Birnbacher and Hommen's Account of Negative Causality

Dieter Birnbacher and David Hommen are philosophers at Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf. Birnbacher has written widely on such subjects as ethics, applied ethics, theories of emotions, and the work of Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer. Hommen has also written widely on such subjects as the philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind.
      Together they wrote a very enlightening book entitled Negative Kausalität (2012), which examines the question of whether negative entities such as omissions and non-actions can be causes or causal factors. This question has moral and legal dimensions, because it leads to the question of whether harmful actions are more blameworthy than non-actions, and whether actively causing harm is more blameworthy than passively allowing harm. The relative blameworthiness of harmful actions versus non-actions also leads to the question of whether intentional omissions of morally obligatory actions are more blameworthy than inadvertent omissions, and whether the blameworthiness of such omissions depends on the severity of the consequences (since harmless omissions may not be considered as morally blameworthy as those that have harmful consequences).
      As an example of the causality of omissions or non-actions, Birnbacher and Hommen describe a scenario in which a subject A goes on vacation and asks his co-worker B to water the plants in his office while he is away. B agrees to do so but fails to keep his word, and by the time A returns to the office, the plants have all died. B's omission of the action that A expected him to do is seen as a causal factor in the death of the plants.
      As another example of omission causality, they describe a scenario in which a subject A regularly drinks coffee in the morning, but one morning doesn't, and this change in his usual daily routine prompts B to ask what is going on with him today. A's omission of something that B expected him to do is the cause of B's question. 
      Omission (Unterlassung) may need to be distinguished from negligence (Fahrlässigkeit), which may take the form of a failure to exercise the care required in a given situation, thereby causing harm, even though the subject may not have intended to cause harm or have even foreseen it. The subject has thus violated a duty of care.¹ Negligence, like omission, may take the form of non-action or failure to do something. 
      Doubts about whether omissions (Unterlassungen) or non-actions (Nicht-Handlungen) may be considered as causes (Ursachen) may also be associated with doubts about whether they may be considered as effects (Wirkungen). One solution to this problem may be to consider omissions as quasi-causal, hypothetically causal, or causal under counterfactual conditions, in which case the performance of an action that was not actually performed would certainly (according to the "strong" interpretation) or probably (according to the "weak"interpretation) have prevented the consequences in question. The strong interpretation may be epistemically problematic insofar as it places a much higher burden of proof on anyone who claims to know with certainty that an action that was omitted would have prevented a given event from occurring.² Indeed, the claim that there may be a completely deterministic connection between actions or non-actions and their effects is difficult to substantiate. It's almost always possible to imagine circumstances in which additional factors could intervene to disrupt the causal connection between an action or non-action and its intended effect.³
      Birnbacher and Hommen make clear that to say the relation between non-actions and their consequences is one of hypothetical causality is not to say that it is one of actual causality. Hypothetical causality is not actual or genuine causality.⁴ However, they admit that the case in which A causes harm to B by omitting to do something may not always be so different from the case in which A actively harms B, and that we may need to ask whether we really need to approach the problem of moral responsibility differently in the two cases. Is there actually a genuine causality in the harms A actively causes B, but not in the harms that A causes B through inaction? 
      They explain that under a broad definition of omission, omission refers to the non-performance (Nicht-Ausführung) of an action (Handlung) that an agent could have performed under the given conditions. In order for the agent to have omitted performing the action, they must at least have been capable of performing that action. A narrower definition of omission, however, might also stipulate the expectedness (Erwartetheit) or requiredness (Erfordertheit) of the omitted action under the given conditions. Under this definition, an agent can only omit performing an action they were expected or required to perform under the given conditions.⁵
      Other examples of situations in which omissions may act as causal factors include (1) when A's omission of a certain action is a signal for (or triggers) a certain action by B, and (2) when A's omission of a required action causes B to act in A's place. 

      All omissions need not be intentional. If someone omits to do something, they do not necessarily have to have an explicit intention to omit doing that thing.⁶

      Birnbacher and Hommen note that the legal philosopher Michael S. Moore rejects the idea that omissions or non-events can be causes, because he says that non-events cannot be causal relata. Causal relations can only occur between events, and indeed, there are no such things as non-events; there are are only uninstantiated types of events.⁷Allowing harm to occur should therefore not be mistaken for causing harm by omission.

      Birnbacher and Hommen, however, argue that omissions or non-actions are no less real than the actions they contrast with. Negative events can be observed, just as their positive counterparts can be observed.⁸ The question then is: do we have a theory of causality that allows for the causal efficacy of omissions?

