Nicolai Hartmann’s Outlines of a Metaphysics of Knowledge (Grundzüge
einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, 1921) is perhaps his most important work in the field of epistemology. It was published early in his career, when he was teaching at the
University of Marburg (where he was a professor from 1922-1925), and it
describes the relation between epistemology and ontology. It has not, as of
2013, been published in English.
In the Metaphysics, Hartmann describes four different sides to the problem
of knowledge: (1) the psychological, (2) the logical, (3) the ontological, and (4)
the gnoseological. The first two sides constitute the non-metaphysical side of
the problem of knowledge, while the last two constitute the metaphysical side
of the problem of knowledge. The first three constitute the “wider problem of
knowledge,” while the last one constitutes the “narrower problem of knowledge.”
The metaphysical side of knowledge
is also metapsychological and metalogical in orientation, and thus it is
closely connected to the non-metaphysical side of knowledge.1
The psychological side of knowledge
is represented by the fact that knowledge may be described as a psychological process
or event. A knowing subject, just as much as a known object, is essential to
any act of knowledge. But just as psychology adheres to the side of the
subject, so does logic adhere to the side of the object.2 Just as
psychology is concerned with a psychological event or process in the subject,
so is logic concerned with the logical contents or structure of the object.
Thus, the logical side of knowledge is represented by the fact that
knowledge has an objective and not merely subjective character.3
Psychologism may be
described as a tendency to see all knowledge as dependent on, or explicable in
terms of, psychological events or processes, while logicism may be described as
a tendency to see all knowledge as dependent on, or explicable in terms of,
logical relations. Hartmann argues that both psychologism and logicism, because
of their inability to address important ontological and gnoseological
questions, may lead to misunderstanding of the problem of knowledge.
According to Hartmann, the problem
of knowledge is inseparable from the phenomenon of knowledge, and thus the
aporetics of knowledge can only be fully illuminated by investigation of the
phenomenology of knowledge. The analysis of the problem of knowledge goes hand in hand with the analysis of the phenomenon of
knowledge. Since the “narrower problem of
knowledge” is also inseparable from the problem of being, epistemology may be
inseparable from both phenomenology and ontology.
The phenomenology of knowledge may
define the relation between the knower and the known, and between the subject and
object of knowledge. In the relation of knowledge (Erkenntnisrelation), as long as the object is independent of the
subject and of the subject’s knowing, the object may be said to have a being-in-itself (Ansichsein).4 The object is inseparable from the subject only insofar
as it is known or knowable. As long as it has a being-in-itself, the object is
indifferent toward its objectification or objectifiability.5
Similarly, the subject in the
relation of knowledge has a being-in-itself and does not simply merge into being
a subject for an object. The subject’s being-in-itself is initially only a
gnoseological one, but it becomes a psychological, logical, and ontological one as
well.6
The form of the object in the
consciousness of the subject is determined by the subject’s grasping (or
knowing) of the object. The determinations of the object that lie within the
consciousness of the subject are those that are graspable or knowable by the
subject. Those that lie outside the (floating) boundary of objectification or
knowledge constitute the “transobjective,” and those that lie outside the boundary
of objectifiability or knowability constitute the “irrational” or
“transintelligible.”7
The “transsubjective” is analogous
to the “transobjective” in the relation of knowledge. Just as the object of
knowledge never merges into being merely an object for a subject and always has
a being-in-itself, so also does the subject always in some way subsist
independently as that which is in-itself.
The aporetics of knowedge arise from
the “general aporia of knowledge,” from which in turn arise six other aporias: (1)
the aporia of perception and givenness, (2) the aporia of a priori knowledge, (3) the aporia of the criterion of knowledge,
(4) the aporia of the problem of consciousness, (5) the aporia of the progress
of knowledge, and (6) the aporia of being (the ontological aporia behind the
gnoseological aporia).
The general aporia of knowledge arises
from the dynamic and changing opposition of subject and object. This opposition is reflected
by such questions as: What kind of relation can exist between the subject and
object, if they transcend each other by subsisting independently outside of
their relation? From what source comes to the originally separated subject and
object the unity that is posited in their relation as knower and known? How is
such a relation possible? Does the phenomenon of knowledge emerge from the
transcendence of subject and object, or does the transcendence of subject and
object emerge from the phenomenon of knowledge?8
The aporia of perception and
givenness is reflected by such questions as: If an object must somehow be given
to a perceiving subject in order for its properties to be known by the subject,
then how can it be given to the subject if it transcends the subject and the
relation of knowledge? —Either its givenness must be merely appearance or its
transcendence must be merely appearance.9
The aporia of a priori knowledge is reflected by such questions as: How can it be
that for aprioristic knowledge only logical-immanent and ideal forms of essence
are given to knowing consciousness, and that these forms of essence are
indifferent to the real essence of the actual? How can that which is grasped as ideal essence be
indifferent to the real essence that transcends it? This indifference,
according to Hartmann, is the focal point of the problem of transcendent apriority.10 Immanent apriority, or aprioristic knowledge of ideal objects, depends on the intersubjective identity of categories of knowledge and categories of being, but transcendent apriority, or aprioristic knowledge of real objects, depends on the transcendent identity of categories of knowledge and categories of being.11
The aporia of the criterion of knowledge is reflected by such questions as: How can the perceiving subject know whether the immanent form of the object in consciousness corresponds to the transcendent object? If the subject can only determine whether the immanent form of the object corresponds to other immanent forms and cannot determine whether the immanent form corresponds to the transcendent object, then there may be no valid criterion of knowledge.
The aporia of the criterion of knowledge is reflected by such questions as: How can the perceiving subject know whether the immanent form of the object in consciousness corresponds to the transcendent object? If the subject can only determine whether the immanent form of the object corresponds to other immanent forms and cannot determine whether the immanent form corresponds to the transcendent object, then there may be no valid criterion of knowledge.
The aporia of the problem of
consciousness is expressed by such questions as: How is knowledge possible of
that which is unknown? How can objectification of the “transobjective” occur, without the latter as such being abolished?12
The aporia of the progress of knowledge
is reflected by such questions as: From knowledge that something is unknown,
how can positive knowledge of that thing be attained? From inadequate knowledge of an object, how can we arrive at
adequate knowledge of that object?
The aporia of being is expressed by
such questions as: What is the ontological relation behind the gnoseological
relation of knower and known? What is “that which is” (Seinde), insofar as it is independent
of all knowability? What is the positive meaning of the “transintelligible”?
Hartmann distinguishes between the
“transintelligible” and the “mystical” by saying that the "mystical" can be an
object of revelation, intuition, and ecstatic apprehension.13
The "mystical" is therefore knowable, even though it may not be completely understood.
The “transintelligible,” on the other hand, is incapable of being objectified, and is unknowable.
1Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co.,
1921), p. 11.
2Ibid.,
p. 19.
3Ibid.,
p. 19.
4Ibid.,
pp. 39-40.
5Ibid.,
p. 40.
6Ibid.,
p. 41.
7Ibid.,
p. 47.
8Ibid., p.
49.
9Ibid.,
p. 51.
10Ibid., pp. 52-53.
10Ibid., pp. 52-53.
11Ibid.,
p. 286.
12Ibid.,
p. 53.
13Ibid.,
p. 57.
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