Susan Haack's Evidence and Inquiry

Susan Haack is a British philosopher who was born in 1945 in Burnham, England. (She is a citizen of the United Kingdom, but has been a permanent U.S. resident since 1990). She studied at the University of Oxford and the University of Cambridge, earning her PhD in philosophy at Cambridge in 1972, with a dissertation that later became her first book, Deviant Logic. She served as Fellow of New Hall, Cambridge, and later as Professor of Philosophy at the University of Warwick. Since 1990, she has been a professor of philosophy at the University of Miami, where she is currently Distinguished Professor in the Humanities, Cooper Senior Scholar in Arts and Sciences, Professor of Philosophy, and Professor of Law. 

      She has written on many subjects, including philosophy of logic, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, philosophical and legal pragmatism, feminism, and social philosophy.

      Her many books have included Deviant Logic (1974), Philosophy of Logics (1978), Evidence and Inquiry (1993), Defending Science--Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism (2003), Pragmatism, Old and New (2006), Putting Philosophy to Work: Inquiry and its Place in Culture (2008), and Evidence Matters: Science, Proof and Truth in the Law (2014).

      In Evidence and Inquiry (1993), she offers a theory of epistemic justification that is neither foundationalist nor coherentist, but "foundherentist." She seeks to transcend what she calls the false dichotomies of foundationalism vs. coherentism, externalism vs, internalism, evidentialism vs. reliabilism, and apriorism vs. scientism.¹ She also aims to show that satisfaction of foundherentist criteria is an indication of the truth of beliefs.² She uses the analogy of a crossword puzzle to describe the true structure of relations of evidential support, and to indicate that beliefs can mutually support one another without being logically circular.³ Below is a brief outline of the first chapter.

      Haack describes foundationalism as the theory that (1) some justified beliefs are basic (justified independently of the support of other beliefs), and (2) all other justified beliefs are derived (justified via the direct or indirect support of basic beliefs).⁴ Coherentism is the theory that a belief is justified if and only if it belongs to a coherent set of beliefs.⁵ Foundationalism is a one-directional model of justification (basic beliefs are required to support derived beliefs, and never vice versa), while coherentism is not. Coherentism holds that justification is exclusively a matter of relations, while foundationalism does not.⁶

      Varieties of foundationalism include experientialist (or empirical) foundationalism, which holds that basic beliefs are justified, not by being supported by other beliefs, but by being supported by experience. The extrinsic version of empirical foundationalism holds that basic beliefs are justified by being causally connected to the state of affairs that makes them true, while the intrinsic version holds that basic beliefs are justified by their intrinsic nature and content.⁷

      Strong foundationalism, which holds that basic beliefs are decisively, conclusively, or completely justified, independently of the support of other beliefs, may be distinguished from weak foundationalism, which holds that basic beliefs are only prima facie, defeasibly, or to some degree justified, independently of the support of other beliefs.⁸

      Pure foundationalism, which holds that derived beliefs are justified wholly via the support of basic beliefs, may also be distinguished from impure foundationalism, which holds that derived beliefs are justified at least in part via the support of basic beliefs.⁹

      Haack notes that contextualism (which she describes as the theory that justification is a matter of conformity to the standards of an epistemic community) may be a third alternative theory of epistemic justification. Contextualism, like foundationalism, may posit certain basic beliefs by which all other justified beliefs are supported, but rather than seeing those beliefs as being supported in some other way than via the support of other beliefs, it may see them as not standing in need of justification at all for the epistemic community in question.¹⁰ A weakness of contextualism, however, is that it may lead to the impression that epistemic standards are merely conventional rather than objective, which may undermine the legitimacy of the project of ratifying certain beliefs as justified.¹¹

      Haack describes and evaluates some of the arguments for and against foundationalism and coherentism. According to the infinite regress argument for foundationalism, a belief can't be justified if it requires support via other beliefs, which then require support via other beliefs, which then require support via other beliefs, in an infinite regression. Some beliefs must be justified, independently of the support of other beliefs. But she contends that this argument makes the false assumption that the reasons for a belief must constitute a chain, rather than a pyramid or some other supporting structure.