      They explain that while physicalist theories of causality, which postulate a physical relation between cause and effect, may be incompatible with the causality of omissions or non-actions, other theories, such as regularity theory, interventionism, and various forms of counterfactual theory may be compatible. 
      According to regularity theory, if a set of causal factors S is causally sufficient for a particular event W, then W regularly follows S, and individual occurrences of S are causal for W only as long as this regularity exists. The causality of S for W is seen in the regularity with which W follows S. However, a weakness of this theory is that it may fail to distinguish between causal relations and mere correlations in which there is no causal relation.⁹

      Interventionist theories of causality may distinguish between causal relations and correlations by postulating an external intervention (or event, or condition) that causes the omission or non-action, which then causes the given effect. For example, if B forgets to water A's plants because he has taken drugs that make him forget the promise he made to A, then his taking the drugs and his forgetting to water the plants (and thus omitting the action he was expected to do) may both be causal factors for the death of the plants. 
      According to counterfactual theory, the regularity that exists between cause and effect can be extended beyond actually occurring cases to counterfactual cases. Thus, in the example of causality described above, if B were not to water A's plants while A is away on vacation, then under the given background conditions, this omission would be causally sufficient for A's plants to die, in all possible worlds with the same nosological structure as the actual world.¹⁰

      Birnbacher and Hommen also explain that there tends to be a normative asymmetry between actions and non-actions insofar as actively causing harm is often judged more severely than failing to prevent harm, even if the harm is the same in the two cases. Some of the qualitative differences between active and passive harms may be determined by the degree of intentionality, deliberateness, and willfulness on the part of the agent. Thus, for example, the Ten Commandments ("Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal," etc.) are predominantly prohibitions on actions, rather than prohibitions on omissions.¹¹

      The causal efficacy of omissions may also be seen in the fact that some omissions are seen as expected or desirable, such as refraining from playing a radio in the library or refraining from talking during a concert performance.

      Negative causes of events may include non-actions, omissions, inhibitions, absences, deficiencies, and non-occurrences of events. These negative causes can form links in causal chains, just like positive causes. And just as non-actions and omissions may only be seen as causes if the agent could have performed the non-performed or omitted action, so other negative causes may only be seen as causes if they could logically or nomologically have been possible. 
      An example of an absence as a causal factor would be the absence of a traffic light at a busy intersection, causing traffic congestion at that intersection. Another example of an absence as a causal factor would be the absence of snowfall at a ski resort, causing a decline in the number of tourists at that resort. Other examples include the absence of rain as a cause for drought, and the absence of oxygen as a cause of a match not lighting when struck.

      According to Birnbacher and Hommen, the inflation objection to the causality of absences is that a myriad of absences may be postulated as negative causal factors for any given event. For example, the absence of an elephant, the absence of a hippopotamus, and the absence of a rhinoceros in my bedroom may all be postulated as causal factors for my being able to sleep without being disturbed. A way of countering this objection may be to formulate criteria by which causally relevant factors are distinguished from irrelevant ones. With regard to the causality of omissions, such criteria might include restriction of the concept of omission to the non-performance of actions that are expected or required. However, the non-performance of unexpected or unsolicited actions may also in some cases be causal factors for events, so additional criteria must be considered. Other such criteria might be intended to exclude all negative causal factors that seem to be trivial, but even this strategy might be unsuccessful if some negative causal factors that at first seemed to be trivial later turned out to be significant. Thus, Birnbacher and Hommen conclude that, despite the difficulty of countering the inflation objection, certain strategies for reducing the number of negative possible causes to be considered for any given event may still be preferable to restricting consideration of possible causes to only positive ones.

 

FOOTNOTES

¹Dieter Birnbacher and David Hommen, Negative Kausalität (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), p. 10.

²Ibid., p. 19.

³Ibid., p. 20.

⁴Ibid., p. 21

⁵Ibid., p. 29.

⁶Ibid., p. 19.

⁷Michael Moore, "For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual Baselines," San Diego Law Review, Vol. 40, 2003, p. 1223.

⁸Birnbacher and Hommen, p. 36.

⁹Ibid., p. 101.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 107.

¹¹Ibid., p. 115.

