Some Objections to the Simulation Hypothesis

My first objection to the version of the simulation hypothesis described by David Chalmers (2022), that we are and always been living in a computer simulation of a world,¹ is that if we can't prove we're not living in a computer simulation, then that doesn't necessarily mean we're living in one. If Chalmers wants to convince us that we're most likely living in a computer simulation, then it's up to him to provide sufficient evidence for that hypothesis (and I don't think he does). The burden of proof is on him, because he's proposing something that isn't intuitively evident and that in fact contradicts what we'd assume from our daily experience (that the world we inhabit is the actual world, and not a computer simulation).

      If Chalmers wants us to entertain the possibility that we're living in a computer simulation, then it's up to him to provide sufficient evidence that this is the case (and I don't think he does). Merely describing the lack of proof that we're not living in a computer simulation isn't sufficient to prove we're living in one (and in fact he admits he can't prove it). Indeed, it's no more sufficient than saying that anything that can't be proven not to be the case may actually be the case (which is true, but trivial and doesn't account for how unlikely that case may be).

      My second objection to his version of the simulation hypothesis is that he says we're living in a computer simulation of a world, which could be taken to mean any world, virtual or actual. So we might only be living in a simulation of a simulation (or even a simulation of a simulation of a simulation, ad infinitum), which is rather implausible. His version of the simulation hypothesis doesn't say anything about the actual world or even that there is an actual world (perhaps because he's asking us to consider the possibility that the world we're actually living in is a simulation). However, a simulation of a world could be a simulation of any world at all, no matter how impoverished or bereft of possibility, and no matter how unlike the world of daily human experience. (Although, of course, the simulation would indeed be like the world of daily human experience if that world is in fact impoverished and bereft of possibility, as it may be for many people who live in severe poverty. But then it would be rather callous and unfeeling to suggest that people living in severe poverty are merely living in a simulated or virtual world, and not the world of actual reality. So that exigency might be another reason for rejecting the simulation hypothesis.)

      We must also ask, "If we can neither prove nor disprove that we're living in a computer simulation, then is the question of whether we're living in a computer simulation still a meaningful question?" Perhaps it's only meaningful insofar as we understand it as an aporia. On the other hand, if we can prove that we're not living in a computer simulation, then it may merely serve to remind us of the limitations of computer simulations.

      I think the simulation hypothesis may be an act of mental gymnastics, a means of suggesting we can't know anything if we can't prove that the world we're living in isn't a computer simulation. But that rhetorical strategy doesn't preclude the possibility of our having genuine knowledge of some simulated or virtual world, if that's the world we happen to be living in at the moment. And it doesn't preclude the possibility of a simulated or virtual (or even imaginary) world that seems as real to us as the actual world. Some simulated or virtual worlds may seem or may perhaps even be as real to us as the actual world, and I think we may draw meaningful conclusions from inhabiting them.

      Aside from my objections to the simulation hypothesis, I found Chalmers's Reality + (2022) to be a very enlightening and entertaining book, and it's a brilliant exposition of virtual worlds and the problems they pose for philosophy. Chalmers describes the approaches of Eastern and Western philosophy to the question of the difference between appearance and reality, and he shows how the Knowledge Question ("Can we know whether or not we're in a virtual world?"), the Reality Question ("Are virtual worlds real or illusory?"), and the Value Question ("Can you live a good life in a virtual world?") correspond to three of the central branches of philosophy (epistemology, metaphysics, and value theory).²

FOOTNOTES
¹David J. Chalmers, Reality +: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2022), p. 29.

²Ibid., p. 17.