      Another argument against extrinsic foundationalism is the evidentialist objection, that this theory of justification seems to claim that a basic belief is justified if there's an appropriate connection between a belief-state and a state of affairs that makes it true, even when the subject has no other evidence for the belief or has evidence against it.¹²

      An argument against coherentism is the too much to ask objection, that consistency is assumed to be a necessary condition of coherence, and that a subject who has inconsistent beliefs can't therefore be justified in any of their beliefs (which makes consistency seem like too demanding a requirement).¹³

      Another argument against coherentism, however, is the consistent fairy story objection, which says, not that consistency is too strong a requirement for epistemic justification, but that it's too weak.¹⁴

      Still another argument against coherentism is what Haack calls the drunken sailors argument, which takes its name from an observation by C.I. Lewis that the coherentist claim that empirical beliefs can be justified by nothing other than relations of mutual support is like suggesting that two drunken sailors can support each other by leaning against each other, even when they have nothing to stand on.¹⁵ According to the drunken sailors argument, justification can't depend solely on relations between beliefs, and unless there's some role for empirical testing of our beliefs, we can't have any guarantee that our beliefs are justified.

      Haack describes foundherentism as the theory that (1) "a subject's experience is relevant to the justification of their beliefs, but there need be no privileged class of beliefs justified exclusively by the support of experience, independently of the support of other beliefs," and (2) "justification is not exclusively one-directional, but involves pervasive relations of mutual support."¹³ Since beliefs are seen to be justified partly by experience and partly by other beliefs, justification is gradational rather than categorical.¹⁶ Foundherentism may therefore be a middle ground between foundationalism and coherentism.

      Haack explains that foundherentism survives the decisive argument against coherentism, the drunken sailors argument. It also survives the evidentialist objection to extrinsic foundationalism, and "its superiority to even weak and impure forms of experientialist foundationalism is exhibited by its ability, and their inability, to accommodate the up and back all the way down arguments" for abandoning the one-directionality of justification. So foundherentism survives the strongest arguments against both foundationalism and coherentism.¹⁷

FOOTNOTES

¹Susan Haack, "Not One of the Boys: Memoir of an Academic Misfit," Against Professional Philosophy, August 3, 2020, online at https://againstprofphil.org/2020/08/03/susan-haacks-not-one-of-the-boys-memoir-of-an-academic-misfit/.

²Haack, Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 7.

³Ibid., p. 2.

⁴Ibid., p. 14.

⁵Ibid., p. 17.

⁶Ibid., p. 19.

⁷Ibid., p. 15.

⁸Ibid., p. 16.

⁹Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 20.

¹¹Ibid., p. 20.

¹²Ibid., p. 28.

¹³Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 19.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 33.

Baltimore 10 Miler, 2023

The Baltimore 10 Miler was held June 3rd, 2023. The start and finish were at Druid Hill Park, near the Maryland Zoo in Baltimore. The weather was perfect, 68 degrees at 7 am. But the temperature quickly climbed to 75 degrees by 9 am. Fortunately, there were plenty of water stations along the course, and the sun was behind us during the second half of the race, since we were running west back toward the park.

      The course was the same as in previous years, with the exception that, since there was a construction project at Lake Montebello, runners went halfway around the lake before making a U-turn and coming back along the bike lane to the entrance of the lake (and then back down 33rd Street). 

      I've been battling various leg injuries over the last two years, so I wasn't sure whether I'd be able to run. I even thought of calling it quits as I was trying to get warmed up at 4 or 5 am that morning. Leg stiffness has become a real problem as I get older, leading to greater susceptibility to muscle strains and other injuries.

      This year's overall winners were Jeremy Ardanuy, in the men's division, who had a time of 54:05, and Meaghan Murray, in the women's division, who had a time of 1:02. Jeremy Ardanuy was also the men's winner in 2019 and 2021. Meaghan Murray was the second place finisher in 2022, and third place finisher in 2021.

      I finished with a time of 1:52, 8th out of 19 men in my age group (1476th out of 2285 runners overall). Two of the eleven women in my age group had faster times. (The first place women's finisher had a time of 1:42, and she finished faster than all but three of the nineteen men. The first place men's finisher in my age group had a time of 1:27.) I was very happy with my time!

Baseball Card Aesthetics

Are baseball cards works of art? Are they aesthetic objects or are they merely pieces of cardboard with images of baseball players on them, supporting a hobby that is shared by kids and adults alike, who enjoy trading, sharing, buying, and selling them? What makes (or would make) an object such as a baseball card a work of art? How is the experience of looking at a baseball card (or holding it in your hand) changed when you view it as a work of art?