Stascha Rohmer's Theory of Love as a Ground of Human Existence and Freedom

Stascha Rohmer is a German philosopher who was born on June 29, 1966, in Trier, Germany. He attended the Beethoven-Gymnasium in Bonn, and then the Freie Universität in Berlin and the Technische Universität in Berlin, where he earned his doctoral degree in philosophy in 1999. Between 1999 and 2014, he taught at the Institut für Philosophie of the Humboldt-Universität in Berlin, and at the Instituto de Filosofía of the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC) in Madrid. In 2015, he became a full-time professor of the philosophy of law at the Universidad de Medellín, in Medellín, Colombia.
      His research interests include German idealism, metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of nature, philosophy of culture, and the philosophy of law, and he has written extensively on the work of Hegel and Whitehead. He has also written on the work of Kant, Kierkegaard, Freud, Ortega y Gasset, Heidegger, Plessner, Horkheimer, Adorno, Hans Jonas, and Scheler.

      His books include Whiteheads Synthese von Kreativität und Rationalität: Reflexion und Transformation in Alfred North Whiteheads Philosophie der Natur (2000), Liebe - Zukunft einer Emotion (2008), and Die Idee des Lebens: Zum Begriff der Grenze bei Hegel und Plessner (2016).

      He has also published German translations of the writings of José Ortega y Gasset (José Ortega y Gasset, Der Mensch ist ein Fremder: Schriften zur Metaphysik und Lebensphilosophie, 2008) and Alfred North Whitehead (Alfred North Whitehead, Denkweisen, 2001).

      In Liebe - Zukunft einer Emotion (Love - The Future of an Emotion), Rohmer asks, "What are the primary motivating drives or forces in human beings?" He proposes hunger, thirst, and the desire for sexual fulfillment as possible candidates for these primary drives or forces. However, he explains that the fulfillment of the need for love may be just as important a motivating force, and that love may function not only as a ground of human existence, but also as a foundation for human freedom.
      Love may be experienced by human beings in profoundly subjective, distinctive, and intimate ways. The subjectivity of love doesn't mean that love doesn't also exist objectively as a ground for the social dimension of human existence, and as a foundation for human freedom. As a foundation for human freedom, love unites autonomy and selfhood, so that the self experiences the other not as a limit, but as a condition of the possibility of its own realization.
      The question of whether love is indispensable for human existence--whether human beings are just as dependent on loving and being loved as they are on physical nourishment and sustenance--is also the question of whether love constitutes an ontological necessity. Is human existence possible without love? Is the continued existence of humanity possible without such a motivating drive or force?
      Rohmer contends that love has a fundamental role in human generativity, and that it establishes a basic sphere of social mediation, which is both intergenerational and intersubjective. At the same time, love may appear in infinitely many forms, and it transcends any finite determination. Thus, it cannot truly be grasped or objectified, and its ontological necessity lies precisely in our understanding of it as a force constitutive of the continuous progress of human life.¹
      With the progress of modern reproductive technology, love can no longer be seen as essential to human reproduction. The biological process of procreation may be possible without the intervention of love and may be achieved through technological interventions such as in vitro fertilization and genetic engineering. However, love cannot be controlled and manipulated in the way that biological cells can be controlled and manipulated. Love has an aspect of freedom that makes possible the cohesion, harmony, and solidarity of human beings. Love also creatively overcomes death by binding successive generations together.²
      However, just as love cannot be conceived in purely biological terms and cannot be placed wholly in the service of procreation, it also cannot be conceived as wholly divorced from procreation. The ideality and universality of love consist in the way that lovers may face each other and may be mirrored by and united with each other, thus creating a relation in which each lover sees their ideal in the other and has their being in the other.
      The objective existence of love may be revealed by examining its relation to a comprehensive ideal of universality that is also an ideal of reason and justice. Love makes it possible for us to realize that we are all interconnected, and it enables us, in our finiteness, to transcend ourselves. Love is like a mirror in which we see ourselves reflected as others and others reflected as ourselves. Indeed, a relationship between two lovers seems to function only as long as they succeed in discovering in each other the pivotal point of their own selfhood.³ Even under the conditions of modernity, love seems to be based on an experience of immemorial commonality (unvordenkliche Gemeinsamkeit), and thus it cannot be understood as merely a product of willfully controlled or calculated behavior on the part of those who supposedly want to fall in love with each other.⁴
      According to Rohmer, love is the fundamental and driving force in the structure of human generativity.⁵ The question then is "Why is human reality so characterized by lovelessness, irrationality, and injustice?" Why is human reality so characterized by disunity, as manifested by brutality and fascism, crime and hatred, deception and exploitation, war and genocide?
      A theory of love as a basic driving force that seeks to reconcile the real and the ideal, the individual and the universal, and the separated and the conjoined seems to also require a theory of evil as a basic driving force that causes the division, brokenness, and disintegration of humanity.⁶ However, Rohmer contends that from a standpoint that transcends the present, the structure of human generativity embodies in its universality the realization that whatever is subjectively experienced as love is manifested objectively as rationality, order, and justice. The chain of successive generations overcomes decay and death, and it has no definable beginning or ending.

