Thursday, December 29, 2016

Moral Imagination

What is moral imagination, and what role does (or should) it play in moral reasoning? What is its importance in moral decision-making?
      Moral imagination may be described as an ability to devise new or alternative approaches to moral problem-solving, and thus an ability to formulate new interpretations of the meaning of moral actions and situations.
      It may also be described as an ability to conceive of new or alternative moral principles and values, and thus an ability to engage with, and have a fuller understanding of, one’s own moral capacities and those of a given individual, group, or society.
      It may also be described as an ability to develop new or alternative interpretations of the moral motivations of others, and thus an ability to recognize the range of possibilities available for moral behavior.
      For some individuals, moral imagination may take the form of imagining a kind of morality different from conventional morality. It may take the form of an imagining that what is conventionally taken as right is actually wrong, or that what is conventionally taken as wrong is actually right, or that there actually is no right or wrong.
      For those who do not know right from wrong (such as some young children, perhaps, or some cognitively disabled individuals, or some psychiatrically impaired individuals), moral imagination may be an imagining that something is right or wrong because of the responses that it seems to evoke from others. The emotionally immature or cognitively disabled individual may in some cases only discover that something is right or wrong by becoming acquainted with the moral and social responses of others to it.
      Trying to improve our moral conduct, and striving toward a moral ideal, may also to some extent involve our imagining the kinds of people we could be if we were to be live up to all our responsibilities and fulfill all our moral ideals. In order to become better citizens, we may sometimes have to imagine how we could become better fathers, mothers, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, teachers, students, co-workers, colleagues, teammates, friends, or neighbors.
      To imagine something may be to conceive of that thing without ever having actually seen or experienced it. It may also be to perceive something as present or possible without its ever having actually been present for, or accessible to, sensory perception.
      To imagine something may also be to conceive of an object, person, situation, or condition that does not yet, but could, exist. It may be to evoke, summon, or call forth unrealized possibilities.
      If something engages or captivates our imaginations, we may find it to be particularly intriguing or compelling. We may discover that it presents to us a range of possibilities that we were previously unaware of or were only partially aware of. We may then be drawn to further explore its nature, meaning, significance, and implications.
      Moral imagination may be a power or faculty of producing from current or past perceptions new ideas or concepts that have moral applications, implications, or dimensions. It may involve creative and intuitive, as well as analytic and critical thinking. It may be combined with other moral faculties, such as moral perception, intuition, insight, reasoning, and understanding, in order to produce a more secure and reliable foundation for moral judgment.
      Moral imagination may also enable us to recognize that there may be more than one way of looking at and responding to moral problems.
      The ability to be imaginative may depend on an openness to new thoughts, new impressions, and new ways of looking at things
      Moral imagination may therefore enable us to find creative solutions to moral dilemmas. It may enable us to envision and formulate ideal modes of conduct.
      Supererogatory conduct (actions that go beyond what is morally obligatory) may depend on the power of the imagination to inspire us to perform actions that go beyond the call of duty.
      Imagination may also play an important role in such moral attitudes as sympathy, empathy, and compassion. The ability to feel and express sympathy, empathy, or compassion for others may to some extent depend on the ability to imagine what they are feeling, and thus to imagine the pain, suffering, distress, anxiety, embarrassment, shame, sadness, or despair they may be experiencing.
      A constricted moral imagination may constrict the ability to feel sympathy, empathy, or compassion for others. Failure to respond to the suffering and distress of those who are seen as outsiders or strangers may thus in some cases be due to a constriction, deficiency, or failure of imagination.
      Imagination may also enable us to evaluate our own actions in light of what we think others may think about them. It may help us to recognize that our conduct can always be improved.
      Moral imagination may enable us to exercise capacities for moral decision-making that we did not previously know we possessed or were only dimly aware of. It may enable us to anticipate the possible unintended consequences of our actions, and to judge whether those consequences are desirable or undesirable. In cases in which we are compelled to ask ourselves whether we may have failed to treat others as we ourselves would want to be treated, it may enable us to recognize how we would feel if we were treated by others in the same way that we have treated them.
       Moral imagination may also play a role in, or be incorporated into, other forms of imagination, such as religious, aesthetic, literary, poetic, or dramatic imagination. It may inspire the creation of moral comedy or tragedy. It may provide a foundation for moral aesthetics or poetics, including the poetics of moral possibility.
      As a creative enterprise, moral imagination may also be opposed to mimesis, rote repetition, or mechanical mimicry of conventionally accepted behavior. It may be opposed to rigid and inflexible adherence to moral norms and principles of duty. Thus, it may make possible the perception of a kind of moral truth that transcends conventionally accepted truth, and it may inspire new approaches to, and creative strategies for, moral problem-solving.
      Moral imagination may therefore depend less on the seeing of things as they are (though it certainly does depend on this kind of seeing) than on the seeing of things as they might be. The seeing of things as they might be, or as they could possibly be, is also the awareness of possibility, which may be the essence or most fundamental feature of imagination.
      Moral imagination may be something that makes possible Raskolnikov’s overwhelming sense of guilt in Crime and Punishment, Ahab’s maniacal quest for revenge in Moby Dick, Kurz’s ultimate sense of horror in Heart of Darkness, and Joseph K’s inescapable sense of anxiety and desperation in The Trial.
      It may also be something that makes possible Jane’s faithfulness to her sense of duty in Jane Eyre, Strether’s moral scrupulousness and faithfulness to personal conscience in The Ambassadors, Jay Gatsby’s romantic idealism and sense of hope in The Great Gatsby, Emma’s carelessness and capriciousness in Madame Bovary, Hedda’s recklessness and self-indulgence in Hedda Gabler, Blanche’s disdain for Stanley’s crudeness in A Streetcar Named Desire, Levee’s sense of futility and rage in Ma Rainey’s Black Bottom, Dimmesdale’s agonizing sense of guilt in The Scarlet Letter, and Aschenbach’s hopeless infatuation with Tadzio in Death in Venice.
      Matthew Kieran, in an article entitled “Art, Imagination, and the Cultivation of Morals” (1996), explains that morally significant art may promote imaginative understandings of moral problems, concerns, or situations. Art "may extend or deepen our understanding of the values and commitments that underlie our actions and desires,” and it "may also shape our understanding of what we value by showing us how to act…in morally fruitful or harmful ways.”1
      John Dewey (1922) explains that “deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action….Each habit, each impulse involved in the temporary suspense of overt action takes its turn in being tried out. Deliberation…. is an experiment in making various combinations of selected elements of habits and impulses, [in order] to see what the resultant action would be like if it were entered upon.”2
      Steven Fesmire (2003) extends Dewey’s conception of the role of imagination in moral deliberation by proposing three interrelated theses: (1) moral character, belief, and reasoning are inherently social, embodied, and historically situated, (2) moral deliberation is fundamentally imaginative and takes the form of dramatic rehearsal, and (3) moral imagination may be conceived as a process of aesthetic perception and artistic creation.Fesmire therefore argues that imagination may provide deliberative resources for moral decision-making that are not provided by rigid adherence to abstract principles of morality.
      Mark Johnson (1993) explains that "moral reasoning is...basically an imaginative activity, because it...requires imagination to discern what is morally relevant in situations, to understand empathetically how others experience things, and to envision the full range of possibilities open to us in a particular case."4 He also says that moral situations may be metaphorically conceptualized in order to more clearly understand them, and that "the metaphorical character of moral understanding is precisely what makes it possible to make appropriate moral judgments."5
      Moral imagination may inspire the construction of moral narratives, and it may promote understanding of the ways in which such narratives can be framed or contextualized. Moral narratives may be those that have a moral content, subject matter, theme, purpose, or meaning. The understanding of moral situations may to some extent depend on the understanding of narrative accounts and explanations that have been provided with respect to those situations. Moral understanding may therefore be to some extent a kind of narrative understanding.
      However, moral understanding may be not only analytic, conceptual, thematic, and textual, but also synthetic, imaginative, empathetic, and experiential.
      Moral imagination may include the capacity to perceive previously unrecognized or poorly understood moral dimensions of our actions. It may also include, as a result of the capacity to think creatively about moral possibility and responsibility, the capacity to perceive those moral dimensions of our actions that are not immediately or prima facie evident. It may therefore enable us to develop a fuller understanding of the morally good, and a clearer understanding of the true nature of morality (whatever that may be).


