According to Confucius, the junzi (gentleman or superior man) rectifies the names that are applied to various kinds of conduct. If names are rectified, then we will know when our conduct is right or wrong. If incorrect names are applied to various kinds of moral conduct, then we may confuse wrong with right or right with wrong.
If names are rectified, then we will know when someone who has been named a ruler or minister is truly acting as a ruler or minister. We will also know when a father is truly acting as a father, and when a son is truly acting as a son. Confucius explains that "There is government when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son" (12.11). He says that to govern means to rectify [language and moral conduct] (12.17).
The words of a gentleman are consistent with his actions. He is cautious with his words, and he is earnest in his conduct (4.24). He acts before he speaks, and he speaks according to his actions (2.13).
Confucius also says that a minister must rectify himself and make his own conduct correct before he can rectify others (13.13).
False or misleading speech may be socially advantageous or politically expedient in a fallen or corrupt society (6.14). But when names do not correspond to reality, a vessel without corners is called a cornered vessel (6.23), and a man of notoriety is mistaken for a man of distinction (12.20).
Confucius's theory of the "rectification of names" (zhengming) may be described as a descriptivist theory of names, insofar as he uses the names "ruler," "minister," "father," "son," etc. as descriptions of the (ideal) subjects to whom he refers. These names convey normative assumptions about who can rightly be called a ruler, minister, father, son, etc., and how they should behave if they are to appropriately receive those designations.
In this sense, a name is like a job description. If someone is called a ruler, then he should fulfill the duties of that job description. At the same time, the name should fit the job description. The name "ruler" should signify what is actually expected of a ruler.
Thus, the rectification of names means that when a minister is called a minister, he should deserve to be called by that name. When a minister is no longer acting like one, he should no longer be called by that name. Being called a minister entails living up to the moral standards expected of a minister, and when a minister isn’t living up to those standards, he should no longer be called by that name. The same holds true for fathers and sons. Names should be appropriate to the persons or things to which they refer. Thus, the rectification of names may require both a rectification of naming practices and a rectification of the persons or things named.2
The rectification of names may be based on a number of assumptions. The use of names to refer to persons or things presupposes that those persons or things actually exist (or may actually exist). Otherwise, those names will be empty and won't refer to anything. The use of names as descriptions of persons or things also presupposes that the descriptions implied by those names are not indefinite or ambiguous, and that there are some definite sets of characteristics that belong to those persons or things. It also presupposes that the names used have some stable meaning, and that they are not being used arbitrarily to refer to persons or things to which they shouldn't refer. It also presupposes some shared understanding of the meaning of those names, and a shared adherence to (explicitly or implicitly) specified rules of naming (governing name usage and application). It also presupposes that the subjects or objects named can actually be named.
Some questions that may arise regarding the use of names as descriptions include: what about the use of non-descriptional names? What if the meaning of a name is context-sensitive, and it varies according to the historical, social, or cultural context? How fixed or changeable are names? What if the name of something is not in accord with the nature or description of that thing?
The rectification of names also presupposes that there are indeed right and wrong names for things, names that indicate whether those things are good or bad, right or wrong, virtuous or non-virtuous, etc.
Mozi (c.470 BCE-c.391 BCE) has a somewhat different view of rectification, insofar as he is mainly concerned with rectification of moral character rather than rectification of names. According to Mozi, people of higher social standing should be exemplars of righteousness, and they should be able to rectify people of lower social standing. Thus, the common people should be rectified by the officers, who should be rectified by the generals and great officers, who should be rectified by the dukes and feudal lords, who should be rectified by the ruler (the Son of Heaven), who is rectified by Heaven (26.3). The will of Heaven is for everyone to be benevolent and righteous, and rectification may therefore be transmitted from the top down in the feudal hierarchy.
Xunzi (c.310 BCE-c.238 BCE) explains that correct naming of things may enable us to gain a better understanding of those things. Correct naming may also enable us to better understand the relations between things. Misunderstanding of things may lead to incorrect naming of those things. Disorders of judgment may also lead us to give incorrect names to things.
According to Xunzi, we should not recklessly apply names to things. There is an ethics or right and wrong way of naming things. The gentleman is he who uses names that are sufficient to indicate the things to which he is referring. Thus, the names he uses clearly signify his thoughts and intentions.