      Baseball cards may have many aesthetic qualities (such as beauty, symmetry, evenness of layout or configuration, vibrancy or clarity of color, captivating imagery or photography, emotional appeal, and evocative portrayals of grace, prowess, and power), and they may be designed according to aesthetic conventions (e.g. a baseball card company may have a different design for its cards each year). Baseball cards may elicit an aesthetic response in the viewer, and the viewer may adopt an aesthetic attitude toward them.

      Clean edges, sharp corners, unflawed surfaces, centering of the image, and excellent condition are all aesthetically appealing qualities of baseball cards.

      Sports cards can be graded by such companies as Professional Sports Authenticator (PSA), Sportscard Guaranty Corporation (SGC), Beckett Grading Service (BGC), and Certified Sports Guaranty (CSG). Cards are graded from 1-10, based on such factors as centering of the image, sharpness of the corners and edges, cleanness of the surface, and overall condition. Graded cards are encased in slabs (rigid plastic containers that protect them). The grade assigned to a card is based on both objective factors (such as centering, sharpness of focus of the image, sharpness of the corners and edges, and absence of such defects as faded colors, worn or rounded corners, surface wrinkles or creases, pen or pencil marks, stains, and general wear) and subjective factors (such as overall eye appeal).

      Valuable sports cards may sell for millions of dollars (e.g. a 1909 T206 Honus Wagner card sold for $7.25 million in 2022, and a 1952 Topps Mickey Mantle card sold for $12.6 million in 2022), so their monetary value may be comparable to that of prized artworks.

      Some of the most valuable baseball cards in history have included the 1909 T206 Honus Wagner, the 1952 Topps Mickey Mantle, the 1914 Baltimore News Babe Ruth (which sold for $6 million in 2021), the 1933 Goudey #53 Babe Ruth (which sold for $4.2 million in 2021), and a unique 2009 Bowman Chrome Mike Trout Superfractors rookie card (which sold for $3.8 million in 2020).

1960 Topps Willie Mays All-Star Card.

      Baseball card collections may be found in museums of fine art. The Metropolitan Museum of Art in NYC has a collection of more than 30,000 baseball cards that were donated to the museum by Jefferson R. Burdick (1900-1963), an American electrician who collected baseball cards, trading cards, postcards, posters, and other printed ephemera. The collection includes cards dating from the 1860's to 1963, among them many 1888 Old Judge Cigarettes cards, including one of Buck Ewing, many 1909-1911 T206 cards, including one of Honus Wagner, many 1933 Goudey cards, including cards of Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig, many 1948 Leaf cards, including cards of Babe Ruth, Honus Wagner, Joe DiMaggio, Stan Musial, Warren Spahn, and Phil Rizzuto, and many 1950 Bowman cards, including cards of Jackie Robinson, Yogi Berra, and Ted Williams.

2002 Fleer Tradition #4 Brad Radke

2001 Topps #665 Nomar Garciaparra

      Baseball cards have design features that may be aesthetically appealing and distinctive. If they are particularly attractive or distinctive, then they may elicit the same kind of response in the viewer that a work of fine art may elicit. Although a baseball card may not be unique in the sense that a painting or sculpture may be unique (since there may be hundreds or thousands of copies of a single baseball card in circulation among buyers, sellers, and collectors), baseball cards may be considered as examples of mass art (they are mass-produced and mass-distributed). Does that make them kitsch (tacky, lowbrow, trivial, banal, or lacking in aesthetic value)? Not at all! They are certainly not lacking in aesthetic or monetary value for collectors and investors who may pay thousands of dollars for them and may seek the most perfect, highest graded, and most pristine cards they can find!

      On the other hand, maybe baseball cards are a little bit kitsch! They may often be found at flea markets, sidewalk sales, antique shops, and shopping malls. They may be handed down as family heirlooms or serendipitously discovered among other forgotten items in closets and attics.

      Although baseball cards are mass-produced and mass-distributed, there are an increasing number of one-of-a-kind cards. Major League Baseball (MLB) has partnered with Fanatics Collectibles, with the Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA), and with The Topps Company to create one-of-a-kind cards for rookies making their debuts. (Fanatics acquired the rights to make trading cards for MLB in 2021, ending MLB's 70-year partnership with Topps. Topps began producing baseball cards in 1951, and since 2010 has had an exclusive deal with MLB that will end in 2025. Fanatics also acquired Topps in 2022.)