1Matthew Kieran, “Art, Imagination, and the Cultivation of Morals,” in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 54, No. 4 (1996), p. 345.
2John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1922), p. 190.
3Steven Fesmire, John Dewey and Moral Imagination: Pragmatism in Ethics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), p. 4.
4Mark Johnson, Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. ix-x.
5Ibid., p. 10.

Saturday, December 10, 2016

Health Care as a Basic Human Right

If every person has, or should have, the right to health care, what are the limits of that right? To what kind of health care is every person entitled, if health care is a basic human right?
      I believe the right to health care is indeed a basic human right, along with the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to personal security, the right to due process of law, the right to work, the right to receive an education, and other basic human rights.
      The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25, says that “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”1
      I believe there is a moral argument to be made (which I shall not present here) for providing some level of basic health care to everyone who is in need of care, regardless of his or her ability to pay. What then is the level of basic care that should be provided?
       Allen Buchanan, in an article entitled “The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care” (1984), argues that the right to health care is not an unlimited right, but rather a right to a “decent minimum” of care.2 However, I would argue that the concept of a “decent minimum” of care is unacceptable for a number of reasons, and that the right to health care is a right to timely and adequate access to medically necessary care, recognizing that (1) access must be reasonable, not unnecessarily impeded, not unduly burdensome, and actual rather than merely theoretical, and (2) the care provided must be respectful of the human and personal dignity of each individual.
      Medically necessary care may be defined as care provided to prevent, diagnose, or treat a medical condition, in accordance with the accepted medical standard of care for that condition. The standard of care for a given medical condition may be defined as the kind of care that would ordinarily be rendered by a competent health care provider in the same community under similar circumstances. Medically necessary care may also be defined as care without which the patient being treated would suffer debilitating symptoms, preventable complications, irreparable injury, or permanent loss of function.
      The right to health care is not a right to unlimited or unnecessary care. Patients do not have the right to demand unnecessary services, and care providers do not have an obligation to provide unnecessary services. Indeed, care providers have an obligation not to provide unnecessary services, because such services may be harmful to patients and wasteful of health care resources.
      What then is wrong with the concept of a “decent minimum” of care? A “decent minimum” may be defined in a number of ways, some of them quite problematic. For example, from the point of view of party A, who thinks that party B is morally and socially inferior and therefore undeserving of the same level of health care available to party A, a “decent minimum” of care for party B may be something quite lower than what party A is entitled to. Also, from the viewpoint of party A, who lives in wealthy country C, a “decent minimum” of care for party B, who lives in poor country D, may be something quite lower than what party A is entitled to, because of the disparities between the economic and health care resources of countries C and D and the consequent disparity between what people of the two countries may see as the “decent minimum” level of care to which they are entitled. Both of these viewpoints may lead to arbitrariness, inequity, and injustice in the way in which the definition of a “decent minimum” of care is decided upon.
      It may also be argued that people have a right to more than a “decent minimum” of care, and that they have a right to the best quality of medically necessary care that can be provided, within the logistical, economic, and technological constraints of the health care system of the society in which they live.
      The financial cost of health care, of course, has to be taken into account in determining what constitutes the best possible care. The best possible care is also the safest, most reliable, most effective, and most cost-efficient care, as well as the care that is least burdensome for patients and most likely to produce the best possible outcomes.
      Buchanan says that debate about the claim that there is a right to a “decent minimum” of health care may center on two issues: (1) the issue of whether there is a more extensive right to health care, and (2) the issue of what health care services comprise the “decent minimum” of care to which there is a right.3 He admits that the claim that there is a “decent minimum” of care usually presupposes that this “decent minimum” is relative to the given society in which it is said to exist, but he argues that the advantages of the concept of a “decent minimum” for all individuals, as opposed to an equality of opportunity (regarding health care) for all individuals, are that (1) the concept of a “decent minimum” enables us to adjust the level of care according to relevant social conditions, (2) it “avoids the excesses of the strong equal access principle” (that everyone has an equal right to the best health care available) , while still acknowledging a substantive universal right, and (3) it recognizes that there must be some limitation to the right to health care, because of the limitations in resources available to any given society.4
      Buchanan thus explains that it’s reasonable to assume that, just as with other social goods and services, the extent of the right to health care services depends on the resources available to a given society.5 He makes a distinction between universal rights claims (which attribute the same rights to all individuals) and special rights claims (which attribute rights to particular individuals or groups).6 He also explains that special rights claims may be based on past discrimination against an individual or group (because that individual or group may have a special right to goods or services they have previously been denied) or may be based on unjust harms suffered by an individual or group (because that individual or group may have a special right to compensation for the unjust harms they have suffered) or may be based on sacrifices made by an individual or group for the good of society as a whole (because that individual or group may have a special right to compensation for the sacrifices they have made).7
