Philippa Foot rejected Kant’s notion that morality consists of a single categorical imperative by arguing that morality may instead consist of a system of hypothetical imperatives (Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, University of California Press, 1978, pp. 157-173). But one problem with Foot’s argument is that morality may consist of not only imperatives (commands or requirements) but also permissions, prescriptions, admonitions, and prohibitions. These various categories of deontic modality describe the moral possibility or necessity (permissibility or obligatoriness) of a given action. A given action may be permissible but not obligatory, or both permissible and obligatory, or neither permissible nor obligatory. A more nuanced conception of morality than that of either Kant or Foot must therefore be sought.
What is post-analytic philosophy?
What does the fact that there are dictionaries of philosophy say about philosophy?
Do what extent do we write ourselves into being? Can we each have a written as well as spoken identity? What happens to our concepts of ourselves when we cannot write? To write ourselves into being may also be to write ourselves into history. We may construct ourselves by writing about ourselves, and our histories may be written as well as unwritten (spoken or acted out).
Kinds of power include political, military, economic, social, legal, legislative, judiciary, executive, electoral, penal, disciplinary, coercive, rhetorical, persuasive, and dramatic power.
Is an opinion about things as important to philosophy as it is to social criticism? Do opinionated people make the best philosophers?
Politics may teach us that “seeing” (injustice, inequity, social dysfunction, or our own economic insecurity) is somehow “believing” (in a particular political party, candidate, regime, or system of power). But religion may teach us that “believing” (in a supernatural being or divine power) is somehow “seeing” (ultimate reality).
“dis/advantage” may symbolize the fine line between advantage and disadvantage, just as “dis/appearing,” “dis/approving,” and “dis/arranging” may symbolize the fine line between appearing and disappearing, approving and disapproving, and arranging and disarranging.
Irruption/eruption/interruption/disruption/ abruption may signify a breach, a rupture, an outburst, even an act of violence, but also an emergence, a bringing forth, a beginning and simultaneous ending.
Whenever I visit the Eisenhower Library at Johns Hopkins, I go directly to the philosophy section on level B (two levels below the ground floor). My mission is usually to find an interesting book to read or to find some book that I’ve already read about and found in the library catalogue. The philosophy section consists of about a dozen double rows of metal shelves filled with books from floor to ceiling. There are two rows of desks separating the philosophy section from the religion section. Each desk is enclosed by a wooden partition, with a sign above it saying THIS IS AN ASSIGNED WORKSTATION. IF YOU ARE NOT ASSIGNED TO THIS WORKSTATION, PLEASE USE ONE THAT IS NOT ASSIGNED. But there are no unassigned work stations, so in order to sit down, I have to break the rules. I have to become a kind of trespasser. But of course all the desks are usually empty, unless there’s an examination period scheduled for semester courses and students are studying at the library. Most of the time, I can choose whatever desk I want. The padded chair in front of each desk is so dusty, however, that regardless of which one I choose, I have to slap the seat several times and wait for the dust to clear before I can sit down. Then I’m able to ask myself, “”In what way, and for whom, is my engagement in philosophy an act of trespass? On whose terrain am I trespassing? Does engaged philosophy necessarily entail a kind of trespass? Must we all be trespassers in one way or another in order to engage in philosophy?”