      There is a fascinating variety of types and designs of baseball cards, from the 1909-1911 T206 tobacco cards (Piedmont, Sweet Caporal, American Beauty), to the 1915 Cracker Jack cards, to the 1922 American Caramel cards, to the 1933 Goudey gum cards, to the 1934 Gold Medal Flour cards, to the 1936 Wheaties cards, to the 1952 Topps gum cards, and so on. Indeed, there may be thousands of different types and designs of baseball cards.

      If baseball cards are artworks, then what's the difference between them and memorabilia? Vintage cards may be valuable not only for their aesthetic qualities, but also for their historical interest (when they are rare or are memorable because they belong to highly admired sets or represent highly admired players). Thus, they may be considered as both artworks and memorabilia.

      Other items of baseball memorabilia include autographed baseballs, autographed bats and jerseys, autographed batting helmets, and autographed photos.

      Autographs may have their own aesthetics. Ideally, they should be legible and clear, not smudged or blurry, and they should be written over a lighter part of the background so that they are easily distinguishable. Also, they shouldn't cover up a significant portion of the card or obscure the player's face or upper body. They should be written in blue or black ink (blue sharpie is usually the preferred autograph pen) so that they align with or contrast nicely with the other colors in the background.

Autographed 1988 Donruss Eddie Murray, PSA certified.

      I'm a relatively new baseball card collector. I collected cards when I was seven or eight years old, using my allowance to buy Topps baseball cards at the local five and dime store, when I was growing up in the Hyde Park neighborhood of Chicago, but my cards got lost, and I didn't start collecting again until early 2020 (at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic), when I was living in Baltimore. Since then, I've been collecting mostly vintage cards, signed photo postcards, and autographed photos, although I'm not sure exactly how many I've accumulated.

      Below is one of my favorite cards. It's an example of why I think baseball cards may be considered works of art.

Autographed Brace photo postcard of Joe DiMaggio, PSA certified.

      Joe DiMaggio was a Hall of Fame center fielder who played for the New York Yankees. He played thirteen seasons, from 1936-1951 (he served in the U.S. Army Air Forces from 1943-1945). He had a .325 career batting average, 2214 hits, and 361 home runs. He was a thirteen-time All Star, nine-time World Series champion, three-time American League MVP, two-time American League batting champion, and he still holds the record for baseball's longest hitting streak (56 straight games in 1941). His brothers Vince and Dom were also major league center fielders.

      George Brace (1913-2002) worked as an assistant to the photographer George Burke (1874-1951). They were the official photographers for the Chicago Cubs, the Chicago White Sox, and the National Football League's Chicago Bears from 1929 to 1951. After Burke's death in 1951, Brace continued working as a photographer until he retired in 1994. He was a superb craftsman, and he photographed almost every major league player from 1929 to 1994 (over 250,000 images), including over 200 Hall of Fame players.

      This particular autographed Brace photo of Joe DiMaggio is remarkable for its composition, and for what it reveals about the grace, ease, and power of DiMaggio's swing. It's remarkably beautiful and breathtaking.

      So my answer to the question of whether baseball cards are works of art is that yes, they can be very original, imaginative, attractive, appealing, valuable, and in some cases very rare or unique works of art.

Becoming Beloved Community

The following is a reflection I shared with my fellow parishioners at the "Faith at Eight" service at church, on Sunday, January 17, 2021.

The gospel readings from this week and last week describe the beginning of Jesus's ministry. The reading last week from Mark (1:4-11) describes the baptism of Jesus, and the reading this week from John (1:43-51) describes Jesus's calling his disciples to follow him.

      So what exactly was the purpose of Jesus's ministry? What was his mission? Why did he come to us? Why did he offer himself as a sacrifice for us?

      Each of us may have our own answers to these questions. Some possible answers include:

      (1) Jesus came to fulfill the law. In Matthew 5:17, Jesus says, "Think not that I have come to abolish the law and the prophets; I have come not to abolish them but to fulfill them."