      It may be argued, however, that everyone has a right to the best care available within the logistical, economic, and technological constraints of the health care system of the society in which they live, although everyone may not necessarily the same right. Those who are more in need of health care may have more of a right to the best care available. Those who invest their financial resources in order to ensure that they receive the best care available may also have a special right to receive the best care available. However, need should be considered more important than ability to pay in determining who is most deserving of available health care. Individuals should not be prohibited from investing their financial resources in order to ensure that they receive the best care available, but all individuals should be able to receive the best care available if they are really in need, regardless of their ability to pay.
      Another argument against the acceptability of the concept of a “decent minimum” of care is that care providers may have a duty to provide more than a “decent minimum.” They actually have a duty to fulfill a “reasonable standard of care,” which may be more than a “decent minimum.” Moreover, it may be argued they have a duty to provide the best care they can provide within the constraints of the health care system in which they function as providers. Requiring them to provide only a “decent minimum” of care may conflict with their duty to fulfill a “reasonable standard” of care and to provide the best care they can provide within the constraints of the given health care system.
      I would argue that health care providers also have a duty to provide the best possible care for all their patients, regardless of their patients’ socioeconomic status, age, gender, race, nationality, religion, sexual orientation, gender identity, or disability.
      Part of the duty of every health care provider is to function as an advocate for his or her patients in order to help them navigate the health care system, and in order to ensure that they have access to all the care they need. Patients have a right to expect that their health care providers will do their best to ensure that they receive all the care they need, and to ensure that they receive the best care possible.
      The concept of a “decent minimum” of care may therefore become a means to unfairly discriminate against individuals, based on their socioeconomic status or other factors. Those who are seen as being of lower socioeconomic status may be seen as being entitled to only a “decent minimum” of care, while those who are seen as being of higher socioeconomic status may be seen as being entitled to the best care available.
      The supposed obligation to provide only a “decent minimum” of care may also become a “slippery slope” for care providers, leading them to provide less and less care until the concept of a “decent minimum” has hardly any meaning. A “decent minimum” may come to mean almost nothing at all. A “decent minimum” may also come to mean a lower level of care than could reasonably be provided within the constraints of the health care system.  A “decent minimum” may become a kind of “race to the bottom,” rather than an effort to make a higher baseline level of health care available to all individuals.
      Perhaps, instead of trying to explore the content of a “decent minimum of care,” we should try to explore the content of an “adequate baseline level of care.”
      Justice in health care does not require that everyone have the same access to care and receive the same level of care, regardless of whether some are more in need of care than others. It does, however, require that everyone be provided with the health care he or she needs, and that an adequate baseline level of health care be made available to all.
      Kenneth Cust (1997) describes a “just minimum of health care” as a more viable concept than a “decent minimum of health care.” He says that

“Thus far we have taken the phrase ‘decent minimum of health care’ to mean roughly an adequate amount of health care. However, the concept “decent” has normative content as well. It can mean, for example, conformity with a standard of conduct or propriety. On this account, to say that people were entitled to a decent minimum of health care would mean little more than to say they were entitled to only what we choose to give them. If this is what Buchanan meant by a decent minimum of health care, then it may not be sufficient to meet people’s basic heath care needs.”8

      The right to medically necessary care may imply other rights, such as those enumerated in various statements of patient rights and responsibilities. Patient rights implied by the right to medically necessary care may include such rights as (1) the right to be treated with dignity and respect, (2) the right to be treated in a safe and secure environment, (3) the right to be protected from abuse, neglect, and mistreatment, (4) the right to be protected from discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, or disability, (5) the right to informed consent, (6) the right to privacy, (7) the right to confidentiality of personal and health information, (8) the right to participate in medical decision-making concerning one’s own care and treatment, and (9) the right to timely and understandable communications from health care providers.
      Patient responsibilities, on the other hand, may include (1) the responsibility to provide complete and accurate information about present symptoms, present and past medications, past medical history, and past treatment, (2) the responsibility to cooperate with care providers in order to develop plans of treatment, (3) the responsibility to comply with recommended treatment, (4) the responsibility to return for follow-up appointments in a timely fashion, and (5) the responsibility to respect the rights of other patients.