FOOTNOTES

¹Stascha Rohmer, Liebe – Zukunft einer Emotion (Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 2008) p. 33.

²Ibid., p. 48.

³Ibid., p. 65.

⁴Ibid., p. 67.

⁵Ibid., p. 230.

⁶Ibid., p. 232.

Streets in Baltimore that are Named after Slaveholders

• O'Donnell St. - John O'Donnell (1749-1805) was a wealthy merchant who enslaved people on his Canton plantation.
• John St. - John Eager Howard (1752-1827) was a soldier, statesman, and slaveholder. He has three streets in Baltimore named after him (John, Eager, and Howard Streets).
• Eager St. - John Eager Howard (1752-1827) came from a wealthy family of slaveholders and was born at their "Belvidere" plantation, which he inherited, and which is now the site of the Belvedere Hotel in Baltimore. He also bought a plantation in Marriottsville, which he gave as a wedding present to his second son, George. George Howard married Prudence Ridgely, and they named the plantation "Waverly," after the famous novel, Waverley, by Sir Walter Scott. The Waverly planation relied on the labor of enslaved people.
• Howard St. - John Eager Howard (1752-1827) was an officer in the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War. He was also Governor of Maryland (1788-1791), a member of the Maryland Senate (1791-1795), and U.S. Senator from Maryland (1796-1803). 
• Calvert St. - Cecil Calvert (1605-1675) was the second Lord Baltimore. He owned two ships, The Ark and The Dove, which he sent to establish the colony of Maryland in 1633. The ships arrived in February 1634, carrying colonists and slaves. A painting by Gerald Soest (c. 1600-1681) entitled "The Second Lord Baltimore," which is owned by the Enoch Pratt Free Library, shows Cecil Calvert with his young grandson Cecil and a young African slave.
• Baltimore St. - Cecil Calvert, second Lord Baltimore.
• Charles St. - Charles Calvert (1699-1751) was the fifth Lord Baltimore. He was proprietary governor of the colony of Maryland from 1732-1733. A painting by John Hesselius (1728-1778) owned by The Baltimore Museum of Art shows him at the age of five with one of his family's slaves.
• Greene St. - Nathanael Greene (1742-1786) was a Major General of the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War. He was a slaveholder.
• Fayette St. - The Marquis de Lafayette (1757-1834) became a slaveholder when he bought a plantation in French Guiana with the intent of freeing the enslaved people there.
• Lafayette Ave. - Marquis de Lafayette (1757-1834).
• McDonough St. - John McDonough (1779-1850) was a wealthy merchant and slaveholder. He supported efforts by the American Colonization Society to enable freed black slaves to return to Africa.
• Washington St. - George Washington (1732-1799) was the Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army (1775-1783) and the first President of the United States (1789-1797). He enslaved people at his Mt. Vernon plantation.
• Laurens St. - John Laurens (1754-1782), although he supported the abolition of slavery, came from a family of wealthy slaveholders in South Carolina. His father owned slaves, and he would have inherited them had he lived long enough. While serving as an officer during the Revolutionary War, he unsuccessfully attempted to form a regiment of enslaved soldiers, who would have been granted freedom in exchange for their service. He was killed in a battle on the Combahee River in 1782, one of the last battles of the Revolutionary War.
• Ridgely St. - Charles Ridgely II (1702-1772) was a merchant and owner of the Hampton plantation, which relied on the labor of enslaved people.
Eden St. - Sir Robert Eden (1741-1784) was the last colonial Governor of Maryland (1769-1776). He was married to Caroline Calvert, the daughter of Charles Calvert, fifth Lord Baltimore, and sister of Frederick Calvert, sixth Lord Baltimore. After his death, a claim was made on behalf of his widow in order to recover property, including enslaved people, that he had lost possession of when he had been forced to leave Maryland in 1776.
• Gilmor St. - The Gilmor family was a prominent Baltimore family who enslaved people on their plantation, Glen Ellen, which is now the site of the Loch Raven Reservoir. Robert Gilmor Jr. (1774-1848) was a wealthy merchant and shipowner. His brother Harry Gilmor (1838-1883) was a Confederate Cavalry officer who later became Baltimore City Police Commissioner (1874-1879).

Paulette Dieterlen, on Distributive Justice

Paulette Dieterlen Struck (1947-2025) was a Mexican philosopher whose work centered on political philosophy, including democracy, human rights, and distributive justice. She also wrote on ethics, poverty, citizenship, and social exclusion.

