent, involve an element of creative interpretation on the part of the performer. Faithfulness to the creativity of the text may require the recitation of the text to reflect that creativity.

      Can recitation of a text give the text new or added meaning? Oral recitation sometimes seems to bring new life to a written text, to reanimate it and make it more vital, and to bring it from the past into the present. Sometimes by hearing a text recited, we may hear that text in some way reinterpreted by the reader doing the recitation, and thus we may see how the reader's own experience of the text (as shaped by her experiences of other texts) may influence her interpretation. We may be exposed to new ways of reading, listening to, and interpreting that text, and we ourselves may subsequently read, listen to, and interpret that text differently.

      Other important questions regarding the nature and meaning of recitation include: Does the oral recitation of a written text somehow change the ontological status of that text? For example, does the recitation of a poem somehow change it from a written to an oral art form? (What about spoken word poetry? Is it an oral or written art form, or both?) Is a written text changed in its being when it is read aloud? To what extent does the ontological status of a particular text depend on the means by which that text is transmitted?

      Does the recitation of a sacred text change the ontological status of that text? Does the act of recitation change the ontological status of the truths that the text is purported to express? Or should the converse question be asked: is the ontological status of the truths that a sacred text is purported to express changed by the act of writing down or transcribing that text? For believers in God, the question is thus, "Is the spoken Word of God the same as the written Word of God?"

      The recitation of a text often seems to make us more open to listening and being more receptive to that text. The text may become a listening as well as reading experience in which we actively participate. In some cases (as, for example, with highly abstract or technical written texts), we may find it more difficult to be good listeners than to be good readers, while in other cases (as, for example, with some auditory texts, such as unidentifiable noises or environmental sounds) we may find it more difficult to be good "readers" than to be good listeners.

     The recitation of a written text by its author may enable the listener to have a new and fuller experience of the author (as a person, speaker, or writer). The listener may gain insight into the author's verbal and thematic strategies in the text by listening to the author's recitation of the text.

      How much of ordinary language consists of the recitation of thoughts by a given speaker or writer? If a given speaker or writer simply "says what's on her mind" and unburdens herself of whatever has been occupying her attention, isn't she, in a sense, merely reciting her thoughts and voicing her feelings? Perhaps, to express one's thoughts verbally is in some way to recite them to the listener or reader.

      Recitation may be performed with varying degrees of proficiency. Technical aspects of recitation (which may depend on the vocal qualities of the performer, her proficiency in reading aloud, her literacy, her understanding of the text, and her communicative competence) may therefore affect the listener's experience of the recited text. Relevant vocal qualities of the performer may include the pitch, volume, resonance, and range of her voice, and the tempo, intonation, articulation, phrasing, and dynamics of her delivery, all of which may affect the listener's attentiveness to, and participation in, the recitation. Nonvocal qualities of the performer such as her facial expressions, posture, and gestures may also affect the listener's experience of the recitation.

      Some texts may be easier to recite than others. Some may be more interesting, resonant, meaningful, and easier to listen to than others.

      Criteria for a praiseworthy recitation of a text may include the accuracy, fluency, and effectiveness of the recitation, as determined by its faithfulness to the words of the text, its precision, its resonance, its spontaneity, its expressive poignancy, and its dramatic power.

      The importance of oral recitation (and of oral versus written narrative) may vary according to the particular aesthetic, religious, or sociocultural tradition in which it occurs. Thus, varying degrees of emphasis may also be placed on the ability to properly recite a text, depending on the aesthetic, religious, or sociocultural setting.

      Modes of recitation include speaking (reading aloud), singing, recitative (or speech-like singing), and chanting. Each of these modes may vary in the degree to which they are rote (mechanical) or improvised.

      Recitation is a kind of performance, and thus we are also confronted by the question of whether the interpretation of a spoken or written text involves a kind of performance on the part of the listener or reader. Just as the reading of a text may be performed silently or aloud, the interpretation of a text may be performed silently or aloud.

      Some machines (such as computers and telephones) may be able to read written text (including text messages) aloud, and thus their repetitive recitation of a particular text may have a uniformity that's not possible with human recitation. Unless the recitation of a particular text by a computer or mobile device is programmed to vary in some way with each recitation, each recitation may be exactly the same as those preceding it. Repetitive human recitation of a particular text, on the other hand, will inevitably exhibit some variation (even if only slight) from one recitation to another.