1United Nations, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” (1948), online at
2Allen Buchanan,, “The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care” (1984), in Justice and Health Care: Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 4.
3Ibid., p. 17.
4Ibid., p. 20.
5Ibid., p. 20.
6Ibid., p. 27.
7Ibid., p. 27.
8Kenneth Cust, A Just Minimum of Health Care (Lanham: University Press of America, 1997), p. 61.

Monday, November 7, 2016

Kenneth Mills, Philosopher of the Struggle for Liberation

Kenneth Ian Leighton Mills (b. June 14, 1931; d. January 31, 1983) was a Trinidadian and British philosopher who was born in Port of Spain, Trinidad. His parents were Horace Eugene Leighton Mills and Muriel Mills (née Hinkson). He left Trinidad in 1956 to study at University College London, where he was awarded a first-class honors degree in philosophy in 1962, which earned him a scholarship to Oxford, where he received a bachelor of philosophy (BPhil) degree in philosophy in 1964. His future wife Marie Therese Mills (née Barratt) left Trinidad a year after him to join him in London, and they were married in London in May 1957. However, they separated in 1962-1963, and Therese returned to Trinidad in 1964 to raise their two young daughters and son. She raised their children as a single mother, and she and Ken were later divorced.
      Therese Mills (b. December 14, 1928; d. January 1, 2014) was born in Port of Spain, and attended Providence Girls Catholic School. When she was 17 years old, she became a library assistant and reporter for the Port-of-Spain Gazette, and she continued working there for 11 years. After leaving for England, where she married Ken Mills and gave birth to their children, she returned to Trinidad in 1964 to work for the Trinidad Guardian, where she was a senior writer and reporter from 1964-1970. She became news editor of the Sunday Guardian from 1970-1978, and then its editor from 1979-1990. She became editor-in-chief of the Trinidad Guardian in 1989, the first woman to hold such a post at a national newspaper in Trinidad and Tobago. After her retirement from the Trinidad Guardian in 1993, she became founding editor-in-chief of Trinidad and Tobago Newsday. She wrote several children’s books, and also wrote a memoir entitled Byline: The Memoirs of Therese Mills (2016), published after her death and edited by her daughter Suzanne. She was the recipient of two national awards for her contributions to journalism: the Hummingbird Medal in 1987, and the Chaconia Medal in 2012. She was also awarded an honorary doctoral degree from the University of the West Indies in 2012.1,2,3
      In March 1960, Ken Mills was among a group of student protesters who were arrested outside the South African Embassy in London during demonstrations against the South African apartheid regime. (On March 21, 1960, the South African police had killed 69 black protesters in Sharpeville, South Africa, in an event that came to be known as the Sharpeville Massacre.) He was released after a night in custody, and charges against him were subsequently dismissed.4
      In 1964, Kenneth Mills was recruited by Stanford University for a teaching position in the philosophy department. His previous arrest at the South African Embassy complicated his efforts to obtain a visa to the U.S., and in order to obtain a visa, he had to swear that he had never been a Communist (which in fact he never was). His visa also stipulated that he leave the U.S. after two years. He became an assistant professor of philosophy at Stanford from 1964-1966, and he then went to Canada, where he taught at the University of Alberta, Edmonton, from 1966-1968. In 1968, he was recruited by Yale University for a professorship, and with Yale's help was able to obtain a new visa to the U.S. He became an assistant professor of philosophy at Yale in the fall of 1968. 
Keith Lowe of the English department, and Kenneth Mills (in the background) of the philosophy department, during an anti-war protest in White Memorial Plaza at Stanford University, January 31, 1966. Copyright 2016 The Stanford Daily, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.