      (2) Jesus came to do God's will. In John 6:38-40, Jesus says, "For I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him who sent me...For my Father's will is that everyone who looks at the Son and believes in him shall have eternal life, and I will raise them up at the last day."

      (3) Jesus came to bring light into the world. In John 12:46, Jesus says "I have come as light into the world, that whoever believes in me may not remain in darkness."

      (4) Jesus came to sacrifice himself for us, so that we might be saved from sin. John 3:17 says, "For God sent the Son into the world, not to condemn the world, but that the world might be saved through him."

      There are of course many other possible answers to the question of what was the nature or purpose of Jesus's ministry. But what is the nature or purpose of our own ministry as followers of Jesus? What is our mission? We each have our own mission or purpose, our reason for being in the world. We each have a purpose to fulfill, individually as well as collectively. What then is that purpose or mission? Perhaps our purpose is to make the world a better place? Perhaps our purpose is to love and care for one another? Perhaps our purpose is simply to be the best people we can be, and thus to glorify God?

      I'd like to explore these questions in the context of the life and ministry of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., since we're celebrating his birthday tomorrow. What did Dr. King see as his lifelong mission or purpose? What did he mean when he talked about the redemptive power of love and the creation of a beloved community?

      I learned a few things about Dr. King yesterday when I was reading about his life and career as a minister and civil rights leader. He was born January 15, 1929, in Atlanta, and he died April 4, 1968 in Memphis. He was born Michael King Jr., the second of three children, to the Rev. Michael King Sr. and Alberta King. In 1934, the Rev. King Sr. traveled to the Middle East and Berlin, Germany for a meeting of the World Baptist Alliance, and when he returned, he began referring to himself as Martin Luther King Sr., and to his son as Martin Luther King Jr. The Rev. King Sr. later explained that the reason he changed his name was because he had an uncle named Martin and an uncle named Luther, but it's said to be likely that his visit to Germany had an impact on him, and that he was moved by having visited the country that was the birthplace of Lutheranism and Protestantism.¹ 

      MLK Jr.'s birth certificate was later changed to read "Martin Luther King Jr." in 1957, when he was 28 years old.¹ 

      His maternal grandfather, Adam Daniel Williams, served as pastor of Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, but after his death, Rev. King Sr., became pastor of Ebenezer Baptist Church. 

      MLK Jr. studied at Morehouse College, at Crozer Theological Seminary in Upland, Pennsylvania, and then at Boston University, where he earned a PhD in theology in 1955. He became pastor of Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama in 1954, and he became co-pastor with his father of Ebenezer Baptist Church in 1959. 

      His father died in 1984. His mother, Alberta, was murdered by a 23-year-old man in 1974 at the Ebenezer Baptist Church during Sunday services. The man stood up, and yelled "You are serving a false god," and fatally shot Mrs. King and the Rev. Edward Boykin, who was a deacon at the church. The gunman, Marcus Wayne Chenault, later died in prison of a stroke in 1995.

      In 1967, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. delivered a sermon entitled "The Birth of a New Nation" at Dexter Avenue Baptist Church. In it, he said that the aftermath of violence is emptiness and bitterness, but the aftermath of nonviolence is reconciliation, redemption, and the creation of a beloved community.²

      The phrase "beloved community" came from the American philosopher Josiah Royce (1855-1916), who taught at Harvard University from 1882-1916. Royce wrote on such subjects as metaphysics, ethics, and the philosophy of religion, and he was a friend and colleague of the philosopher William James (1842-1910), who also taught at Harvard.

      While Dr. King was studying at Boston University, he attended philosophy classes at Harvard and became familiar with Royce's philosophy.

      Royce described the beloved community as an ethical ideal, insofar as its realization can be taken as a standard of our moral conduct. Royce said, "Every proposed reform, every moral deed, is to be tested by whether and to what extent it contributes to the realization of the Beloved Community...When one cannot find the beloved community, one needs to take steps to create it, and if there is not evidence of the existence of such a community, then the rule is to act so as to hasten its coming."³

      Dr. King, although he didn't specifically define what a beloved community is, saw the creation of such a community as a goal of the civil rights movement.