      She was born in Mexico City, and as a girl she attended the Instituto Asunción de México. In 1972, she earned her bachelor's degree in philosophy from the Universidad Iberoamericana, with a thesis entitled "El Concepto de la Muerte en Jean-Paul Sartre" ("The Concept of Death in Jean-Paul Sartre"). In 1981, she earned her master's degree from the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), with a thesis entitled "Sobre los Derechos Humanos" ("On Human Rights"). From 1981-1983, she did postgraduate studies at University College London, and in 1992 she earned her doctoral degree in philosophy from UNAM, with a thesis entitled "El Materialismo Histórico Como Explicación Funcional" ("Historical Materialism as Functional Explanation").

      From 1972-1985, she was a professor at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), and from 1986 onward she was a researcher at the Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas - UNAM, where she served as director from 2000-2004. She was also a professor in the Faculty of Arts and Letters at UNAM. 

      From 2010-2012, she served as President of the Mexican Philosophical Association. She was also a member of the Mexican Academy of Sciences, the Ibero-American Society of Economic Analysis, and the National Human Rights Commission.
      She was the author of four books, as well as many articles and book chapters. Her books included Sobre Los Derechos Humanos (1985), Marxismo Analitico: Explicaciones Funcionales e Intenciones (1995), Ensayos Sobre Justicia Distributiva (1995), and La Pobreza: Un Estudio Filosófico (2000, which was translated into English with the title, Poverty: A Philosophical Approach, 2005).
      In Ensayos Sobre Justicia Distributiva (Essays on Distributive Justice), she explains that when discussing distributive justice, we must consider at least three criteria: (1) the characteristics of the subjects who are to receive the distributed goods (including the comparative needs and abilities of those subjects), (2) the nature of the distributed goods, and (3) the principles that will govern the allocation of those goods to subjects.
      Many philosophical disciplines may enable us to better understand the nature of distributive justice, including ethics, political philosophy, the philosophy of economics, and the philosophy of law.
      Dieterlen makes a detailed and critical examination of Robert Nozick's theory of the minimal state as it relates to distributive justice. Nozick argues that only a minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, protection against theft, protection against fraud, enforcement of contracts, etc. is justified, and that any state more extensive than a minimal state is a violation of individuals' rights.¹ The minimal state, if it is to be just, cannot deprive individuals of property to which they are entitled or redistribute that property to others, even if that redistribution is for the sake of promoting equality.
      According to Nozick's entitlement theory of justice, individuals are entitled to any property they have justly acquired, and individuals who have justly acquired property from those who are entitled to transfer it to them are entitled to own that property. No one has any entitlement to own property that doesn't belong to them. This means that any attempt to promote social equality by depriving wealthy individuals of some of their property in order to provide it to less wealthy individuals is unjust. Any redistribution of goods that deprives some individuals of property to which they are entitled is unjust, even if that redistribution is for the sake of providing equality of opportunity for others.
      Among the criticisms that Dieterlen makes of Nozick's theory are the following:

"Anarchy, State, and Utopia is a book with many arguments, some weak, others strong. Among the weak ones is the one that leads to the conclusion that the only legitimate state is the minimal one, based on the rights of individuals. To demonstrate the difficulties of this reasoning, we need a theory of rights, their hierarchy, and their limits. It is counterintuitive to think that the state violates people's rights if it prevents them from accessing certain books [for example], but does not violate any rights if it allows individuals to be unable to read. The neoliberal thesis asserts that literacy is not a function of the state and that there will always be charitable, voluntary, and private institutions dedicated to teaching those who are illiterate, but that this is not a function of the state. The latter, neoliberals believe, has only produced inefficient and very costly educational institutions for society. A theory of distributive justice like Rawls's explains why this neoliberal argument doesn't work. It is impossible to believe that people's rights are respected when situations of misery are tolerated. 

      Another weak argument is that of distributive justice. It is impossible to apply the principle of rectification of injustices committed in the past because it is often impossible to determine when the last fair transaction took place."²

       Dieterlen contrasts Nozick's theory of distributive justice with that of Rawls, who describes two principles of justice that would be agreed to by rational and mutually disinterested individuals in an "original position" of equality:

(1) each individual should have an equal right to as much liberty as is compatible with the rights of other individuals, and
2) any social or economic inequalities that occur between individuals should (a) be designed to benefit every individual and (b) belong to positions that are equally available to all individuals.