     At Stanford, Ken Mills had become involved in the anti-Vietnam War movement (The Stanford Daily, on May 17, 1965, reported that he was among the speakers at a Viet Nam “teach-in” that day,5 and on Feb, 24, 1966, reported that he was among the speakers at a symposium on Vietnam that day at the College of San Mateo in San Mateo, California6), and he continued his political activism at Yale.
      He published a long article in the journal Inquiry (1968), entitled “Towards a Phenomenology of Morals,” which was written while he was at the University of Alberta, shortly before he came to Yale. The article questions whether there can be any logical or semantic tests for distinguishing moral from non-moral language, and it argues that “the search for some semantic characteristic that moral judgments have in common not only restricts the scope of ethics to no good purpose, but…also fails to shed light on certain English sentences which are genuinely problematic from the point of view of theory of meaning.”7 He describes the artificiality of limiting ethics to the study of the logical properties of moral words or sentences,8 and he explains that philosophical attention to problems of meaning has focused not as much on the possibility of giving an account of the meaning of putative moral judgments (“M judgments”) as on (1) establishing a clear distinction between indicative and non-indicative language, (2) showing that moral language is a form of non-indicative language, (3) giving an account of M judgments that preserves the indicative-non-indicative distinction (but, contra verificationism, does not have the consequence of making moral language vacuous), and (4) observing the fact-value distinction.9
      Ken lived in an apartment at Yale’s Branford College, and he taught a seminar at Branford entitled “Revolution” in 1968-1969. He also taught a course entitled “Politics and Aesthetics” in 1968-1969.
      Lawrence Lifschultz, who was a member of the Yale College Class of 1973, and who later became a journalist and international news correspondent, says, in describing a seminar of Ken's at which the economist Paul Sweezy spoke, that "I first heard Paul speak at Yale in 1969 at a seminar led by Ken Mills, a young philosophy professor. The seminar room was much too small for the size of the crowd that turned up and we shifted to the larger Branford College Common Room. Shortly afterwards, I was asked by Ken Mills to summarize those chapters from [Paul Sweezy and Paul Barran's] Monopoly Capital which centered on the stagnation thesis. It was my first encounter with the [Marxist] concept of 'capital overaccumulation.'"10
      In 1969, Ken was among the leaders of a movement that included the SDS (Students for a Democratic Society), the “Branford Liberation Front,” the Coalition for a New University (CNU), and other groups protesting the presence of the ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training Corps) on campus.11
      The anti-war movement, the civil rights movement, the women’s movement, and the student protest movement had a powerful impact on U.S. colleges and universities in the 1960’s and 1970’s.
      In March 1969, eight civil rights activists known as the “Chicago Eight” were indicted on charges of conspiring to incite a riot, as a result of the disturbances that took place outside the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The eight defendants were: Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, David Dellinger, Tom Hayden, Rennie Davis, John Froines, Lee Weiner, and Bobby Seale. Bobby Seale requested that his trial be postponed, so that his lawyer, Charles Garry, could recover from surgery, but the judge who was hearing the case, Judge Julius Hoffman, refused his request, and he also refused his request to act as his own attorney. When Seale continued to protest this denial of his legal rights, Judge Hoffman accused him of disrupting the trial and ordered him bound, gagged, and chained to a chair as the trial continued. Hoffman subsequently sentenced Seale to four years in prison for contempt of court, and he ordered his case to be severed from the cases of the other seven defendants, who came to be known as the “Chicago Seven.”
      Bobby Seale was a co-founder of the Black Panther Party. While he was serving his four-year sentence for contempt of court, he was charged in New Haven, Connecticut with conspiracy to murder a fellow Panther, Alex Rackley, who had been killed by three other Panthers for allegedly being a police informant. The New Haven Black Panther trials began in May of 1970. There was widespread public concern, however, about whether Bobby Seale could get a fair trial.
      On April 21, 1970, 4500 Yale students attended a meeting at Ingalls Rink to discuss proposals for a student strike in order to express solidarity with the defendants at the New Haven Panther trial. Among the speakers at the meeting were Black Panther Chief of Staff David Hilliard, and Yale assistant professor of philosophy Kenneth Mills. Nine of Yale’s twelve residential colleges voted to strike.12
      On April 30, 1970, 2500 Yale students attended a rally at Ingalls Rink and listened to plans for the May Day student strike. William Farley (Class of 1972) and Kurt Schmoke (Class of 1971) chaired the meeting, and the featured speakers included John Froines of the Chicago Seven, Doug Miranda of the Black Panthers, and Kenneth Mills, assistant professor of philosophy. The Yale Daily News, reported on April 30, 1970 that “Mills received the greatest applause of the evening. Discussing the importance of continuing the strike after the weekend, Mills said, 'We aren’t going back. We want to see justice done.' Over half the audience rose to applaud Mills. Mills said, 'There is one clear and simple demand—that is, free Bobby, free the Panthers.' He warned earlier, 'We are not going to tolerate the lynching of the Panthers in New Haven.' He urged the audience to ‘forget your semantic distinctions on the demands and start dealing with the issues.’”13 He also spoke of the importance of non-violence.
      At a rally on the New Haven Green on the afternoon of May 1, 1970, approximately 10,000 people gathered to listen to such speakers as David Hilliard, Abbie Hofmann, David Dellinger, Dr. Benjamin Spock, Kenneth Mills, and the French writer Jean Genet. Despite the peaceful quality of the afternoon, confrontations between police and demonstrators occurred that evening, leading to the use of tear gas by police and the arrests of 17 demonstrators.

Kenneth Mills, addressing the crowd on the New Haven Green, May 1, 1970. Copyright 2016 Yale Daily News Publishing Company, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.