Language consists of more than names, so a theory of names is not in itself a complete theory of language. Language may be used not only to name things, but also to report things, to explain things, to speculate about things, to ask questions, to make requests, to make demands, and to perform other acts of communication.
Some dictionary definitions of the word "name" include:
"1. a word or a combination of words by which a person, place, idea, etc. is known or designated. 2. mere designation, as distinguished from fact: He was a ruler in name only. 3. something that a person is said to be, esp. by way of insult or reproach: to call a person names. 4. reputation of any kind: to protect someone's good name. 5. a distinguished reputation: to make a name for oneself. 6. a widely known or famous person: She's a name in show business. 7. a symbol of divinity. 8. a body of persons grouped under one name, as a family or race. 9. by name, a. by one's own name: to address someone by name. b. not personally; by repute: I know him only by name. 10. in the name of, a. with appeal to: In the name of mercy, stop that screaming! b. by the authority of: Open, in the name of the law! c. on behalf of. d. under the name of: money deposited in the name of a son."3
Another way of saying this is that a name's extension or denotation is the class of persons or things to which it can be correctly applied. Its intension or connotation is the set of attributes or qualities that it implies or calls to mind.
There may be personal names (first, middle, and last names, nicknames, aliases, titles, etc.), as well as place names. There may also be conventions for naming persons, places, and things.
Plato's Cratylus examines the question of whether names may be assigned correctly or incorrectly to things. The Cratylus is a dialogue between Socrates (an Athenian philosopher), Cratylus (a young scholar), and Hermogenes (the son of a wealthy aristocrat). It is mainly concerned with the truth and correctness of names.
In the dialogue, Hermogenes tells Socrates that Cratylus has said that names are natural and not conventional, but Hermogenes then asks Cratylus whether his name would be Hermogenes if that was what people called him.
Hermogenes questions whether there is any correctness in names by saying that if Cratylus were given a new name, then that name would be as correct as his old one. No name is therefore given to anyone or anything by nature. All names are merely a matter of convention.
Socrates replies that names may be parts of propositions and therefore have some truth value. If propositions may be true or false, then names may also be true or false.
Hermogenes answers, however, that different names may be used for the same thing, so the truth of a name may be relative to the context in which it is used.
Socrates replies, however, that names are not arbitrarily assigned to things. Rather, they are assigned as a means of distinguishing between the natures of those things. The most proper names for things may therefore be the most natural names for those things. Cratylus may therefore be correct in saying that all things by nature have proper names.
Socrates also says that different names may be assigned to the same thing if they share the same meaning. All names are intended to indicate the natures of the things they represent.
Cratylus answers that one name is therefore not better than any other, and that if a name is incorrectly assigned to something, then it is not actually the name of that thing. There are no incorrect names for things.
Socrates says, however, that if names are imitations or likenesses of things, then there may be correct or incorrect ways of assigning them. If names are correctly assigned to things, then they will indicate the natures of those things.
J.S. Mill (1881) distinguishes between individual names (names that can be truly affirmed, in the same sense, of only one thing) and general names (names that can be truly affirmed, in the same sense, of each of indefinitely many things). Thus, "John" is an individual name, while "man" is a general name.4
General names differ from collective names, according to Mill, because a general name can be predicated of each individual in a multitude, but a collective name can be predicated only of a multitude as a whole. While "the 76th regiment" is a collective name but not a general one, "a regiment" is both a collective and general name.5
Names may also be concrete (if they stand for things) or abstract (if they stand for attributes of things). Thus, "man" is concrete, while "humanity" is abstract.
Mill says that names may also be connotative or non-connotative. A name is connotative if it denotes a subject and implies an attribute. It is non-connotative if it denotes a subject or attribute without implying anything about its attributes. All concrete general names, like "man" and "woman," are connotative, but proper names like "John" and "Mary" are non-connotative, because they don't indicate or imply anything about the attributes of the individuals who bear them. Thus, proper names can be assigned to individuals without saying anything about them. Whenever names have any meaning, their meaning therefore resides not in what they denote, but in what they connote.6
Mill says that names may also be connotative or non-connotative. A name is connotative if it denotes a subject and implies an attribute. It is non-connotative if it denotes a subject or attribute without implying anything about its attributes. All concrete general names, like "man" and "woman," are connotative, but proper names like "John" and "Mary" are non-connotative, because they don't indicate or imply anything about the attributes of the individuals who bear them. Thus, proper names can be assigned to individuals without saying anything about them. Whenever names have any meaning, their meaning therefore resides not in what they denote, but in what they connote.6
Names may also be positive or negative (e.g. "good" and "not-good"), and relative or non-relative (e.g. "father" and "son" are relative names, as are "ruler" and "subject," but absolute names are non-relative).7
Bertrand Russell (1919) distinguishes between the use of names as names (having meaning in their own right) and the use of names as descriptions (of the things to which they refer). He says that in practice names are frequently used as abbreviated descriptions. The sentence, "Scott is the author of Waverley" is an example of the difference between a name and a definite description. "Scott" is a proper name, while "the author of Waverley" is a definite description. Descriptions may be definite or indefinite. "The man" is a definite description, while "a man" is an indefinite description. If the name "Scott" is taken to mean "the author of Waverley," then this may be an example of a name being taken as a definite description.