The first principle is called "the principle of greatest equal liberty." The two parts of the second principle are called (a) "the difference principle," and (b) "the principle of fair equality of opportunity."³ 

      According to Rawls, the ordering of the two principles of justice means that the first principle has priority over the second. Thus, basic rights have priority over economic and social advantages, and violations of basic rights can't be justified by the production of economic or social advantages.⁴ Furthermore, the priority of the difference principle over the principle of fair equality of opportunity (in the second principle of justice) indicates that any inequalities of opportunity are permissible only if they are designed to benefit all individuals. The basic conception of justice underlying both the first and second principle is that all social values, such as liberty, opportunity, income, and wealth, should be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution benefits all individuals.⁵ 

      Dieterlen notes that Rawls is critical of utilitarianism, because it claims that the gains in social goods obtained by some individuals can compensate for the losses suffered by other individuals if there is a net benefit for society as a whole. If a majority of individuals are therefore already in a position of advantage as compared to a minority, then the majority may gain even greater advantage while the minority may suffer even greater disadvantage if a redistribution of social goods results in a net benefit for the majority.
      Dieterlen also notes that Rawls is critical of intuitionism, because it offers no constructive criterion that can decide in favor of one or more competing principles of justice. Although moral complexity may call for a number of distinct principles to be recognized, intuitionism offers no explicit method or priority rules for weighing one principle against another.
      She also notes that Amartya Sen (2009) is sceptical of the assumption by Rawls that his two principles of justice are the most likely ones that would be chosen in the "original position." Sen explains that there are genuinely plural and sometimes conflicting concerns that may bear on our understanding of justice.⁶ He is also sceptical of the rationale for liberty being given such an extreme degree of priority over other social goods. He asks, "Why should we regard hunger, starvation, and medical neglect to be invariably less important than the violation of any kind of personal liberty?"⁷ He explains that the difference principle may fail to take into account the variations that may occur in the abilities of individuals to convert primary goods into the human capabilities that will enable them to attain a more satisfactory level of well-being.
      Sen also notes the difficulty of adapting Rawls's use of the social contract to an international context and thereby developing an interpretation of global justice.
      Dieterlen explains that

      "Sen criticizes the idea of primary goods because he finds two problems with it. The first is that it homogenizes the people who receive primary goods, since they have different needs due to their age, health, climatic conditions, geographic location, and temperament. These differences must be taken into account when studying distribution schemes, especially in poor countries. For example, the use of primary goods decreases significantly among people who suffer from malnutrition. Thus, judging levels of advantage exclusively based on primary goods leads to a partially blind morality, since it ignores differences that may be morally relevant. The second problem Sen observes is that primary goods only have contingent instrumental value; to consider them as ends would be to treat them as fetishes, as if they had intrinsic value.
      According to Sen, what we should distribute are the capabilities that refer to the fact that human beings possess a large number of potentialities that adverse situations prevent us from developing; for this reason, any principle of distribution must focus on improving the circumstances that allow us to develop these capabilities. This notion is related to the ideas of equality, freedom, well-being, and agency."⁸ 

      According to Dieterlen, the kind of state Rawls defends is a welfare state that, by reallocating resources, provides greater equality of opportunity.⁹ The question then becomes, what kinds of interventions by a welfare state are justified? She argues that a welfare state may be capable of reconciling the guarantee of basic freedoms with a redistribution of social goods that reduces social and economic inequalities. The state is in fact obligated to perform both of these functions, because of the needs and vulnerabilities of citizens in a market society.
      However, the concept of a welfare state has been criticized from both the left and the right.

       Criticism from the left has included the argument that the welfare state is inefficient and repressive, and that it promotes a false perception of social and political reality in the working class. Instead of seeking to transform capitalist society, the welfare state maintains it.¹⁰ 