      On the night of April 30, 1970, President Richard Nixon delivered a televised speech to the nation announcing that U.S. troops were going to invade Cambodia. On May 2, protesters burned down the ROTC building at Kent State University in Kent, Ohio, and on May 4, 1970, National Guardsmen killed four students at Kent State during student demonstrations. On the night of May 14, 1970, police and state troopers fired into a crowd of protesters at Jackson State College in Jackson, Mississippi, killing two students. Protests and student strikes erupted at hundreds of university and college campuses across the country.
      The jury in the New Haven Panther trials was unable to reach a verdict in Bobby Seale’s case, and the charges against him were dropped, He was eventually released from prison in 1972.
      Bright College Years” (1971) is a film documentary by director Peter Rosen about the May Day 1970 events in New Haven. At 8:57 of the film, there’s a brief video recording of Kenneth Mills delivering a speech to a crowd of students at Ingalls Rink. At 34:29 of the film, there’s a brief recording of him delivering a speech on May Day at the New Haven Green.
      On May 6, 1970, Ken and Roy Bryce-Laporte, director of Yale's African-American Studies Program, led a workshop entitled "Liberation and What We Can Do" at Yale's Morse College, and later that same day Ken and Margaret Leslie from United Newhallville, a community organization in New Haven, led a workshop entitled "Yale and the Community," at Branford Dining Hall.14
      On May 22, 1970, Ken Mills and Murray Kempton were the featured speakers at an anti-war program sponsored by students at Sarah Lawrence College in Bronxville, New York.
      Ken and two other Yale faculty members, Adam Perry of the Classics Department, and Peter Rose of the Classics Department, were also among the sponsors of a mass demonstration held by the Connecticut Peace Action Coalition at the New Haven Green on Oct. 31, 1970, as part of a nationwide effort to end the Vietnam War.15
      Ken delivered a lecture entitled “Dialectics of Black Liberation” in November 1970 at a conference on “Philosophy and the Black Liberation Struggle,” sponsored by the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle. The other speakers included Professor Albert Mosley of Federal City College in Washington, D.C., Professor Bernard Boxill of the University of California at Santa Barbara, and William M.C. Okadigbo of the Catholic University of America.
      [The "dialectics of liberation" had actually been the subject of an international conference that was held in London in July 1967. Participants at the Congress on the Dialectics of Liberation had included such writers and social activists as Gregory Bateson, Stokely Carmichael, Allen Ginsberg, Paul Goodman, Ronald D. Laing, Herbert Marcuse, Paul Sweezy, and Thich Nhat Hanh. David Cooper, a South African psychiatrist and writer, had said in his remarks to the conference that "Each of us is composed of a series of dualities that run through every level...of our existence...These dualities include: subject-object, white-black, oppressor-oppressed, colonizer-colonized...Now the ideal that we contain all these oppositions and learn to bear both the pain and joy of this act of self-containment. But, because of the historical situation, for which we are each of us totally responsible, we have each of us split off any number of these dualities...and have externalized these split-off aspects of ourselves into others. This supreme the existential basis of colonialism, for instance, or institutionalized racism."16 Stokely Carmichael, later known as Kwame Ture, had said in his remarks to the conference that "Black Power, to us, means that black people see themselves as part of a new force, sometimes called the Third World; that we see our struggle as closely related to liberation struggles around the world."17 And Herbert Marcuse had said in his remarks to the conference that "the 'dialectics of liberation' [is] actually a redundant phrase, because I believe that all dialectic is liberation...It is liberation from the repressive, from...a false system, be it an organic system...a social system...a mental or intellectual system: liberation by forces developing within such a system...liberation by virtue of the contradiction generated by the system."18 ]
      John Taft, who was a member of the Yale College Class of 1972, and who later became a historian and television documentary producer, was one of the students in a history seminar taught by Professor Donald Kagan in 1971 who conducted interviews with many Yale students and faculty about the events leading up to the May Day 1970 rally in New Haven. Among the faculty they interviewed were President Kingman Brewster, Special Assistant to the President Henry Chauncey, University Chaplain William Sloane Coffin, professor of English Richard Sewall, professor of psychology Kenneth Keniston, and professor of philosophy Kenneth Mills. The interviews provided background material for Taft's book, Mayday at Yale: A Case Study in Student Radicalism (1976).19
      During the course of his being interviewed by Taft, Ken Mills says, in discussing the May Day student strike, that 'when the normal operations of the university get disrupted, there may be a space created for the posing of certain types of questions that people [ordinarily don't] concern themselves with. That is what we were interested in...The process whereby people become politically reflective.'20
      In a PBS Frontline program entitled “Are We Better Off? The Two Nations of Black America” (1998), Henry Louis Gates Jr., who was a member of the Yale College Class of 1973, says that "Ken Mills [was] a Trinidadian-born, Oxford-trained analytic philosopher, who stood six feet six, wore a blue jean suit,…drove a TR-6, and sported a conical-shaped Afro. He was the voice of the Revolution itself, Marx and Marcuse [with a] black face; pulling quotes from Hegel and Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Fanon, Gramsci and Mad, out of thin air like Svengali, in a classical Oxbridge accent that the Anglophile wannabees on the Yale faculty could only envy. Ken was bad, if ever bad there was, as bad as he wanted to be…”21
      Austin Clarke, the Barbadian novelist, essayist, and short story writer who taught in the English Department at Yale from 1968-1970, says in his memoir ‘Membering (2015) that Ken was a “tall, handsome, and intellectually brilliant man,” and that “although he shuns us, his black colleagues, because we are not bright like him, yet we, students and faculty alike, know that, as the black American hipster puts it, he’s ‘got his shit together.’”22
      Clarke also says that “Some of my black students told me that they regretted Ken’s refusal to associate with them, that he did not want to be their ‘adviser,’…yet they knew, so they assured me, that Ken’s image was assured, for with his brilliance and brains, they were willing to admit that ‘the brother is heavy.’”23
      In the fall semester of 1971, Ken taught a course entitled “Reason and Revolution” (which is also the title of a book by Herbert Marcuse, in which Marcuse argues that Hegel's political philosophy may be described as a theory of revolution, insofar as Hegel says that reason is a historical force that leads to freedom, and that revolution can demonstrate reason's ultimate power over reality.24)
      On February 8, 1972, it was announced that President Kingman Brewster had suspended Kenneth Mills for one year from the Yale faculty, due to the discovery that Ken had simultaneously held a faculty position at another university (the State University of New York, Stony Brook) against Yale’s regulations. Yale Provost Charles Taylor, without any prior warning to Ken, had sent Dean Horace Taft to Ken's apartment on January 6, 1972 to knock on his door and demand his resignation, and when Ken refused to resign, Brewster decided to suspend him. Ken chose to resign from Stony Brook, rather than from Yale. He criticized Provost Charles Taylor’s disregard for due process, and he explained that his acceptance of a position at Stony Brook had been motivated not by financial reasons, but by his doubtful advancement possibilities at Yale and his desire to work with Stony Brook’s innovative social welfare program.25 The Yale Daily News later reported that Brewster “claimed to be taking a compromise position between those who felt Mills should be fired outright and those who maintained little or no response was necessary.”26The Yale Corporation, on March 11, 1972, approved Brewster’s decision.
      The Yale Daily News reported, on Feb. 2, 1972, that Yale faculty contracts at that time were “generally verbal rather than written,”27 and, on Feb. 8, 1972, that “The rule Mills broke was not written into his contract, (as a matter of fact, he had no written contract) nor was it directly expressed orally or literally to him in any way when he came to Yale. The rule is found only in the ‘Faculty Handbook.’”28
      The Black Student Alliance at Yale (BSAY) and other student groups expressed support for Ken, and they demanded that he be immediately reinstated. Delegations of students met with President Brewster and with members of the Yale Corporation. Student rallies were held, and a petition signed by 940 students was presented to the philosophy department in March 1972. However, the university administration refused to change its position.
      The New York Times, on February 28, 1972, reported that “Kingman Brewster Jr., the president of Yale University, recently suspended for one year a young, popular, black, Marxist philosophy teacher, causing a stir among faculty and undergraduates…A towering Trinidadian who did his undergraduate work at University College, London, and his graduate work under the eminent philosopher of language A.J. Ayer, at New College, Oxford, Professor Mills speaks of himself as a stranger to the ‘Old Blue inner circle at Yale.’”29
      The Times continued:

