Are there some actions that transcend morality? Are there some actions about which it is useless to say that they should have been performed in this way or that way, or that they should have come about in this way or that way?
Are there some things that we have to accept, and that have nothing to do with morality? Is there a realm of facts to which morality does not apply? Are there some things that have no moral meaning, unless we project it onto them?
Why must we feel compelled to project some moral meaning onto everything and to insist that there is a moral purpose to everything? Perhaps some things have a purpose that transcends morality.
Surely, there can be non-moral objects and properties, just as there can be moral objects and properties. Surely, actions can be motivated by non-moral purposes and intentions, just as they can be motivated by moral purposes and intentions.
Must every action have a moral meaning? Why can’t there be morally neutral actions? If actions may in some cases be morally neutral, then their moral neutrality may depend on the context in which they occur. Actions that are morally neutral in one context may be morally right or wrong in another context.
Does every object or property require a moral explanation or interpretation? Why can’t there be supra-moral objects or properties that are neither moral nor non-moral and that transcend moral explanation and interpretation?
Why should moral properties necessarily have to be associated with, or supervene on, non-moral properties? Perhaps we should examine the arguments for and against a soft or moderate projectivism, according to which some properties are actually moral, while others are merely projected as moral. This kind of projectivism would also amount to a soft or moderate realism, according to which some moral properties exist independently of our perceptions of them, while others do not.
Subjective morality may try to make moral properties of non-moral properties (and moral objects of non-moral objects), while objective morality may try to avoid making moral properties of non-moral properties (and moral objects of non-moral objects).
Moral objects may be objects of a moral world, while non-moral objects may be objects of a non-moral world. Could it be possible that there are parallel or coexisting worlds, a non-moral world and a moral world, which are independent of each other?
A compound object (an object that includes more than one object) may include moral and non-moral parts. The non-moral parts of a compound object may not contribute to its overall moral value or may enhance its moral value by enhancing the value of its moral parts.
What does it mean to say that a situation is beyond right and wrong? Perhaps it is, in some cases, to say that punishing an individual for having acted wrongly is not always the best way to persuade that individual to accept responsibility for his actions. Perhaps it is also, in some cases, to say that enacting retributive penalties against an individual for his having wronged others is not always the best way to help the victims of his wrongdoing to recover from the wrongs that he has done to them.
What should we do when we find conventional moral norms to be insufficient to guide our actions? What should we do when we find a particular code of ethics or system of morality to be mistaken, misplaced, or unfounded? What exactly should a reevaluation of ethical or moral values in such cases entail? Is there perhaps a post-moral mode of thinking and acting or a way of looking beyond morality that we should adopt?