      The Episcopal Church has promoted Dr. King's vision of the beloved community, and in a document entitled "Becoming Beloved Community" (published in 2017), which can be found at the episcopalchurch.org website, it describes what such a commitment might mean for us. The document displays an image of a circular labyrinth, with four interrelated commitments listed along the circumference of the labyrinth. At the top left is "Telling the Truth." At the top right is "Proclaiming the Dream." At the bottom right is "Practicing the Way," and at the bottom left is "Repairing the Breach." So a kind of cyclical process is described.

      The first commitment, to tell the truth, leads to such questions as "Who are we?" and "What things have we done and left undone regarding racial justice and healing?" The second commitment, to proclaim the dream, leads to such questions as "How can we publicly acknowledge things done and left undone?", "What does beloved community look like?", and "What actions and commitments will promote reconciliation, justice, and healing?" The third commitment, to practice the way of love, leads to such questions as "How will we grow as reconcilers, healers, and justice-bearers?" and "How will we actively grow in relationship across dividing walls and seek Christ in the other?" And the fourth commitment, to repair the breach, leads to such questions as "What institutions and systems are broken?" and "How will we participate in repair, restoration, and healing of people, institutions, and systems?"⁴

      The document explains that the image of the labyrinth is chosen because there's no single path for each person to follow. People may draw on their own experiences, and they may arrive at different answers for the same questions.⁵

      The document also explains that becoming beloved community represents "not so much a set of programs as a journey and a set of interrelated commitments around which Episcopalians may organize our many efforts to respond to racial injustice and grow as a community of reconcilers, justice-makers, and healers. As the Episcopal branch of the Jesus movement, we dream and work to foster beloved communities where all people may experience dignity and abundant life and see themselves and others as beloved children of God."⁶

      So what are our responsibilities regarding the fulfillment of Dr. King's vision of the beloved community? Is the beloved community merely a utopian ideal? Do we really need such ideal models of justice in order to remedy present injustice?

      What is the utility of "ideal" versus "non-ideal" theories of racial justice?

      Charles W. Mills, professor of philosophy at The Graduate Center, CUNY, has argued that  so-called "ideal theory" concerning justice in a perfectly just society must be replaced by "non-ideal theory" concerning justice in an imperfect and unjust society. Mills provides many persuasive criticisms of ideal theory, including the criticism that it may divert attention from real-world problems and that we don't necessarily need to be able to envision justice in an ideal world in order to be able to correct justice in the real world.⁷

      Tommie Shelby, professor of philosophy at Harvard University, on the other hand, has argued that ideal theory and non-ideal theory may be complementary, and that ideal theory, which studies the principles of justice in a perfectly just society, may provide standards of justice for non-ideal theory, which studies the principles that should guide our responses to injustice in our own society.⁸

      The website of The King Center explains that "For Dr. King, The Beloved Community was not a lofty utopian goal to be confused with the rapturous image of the Peaceable Kingdom, in which lions and lambs coexist in idyllic harmony. Rather, The Beloved Community was for him a realistic, achievable goal that could be attained by a critical mass of people committed to and trained in the philosophy and methods of nonviolence."⁹

      The website also explains that "Dr. King's Beloved Community is a global vision, in which all people can share in the wealth of the earth. In the Beloved Community, poverty, hunger, and homelessness will be not be tolerated because international standards of human decency will not allow it. Racism and all forms of discrimination, bigotry and prejudice will be replaced by an all-inclusive spirit of sisterhood and brotherhood. In the Beloved Community, international disputes will be resolved by peaceful conflict-resolution and reconciliation of adversaries, instead of by military power. Love and trust will triumph over fear and hatred. Peace with justice will prevail over war and military conflict."¹⁰

      So what steps can we as individuals, as a community, and as a society take today and in the coming year to promote the becoming of a beloved community?

FOOTNOTES

¹DeNeen L. Brown, "The story of how Michael King Jr. became Martin Luther King Jr.," The Washington Post, January 15, 2019, online at https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/01/15/story-how-michael-king-jr-became-martin-luther-king-jr/

²Martin Luther King Jr., "The Birth of a New Nation," April 7, 1957, in The Papers of Martin Luther King, Jr., Volume IV, edited by Clayborne Carson, et al., (Berkeley: University of California Press at Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2000), online at https://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/birth-new-nation-sermon-delivered-dexter-avenue-baptist-church

³Josiah Royce, online at Building the Beloved Community: An Interfaith Initiative for Fair Housing, https://www.bbcfairhousing.org/about-the-initiative/

⁴The Episcopal Church, "Becoming Beloved Community," 2017, online at https://www.episcopalchurch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2021/01/becoming_beloved_community_summary.pdf

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Charles W. Mills, "Realizing (Though Racializing) Pogge," in Thomas Pogge and His Critics, edited by Alison M. Jaggar (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2010), p. 102.