John Searle (1950), on the other hand, says that proper names differ from definite descriptions by not specifying any characteristics of the objects to which they refer. The proper name "Scott" refers to the same person as does "the author of Waverley," but it doesn't specify any of his characteristics. The use of his name may presuppose a set of uniquely identifying characteristics belonging to him, but it doesn't indicate which ones are presupposed. Thus, the usefulness of names is partly due to the fact that they allow us to refer to things without having to come to agreement on what exactly are their defining characteristics, so names actually function not as descriptions, but as "pegs on which to hang descriptions."8
Saul Kripke (1972) distinguishes between names and descriptions by saying that names are rigid designators (they refer to the same objects in all possible worlds), while descriptions are nonrigid designators (they do not necessarily refer to the same objects in all possible worlds). At the same time, he distinguishes between using a description to give a name its meaning and using a description to determine a name's reference.9 He rejects the descriptivist theory of names both as a theory of meaning and a theory of reference.
John Searle (1950), on the other hand, says that proper names differ from definite descriptions by not specifying any characteristics of the objects to which they refer. The proper name "Scott" refers to the same person as does "the author of Waverley," but it doesn't specify any of his characteristics. The use of his name may presuppose a set of uniquely identifying characteristics belonging to him, but it doesn't indicate which ones are presupposed. Thus, the usefulness of names is partly due to the fact that they allow us to refer to things without having to come to agreement on what exactly are their defining characteristics, so names actually function not as descriptions, but as "pegs on which to hang descriptions."8
Saul Kripke (1972) distinguishes between names and descriptions by saying that names are rigid designators (they refer to the same objects in all possible worlds), while descriptions are nonrigid designators (they do not necessarily refer to the same objects in all possible worlds). At the same time, he distinguishes between using a description to give a name its meaning and using a description to determine a name's reference.9 He rejects the descriptivist theory of names both as a theory of meaning and a theory of reference.
If a name were a description, then it would not necessarily designate the same object in all possible worlds, says Kripke, since other objects could have the associated description in other possible worlds. If, for example, the name "Aristotle" is taken as an abbreviated description for "the greatest man who studied under Plato," then in another possible world some other man could be "the greatest man who studied under Plato." Moreover, in another possible world, Aristotle could never have studied under Plato at all.10
Kripke offers a causal theory of reference for names as an alternative to the descriptivist theory. After an object is initially "baptized" with a name, that name may be passed from link to link in a chain of communication. Thus, the reference of the name may be established by a sort of causal chain from person to person. Each user of the name is linked to the next user by the chain of communication.
FOOTNOTES
1Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning & The Doctrine of the Mean, translated by James Legge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 263-264.
2Bryan Van Norden, "Confucius on Language: How NOT to Rectify Names," online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3EdDp1YoZc&t=137s
3The Random House College Dictionary (New York: Random House, 1980), p. 884.
4John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1881), p. 32.
5Ibid., pp. 32-33.
6Ibid., pp. 34-37.
7Ibid., pp. 41-42.
8John R. Searle, "Proper Names," in Mind, 67 (1958), p. 172.
9Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 5.
10Ibid., p. 56.
OTHER RESOURCES
Bertrand Russell, "Descriptions," in Meaning and Reference, edited by A.W. Moore (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1993)., pp. 46-55.
Mozi, The Mozi: A Complete Translation, translated by Ian Johnston (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2010).
Plato, "Cratylus," in The Dialogues of Plato, Volume III, translated by Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1875).
Xunzi, Xunzi: The Complete Text, translated by Eric L. Hutton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
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