      “Sanford Kravitz, dean of Stony Brook’s School of Social Welfare, where Professor Mills had been teaching four days a week, supervising seven students and heading a field project, said he had been as unaware of the professor’s commitment to Yale as Yale had been unaware of his commitment to Stony Brook. Professor Mills taught two courses at both universities.
      Although the Stony Brook Faculty Handbook states only that a faculty member must obtain permission before undertaking any outside appointment, Dean Kravitz said permission would have probably been denied Professor Mills had he sought to legitimize his commitment to Yale. Professor Mills’s salary at Stony Brook was $26,000; at Yale, $13,000.”30
      Time magazine article on Mar. 13, 1972 said that Ken Mills “is a heavy-shouldered, 6-ft. 4-in. black from Trinidad with a towering Afro hairdo and a penchant for blue jeans. He is also an avowed Marxist. Nonetheless, as a pupil of Oxford’s distinguished logician A.J. Ayer, he so impressed the Yale philosophy department that he was hired in 1968 to teach courses on revolution and black liberation. And when Yale confronted the threat of a May Day riot two years ago, he worked diligently to help keep the peace.”31

Kenneth Mills speaking to a group of Yale students at Linsley-Chittenden Hall, 1969. Copyright 2016 Yale Daily News Publishing Company, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.

      Ken went to Brown University as a visiting professor in 1972-1973. He taught two courses during the fall semester: “Political Ideologies and History” and “The State and Revolution.”
       He returned to Yale in the fall of 1973, but he was only given a one-year extension of his contract, and was denied tenure.
      What exactly were the reasons for his not being offered a further extension of his contract? Besides the controversy surrounding his suspension, could his political activism and his outsider status (as a black Trinidadian, civil rights activist, and public philosopher) vis-à-vis Yale’s traditional elite have also been reasons?
      The Yale Daily News, on Nov. 13, 1972, reported that unnamed faculty members had described his chances for reappointment as “slim,” because of “alleged lack of distinction and quantity of published writing and lack of experience in supervising dissertations.”32 However, his faculty and student supporters praised him as being a gifted scholar and as having superb teaching skills.
      The Yale Daily News, on June 26, 1972, also reported that he had received job offers from Antioch College and the University of New Mexico. 
      However, Ken was one of three teachers of philosophical and political Marxism at Yale, of whom two, Kenley Dove and William McBride, had already been denied tenure. The philosophy department’s recommendation that McBride receive tenure had been rejected by the executive committee of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, a somewhat unusual outcome for department recommendations, and a cause for speculation that Marxist thought was being removed from the curriculum. McBride, who later became Arthur G. Hansen Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University, spoke of the decline in the study and teaching of political philosophy that this loss of scholars represented for the Yale philosophy department.33
     Charlotte Allen, in an article entitled “As Bad as it Gets: Three Dark Tales from the Annals of Academic Receivership” (1998), describes the Yale philosophy department of the 1970s as follows:

  “The troubles at Yale’s philosophy department date back to the war over methodology that plagued many American philosophy departments during the 1950s and 1960s…Analytic philosophy…broadly speaking, focuses on the logical analysis of language and concepts. While rival methodologies—phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism---flourished on the European Continent, analytic philosophy became the dominant school of the Anglophone world…
      The Yale philosophy department, by contrast, tried for many years to represent a spectrum of schools. In 1973 the department hired Ruth Barcan Marcus, a leading analytic philosopher and specialist in modal logic. Marcus…was determined to remold Yale into a bastion of analytic thinking. Her main technique was to fight to the death tenurings of non-analytic junior faculty, as well as appointments of non-analytic outsiders. She quickly helped send packing two promising junior phenomenologists, David Carr (now chair of philosophy at Emory) and Edward Casey (now chair of philosophy at SUNY Stony Brook).
      But absolute victory eluded Marcus. Her leading opponent on the Yale faculty was John Smith, an exponent of the American pragmatist school and a philosopher of religion. As department chair, Smith had recruited Marcus to Yale but remained a staunch advocate of the program’s pluralistic tradition. In 1980 Smith was elected president of the Eastern division of the American Philosophical Association (APA) over the opposition of Marcus, who chaired the APA’s national board of officers. Smith and Marcus were famous for their floor fights at the APA—which they took back with them to Yale.
      The result was an impasse that prevented virtually any new hirings or tenurings for most of the 1970s and 1980s.”34
      Ken Mills was one of the speakers at a conference on morality and international violence that was held at Kean College of New Jersey on April 22-24, 1974. He and Arthur Danto spoke on “The Feasibility of Moral Codes in Modern Warfare.” (Arthur Danto later wrote an article entitled “On Moral Codes and Modern War” that was published in the journal Social Research, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1978, pp. 176-190.)

Kenneth Mills at the Ingalls Rink rally, April 1970. Copyright 2016 Yale Daily News Publishing Company, Inc. All rights reserved. Reprinted with permission.