⁸Tommie Shelby, "Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills," in Critical Philosophy of Race, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2013, pp. 155-156.

⁹The King Center, "The King Philosophy - Nonviolence 365," online at https://thekingcenter.org/about-tkc/the-king-philosophy/

¹⁰Ibid.

Nicholas Rescher's Inquiry into the Limits of Knowledge

What are the theoretical and practical limits of human knowledge? What are the reasons for our inability to know certain facts about the world? What distinguishes knowable from unknowable facts?

      How can we ever know whether the universe is finite or infinite? How can we ever know whether it had a beginning, and whether it will have an ending? How can we ever know how space, time, matter, and energy originated?

      How can we ever discover historical facts the evidence of which has been permanently lost?

      How can we ever really know what others are thinking and feeling? The thoughts and feelings of others are to some extent unknowable to us, in the sense that we can't think those thoughts exactly as they think them or feel those feelings exactly as they feel them. We can only say, "I know what you're thinking" or "I know what you're feeling" by means of deduction, inference, reasoning, intuition, imagination, or other means. To use a commonly cited example, we can't ever really know whether others experience the color red in the same way that we experience the color red.

      Some facts (for example, the contents of a classified file or document) may be contingently (but not in principle) unknowable, because they're concealed or because public access to them is forbidden. Our personal data, such as our birthdates, computer passwords, social security numbers, etc., may be contingently unknowable to others, because we generally refuse to share such information with everyone. The details of our own bodies may be contingently unknowable to others, because they're hidden by our clothing.

      To say we know about something may not necessarily be to say that we know everything about it. We may have a relatively complete or incomplete knowledge about a certain thing. If we can't ever really know everything about it, then it may to some extent be unknowable to us, at least in its totality (given our limited cognitive resources).

      Many facts may be unknowable yet trivial, and thus we may not really be interested in knowing them. 

      If there are no facts about certain things, i.e. if there is "no fact of the matter" about them, then they may also be unknowable.

      Nicholas Rescher (2009) explains that reasons for our not being able to know certain things include our not being smart enough to figure them out, and the unavailability of further data we would need to know about them. But we may also not be able to know about certain things because they are in principle unknowable, and this in-principle unknowability is what Rescher is concerned with, rather than unknowability due to our contingent cognitive limitations.

      He describes three kinds of necessary or demonstrable unknowability: (1) logical unknowability (which is demonstrable on the basis of the considerations of epistemic logic), (2) conceptual unknowability (which is demonstrable on the basis of the concepts involved), and (3) in-principle unknowability (which is demonstrable on the basis of the basic principles that delineate some field of inquiry or area of concern).¹

      He also explains that some facts are unknowable because they depend on future contingencies. Thus, we can't know, at the present moment, precisely who will be killed in an automobile accident next year or whose life will be saved by the enactment of a certain automobile speed limit.²

      Some facts may also be unknowable because they're unidentifiable. Examples include claims about the existence of such unidentifiable entities as (1) something whose identity will never be known, (2) some idea that has never occurred to anyone, (3) some person whom no one remembers at all, (4) some event that no one has ever mentioned, and (5) some integer that is never individually specified.³

      Clearly, we may know some facts without being consciously aware that we know them. So every known fact may not be immediately identifiable. We may also be able to individuate some unknowable facts without being able to identify them or say precisely what they are. But we can't know facts that can never be specifically instantiated.

      Rescher also notes that if some facts are unknowable, then we can't rightly be held to be culpably ignorant of them.⁴

      What distinguishes answerable from unanswerable questions? Rescher argues that all scientific questions are potentially answerable (if not at present, then in the future). Even such ultimate questions as "Why is there anything rather than nothing?" and "Why are there any natural laws?" are potentially answerable. The presence of scientific questions that haven't yet been answered doesn't necessarily mean those questions can never be answered or will always remain unanswered. 

      Thus, he rejects the existence of insolubilia (inherently unsolvable scientific problems or inherently unanswerable scientific questions), because of the unpredictability of future scientific developments.⁵ He argues that we can't predict with certainty what will be the future limits of scientific knowledge.