      Criticism from the right has included the argument that the welfare state, by redistributing goods in favor of less favored groups, imposes tax burdens on many individuals and regulates capital, which reduces the incentive to invest. Another argument has been that the welfare state, by protecting certain sectors or classes of workers and granting certain entitlements, reduces the incentive to work or to work as productively as would be the case under the unfettered reign of market forces.¹¹ 
      The concept of the welfare state also confronts two problems when applied to nations with emerging or developing economies. First, in some of these nations, the production of goods and the collection of taxes may not be sufficient to support redistribution, and instead there may be excessive spending by the state, leading to extremely burdensome levels of internal and external debt. Second, in some of these nations there may be great cultural diversity, which must be taken into account when development policies are employed.¹² 
      Dieterlen compares individualist with communitarian theories of distributive justice, and she argues that an error of individualist theories, even egalitarian ones, is that they maintain there is only one criterion of distribution (such as equity, proportionality, merit or desert, need, etc.). Communitarian theories, on the other hand, defend a plurality of distribution patterns. Thus, a criterion of need may take priority at a given moment over a criterion of desert.
      She also says that the main principle underlying the problem of distributive justice in Western societies is that of social equality, which can be promoted by leveling out wage and income differences and implementing policies that minimize differences in opportunity. Egalitarian principles promote the conditions that make democracy possible, since they allow a greater number of people to fully participate and be represented in the political process.¹³ 
      The efficiency of an economic system in distributing social goods may be determined by its Pareto optimality. A distribution of goods is Pareto optimal if there is no way to make one individual better off without making another individual worse off. This situation may be achieved by a competitive market, since such a mechanism may enable us to know how much is produced and who has received the desired goods.¹⁴ The market may also enable us to compare the demand for a given good with the supply of that good, so that if efficiency in the distribution of goods is obtained, any shortage or waste of labor and goods can be avoided.
      Dieterlen says that it is important for us to acknowledge that alleviating misery and poverty, providing health care and education, and giving special consideration to those who lack a minimum standard of living are priorities that deserve our attention. She agrees with Rawls that distribution of primary social goods should start with those who are most disadvantaged and should then continue with those who are less disadvantaged, until a situation of less inequality is obtained. Thus, the fulfillment of Pareto optimality is a necessary but insufficient condition for a just society. If the principles of justice conflict with those of efficiency, then justice should be given greater priority.¹⁵ 
      She also agrees with Sen that when we approach a situation of inequality we should recognize that all citizens have the right to a basic level of functioning. We have a responsibility to ensure that resources are available so that every citizen has the opportunity to function, not only minimally, but as well as possible. Thus, when resources are limited, and it is not possible for individuals to achieve a basic level of functioning, the goal of achieving social equality commits us to giving more to those who have less.¹⁶ Dieterlen believes that the state can promote redistribution of resources through subsidies and financial incentives that will be attractive to owners of capital.¹⁷ 


FOOTNOTES

¹Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 179.
²Paulette Dieterlen, Ensayos Sobre Justicia Distributiva (México, D. F.: Fontamara, 1996), p. 27.
³John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 107.
⁴Ibid., p. 54.
⁵Ibid., p. 54.
⁶Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 57.
⁷Ibid., p. 65.
⁸Paulette Dieterlen, Justicia Distributiva y Pobreza, (Ciudad de México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2016), p. 6.
⁹Paulette Dieterlen, Ensayos Sobre Justicia Distributiva, p. 55.
¹⁰Ibid., p. 70.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 70.
¹²Ibid., p. 71.
¹³Ibid., p. 109.
¹⁴Ibid., p. 111.
¹⁵Ibid., p. 115.
¹⁶Ibid., p. 119
¹⁷Ibid., p. 119.

NOTE: The quoted text from Dieterlen's Ensayos Sobre Justicia Distributiva and Justicia Distributiva y Pobreza was translated with the aid of Google Translate and then reviewed by me for accuracy.