      He also describes four main reasons for the unknowability of, or impracticability of cognitive access to, certain facts about the world: (1) developmental unpredictability (the inability to predict with certainty what will happen in the future and what will be discovered by future science), (2) verificational surdity (the inability to explain facts on the basis of general principles or to derive them from the definitions and laws of their natural domain), (3) ontological detail (the inability to know all the facts about certain things, due to their factual limitlessness and inexhaustibility), and (4) predicative vagrancy (the inability to instantiate any predicates about things that are unspecificable).⁶

      He also discusses the formal logic of unknowability, including such topics as the problem of demonstrating the existence of unknowable truths. This problem has been investigated by many philosophers, including Frederic Fitch, W.D. Hart, J.J. MacIntosh, Richard Routley, Timothy Williamson, Rescher, and others.

     Timothy Williamson (2000) refers to an argument by Frederic Fitch (1963) called the Paradox of Unknowability, which says that if something is an unknown (but perhaps knowable) truth, then its being an unknown truth is itself an unknowable truth.⁷ An unknown truth cannot be known to be unknown.

      Williamson describes strong verificationism as the theory that every truth is actually known (at some point in the past, present, or future), and weak verificationism as the theory that every truth is in principle knowable. The former is called the "omniscience principle," while the latter is called the "knowability thesis." Fitch's paradox is an argument against both kinds of verificationism.

      Williamson explains that

"As Joseph Melia (1991) points out, [Fitch's argument] does not show that if there are unanswered questions, then there are unanswerable questions. More precisely, it does not show that if for some proposition p, it is unknown whether p is true, then...it is unknowable whether p is true. In particular, if p is an unknown truth, then it is unknowable that p is an unknown truth, but it does not follow that it is unknowable whether p is an unknown truth. For that it is an unknowable truth that p is an unknown truth does not imply the... impossibility of a situation in which p is false and even known to be false, and thereby known not to be an unknown truth. Equally, ...it...does not imply the...impossibility of a situation in which p is shown to be true, and even known to be known to be true, and thereby known not to be an unknown truth. In situations of both kinds, it is known whether p is an unknown truth."⁸

       Verificationism is anti-realist in the sense that it holds that every truth (or fact) is in principle knowable and thus accessible to human thought, while a realist position would hold that at least some truths (or facts) are actually unknowable and exist independently of human thought.

      Helge Rückert (2004) explains that Fitch's paradox may be derived as follows:

      (1)   α → ♢Kα   (which may be read as, "if there is a truth α, then it's possible for it to be known")

      (2)   ロ(Kα → α)  (necessarily, if a truth α is known, then it's a truth α) 

      (3)   ロ(K(α ⋀ β) → (Kα ⋀ Kβ))  (necessarily, if a truth α and a truth β are known, then α is known and β is known)

      (4)   ￢♢K(α ⋀ ￢Kα)  (it's impossible for an α and an unknown α to be known)

      (5)   (α ⋀ ￢Kα) → ♢K(α ⋀ ￢Kα)  (if there is an α and an unknown α, then it's possible for an α and an unknown α to be known)

      (6)   ￢(α ⋀ ￢Kα)  (there can't be an α and an unknown α)

      (7)   α → Kα  (if there is a truth α, then it's known)

So weak verificationism entails or "collapses into" strong verificationism. The relatively plausible thesis that every truth is in principle knowable collapses into the wholly implausible thesis that every truth is actually known. This is a significant problem for verificationism.⁹

FOOTNOTES

¹Nicholas Rescher, Unknowability: An Inquiry into the Limits of Knowledge (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), p. 3.

²Ibid., p. 3.

³Ibid., p. 65.

⁴Ibid., p. 6.

⁵Ibid., p. 16.

⁶Ibid., p. ix.

⁷Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 270.

⁸Ibid., p. 289.

⁹Helge Rückert, "A Solution to Fitch's Paradox of Knowability," in Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, edited by Shahid Rahman, John Symons. et al. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), pp. 352-353.

OTHER REFERENCES

Frederic Fitch, "A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts," in Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 28 (1963), pp. 135-142.

Joseph Melia, "Anti-Realism Untouched," in Mind, 100 (1991), pp. 341-342.