Mauricio Beuchot's Analogical Hermeneutics

Mauricio Hardie Beuchot Puente is a Mexican philosopher, research professor, poet, and Dominican priest who was born in Torreón, Coahuila in 1950. He entered the Dominican Order in 1971 and was ordained a priest in 1976. In 1973-1974, he studied at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland, and in 1980 he received his doctoral degree in philosophy from the Ibero-American University (UIA). Since 1985, he has been a professor at the Institute of Philological Research of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). He has also been a member of the Mexican Academy of History (since 1990), the Mexican Academy of Language (since 1997), the Pontifical Academy of Saint Thomas Aquinas (since 1999), the Mexican Academy of Human Rights (since 2000), and the Seminary of Mexican Culture (since 2006).
      He is the author of more than one hundred books, as well as many hundreds of articles and book chapters, and he has written on such topics as the history of philosophy, the philosophy of language, metaphysics, ethics, analytic philosophy, semiotics, structuralism, and hermeneutics. 
      In his Tratado de Hermenéutica Analógica: Hacia un Nuevo Modelo de Interpretación (2019, Treatise on Analogical Hermeneutics: Toward a New Model of Interpretation), Beuchot describes analogical hermeneutics as a theory and practice of interpretation that mediates between univocal and equivocal interpretations of a text. It is an alternative to univocality or equivocality of interpretation, allowing for more than one valid reading of a text and making space for plurality and depth of meaning.
      While a univocal model of interpretation allows for only one valid reading of a text, and an equivocal model may allow for diverse readings that are incompatible or incommensurable with one another, an analogical model allows for a plurality of correct or valid readings, while recognizing that some readings may be closer to the truth of the text than others.
      Beuchot argues that the univocal model of interpretation is in fact a denial of the possibility of hermeneutics, because hermeneutics can only exist if there is multiplicity or diversity of meaning. On the other hand, the equivocal model of interpretation is also a denial of the possibility of hermeneutics, if there is no way of determining whether one interpretation is more correct than another.
      Analogical hermeneutics avoids the relativistic view that all interpretations are equally valid, and it also avoids the positivistic view that the only valid interpretation of a text is one that can be scientifically verified.
      Analogical meaning is closer to equivocality than to univocality, because it allows for both sameness and difference in meaning, with difference predominating. Analogical hermeneutics recognizes that a perfectly univocal interpretation of a text can never be achieved.¹ Thus, it avoids the extremes of both univocality and equivocality, and it seeks the most correct or valid reading among multiple possible readings of a text.
      According to Beuchot, the interpretation of a text is always undertaken with the aim to answer such questions as "What does the text mean?" "What does it want to say?" "Who is it addressed to?" and "What does it say to me?"²
      Since explanation of a text tends toward univocality, analogical hermeneutics may be more directed toward comprehension than explanation, although comprehension itself contains aspects of explanation.³
      Analogical hermeneutics may also be described as synchronic or diachronic (depending on whether it is more concerned with the systematicity or historicity of a text), and as syntagmatic or paradigmatic (depending on whether it is more concerned with the horizontal axis of language in which linguistic elements sequentially follow one another or the vertical axis of language in which linguistic elements may potentially be substituted for one another).
      Beuchot also explains that hermeneutics is always undertaken within a theoretical framework, conceptual scheme, frame of reference, or tradition. Interpretation of something from the past from a contemporary perspective will introduce an aspect of innovation in hermeneutics, which may be seen as a continuation of, or a break with, hermeneutic tradition.⁴ Thus, hermeneutics always involves the contextualization of a text, placing it within a (social, cultural, literary, or historical) context and avoiding the misunderstanding that may arise from decontextualizing it.⁵
      Hermeneutical argumentation (or argumentation to prove a particular interpretation) must itself be contextualized within a hermeneutical tradition to which its audience belongs if it is to be persuasive and convincing. Such argumentation may be more dialogic than monologic in nature, but it may employ various rhetorical or discursive strategies in order to demonstrate its own consistency, coherence, and rationality.
      The task of providing the global context for hermeneutics belongs to metaphysics, says Beuchot. Hermeneutics leads to metaphysics, and metaphysics supports hermeneutics.⁶  Metaphysics is a space of possibility for hermeneutics, insofar as the world can only be interpreted in light of Being. The horizon of Being illuminates and transcends the horizon of the world,⁷ and Being is therefore a horizon of possibility for any questioning or knowing. Hermeneutics leads to metaphysics by thematizing the world, and metaphysics is only possible through a hermeneutics that understands itself in and through Being.

      Analogical-iconic hermeneutics may resolve the struggle between literal and symbolic interpretation, since both kinds of interpretation may be necessary in some contexts. The icon or symbol may not allow interpretation to be imposed on it in some contexts, and it may demand more to be seen or heard than read.⁸ Thus, an analogical-iconic hermeneutics may move from an analogical to an iconographic understanding of the meaning of linguistic signs and symbols.
      The use of analogy as a means of reconciling differences between texts may open up possibilities for interpretation by avoiding the extremes of univocity and equivocation.⁹ Thus, analogy may be a kind of dialectical mediation between, rather than a synthesis of, the two extremes. Dialecticizing analogy and analogizing dialectics may lead to a more dynamic analogical hermeneutics that can recognize the becoming of events as texts and texts as events.¹⁰ The exploration of the dialectical nature of analogy may also be helpful when we encounter epistemological thresholds or limits where formal, categorical, or analytical knowledge cannot be applied.¹¹


FOOTNOTES

¹Mauricio Beuchot, Tratado de hermenéutica analógica. Hacia un nuevo modelo de interpretación (Ciudad de México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2019), p. 57
²Ibid., p. 29.
³Ibid., p. 63.
⁴Ibid., p. 70.
⁵Ibid., p. 16.
⁶Ibid., p. 112.
⁷Ibid., p. 113.
⁸Ibid., p. 199.
⁹Ibid., p. 206.
¹⁰Ibid., p. 216.
¹¹Ibid., pp. 216-217.