       Ken taught at Swarthmore College from 1974-1975. This was his final teaching position.
      He had met Francelle Carapetyan in 1964, when they both were students at Oxford. He was then a graduate student, and she was an undergraduate. She was born in Boston, but was raised in Europe, and she attended the Rosemead School in Littlehampton, England before studying French and Italian literature at Oxford. She and Ken went together to the University of Alberta in 1966, where she studied for three years, and they were married in 1970. She became a teacher and vice principal for students at the Choate Rosemary Hall School in Wallingford, Connecticut from 1974-1985, and she later worked as a photo editor and image researcher.
      In 1976-1977, Ken began to have exacerbations of his Crohn's disease. For several years, there were times when he had to be rushed to the hospital with life-threatening medical problems. He eventually passed away at home in Wallingford, Connecticut, on January 31, 1983.
      One way of describing Ken's legacy as a philosopher may be to say that he showed how theory could be combined with practice, and how philosophical thought could be combined with social action. He was politically engaged, and he was passionately concerned with social justice. He had the courage to oppose oppression and exclusion, and he had the dedication to promote peace and reconciliation.
      Among Francelle's reflections are that: "Ken was never irresponsible. He was never a flame thrower, metaphorically or literally. At the same time, he was someone for whom passion and reason were both important, and in whom both were combined, and he didn't see them as mutually exclusive."
      Francelle also says that after his final year of teaching at Swarthmore College, and in response to the reluctance of other colleges and universities to hire him because of his political activism, "Ken felt that he had reached an impasse in America. He felt boxed in. It was extremely difficult for him. He was a leader when he was teaching and when he was actively political. For him, they were one and the same. He was charismatic. He was intense. But at the same time, he wanted to make sure that people were with him, because the stakes were so high at the time."
      In 1977, it was revealed that the New Haven Police Department had illegally wiretapped more than 1200 people between 1964 and 1971. Among those who were subjected to illegal wiretapping were several Yale faculty members, including Professor Vincent Scully, former University Chaplain William Sloane Coffin, and former Professor Kenneth Mills. The City of New Haven agreed in 1985 to pay $1.75 million to settle a class action lawsuit filed by 52 plaintiffs, among whom were Kenneth Mills and Francelle Carapetyan. Ken and Francelle were eventually able, through the Freedom of Information Act, to obtain some of the transcripts of their telephone conversations that had been illegally recorded. They also discovered that their movements in New Haven had been followed by the New Haven police and the FBI.
      Michele Celine Mills, Ken’s eldest daughter, was born in London, but grew up in Trinidad and Tobago, where she obtained a B.A. degree (with honors) in English Literature from the University of the West Indies (UWI), Trinidad campus. She later completed the in-service post-graduate Diploma in Education at the School of Education, UWI Trinidad. She was a teacher at the secondary level for twenty years, eighteen of these in Trinidad, and two years at the Clement Howell High School, on the island of Providenciales in the Turks & Caicos Islands. Michele has also had a career in journalism, working as the Features Editor with Daily News Limited (Newsday), a national daily newspaper in Trinidad and Tobago. It was during this phase of her career that Michele completed her Master’s degree in Education in 2002 with the Sheffield University Caribbean program, and in 2013 she received her Ph.D. in Education from the University of Bristol.35
      Suzanne Mills, like her mother, has had a distinguished career in journalism. In 2006, she was appointed Editor-in-Chief of Trinidad and Tobago Newsday. She has a Master’s degree in journalism from Goldsmiths College, University of London, where she studied on a British Council Chevening scholarship. She also holds a diploma (with distinction) in International Media Law, and a B.A. in Spanish and Anthropology from the University of New Brunswick, Canada.36
      Roger Mills, the younger brother of Michele and Suzanne Mills, has also worked as a journalist. He has an advanced degree in journalism, and has worked as a Trinidad and Tobago Newsday special correspondent. He is currently a teacher.
      Michele provides the following very poignant and moving account of her father’s life and family relationships.
      “Ken was born in the area of Belmont, close to the capital city Port of Spain during the British colonial era. The Mills family hailed from the town of St. Joseph (San José de Oruna), actually the first capital established by the Spanish in Trinidad, probably due to its elevated situation. The family was a very erudite one, a family of teachers. Ken’s father, Leighton, as he was always called, spoke fluent Latin. Ken’s grandfather was a headmaster of a primary school, and I believe that is where Ken received his early education, as did all the grandchildren.
      Ken’s birth certificate lists his father’s occupation as “accountant.” I cannot elaborate on this, because I know of him as being a journalist. I know almost nothing about my paternal grandmother, as she died when Ken was a toddler. Ken’s father moved to the twin island Tobago, where he started a private secondary school. At that time, there was a need for secondary level schools on both islands, but more so in Tobago. This is where he wrote his book of poems. [Horace Eugene Leighton Mills’s Anthology of Poems, and a 3-act play, Flora was published by Busby’s Printerie in Trinidad, in 1966.] It was entitled “Flora,” after the terrible hurricane that devastated Tobago during his time there. Leighton was married twice. With his first wife, he had Monica and Ken Mills. Sadly, their mother died of tuberculosis when Ken was about two and his sister five. Apparently, she was already ill with the disease when she gave birth to Ken, who was born with Crohn’s disease, which went undiagnosed until he went to London in the 50’s. Ken’s father remarried, and he and his wife had two daughters, Merrie and Ann. Only my aunt Ann married. The younger sisters live in Canada, and my aunt Monica lives in New York.
      Ken’s father died of cancer in Trinidad in February 1982, almost exactly one year before Ken’s death. That would have been the last time I ever spoke to my father. He did not travel back for the funeral, but we spoke on the phone. I think his father, Leighton, was, like him brilliant, but a frustrated artist, because at that time in a colonial society there was little room for artistic development. Hence, most writers, like V.S. Naipaul and others, left the island. I am sure that is why Ken left as well. Ken was also a journalist, and this is how my parents met. Ken and his sister Monica were raised by their aunts in the family home at St. Joseph. Most of the aunts were single women. His younger sisters had their mother, but they too spent a lot of their youth in that household. Ken attended Queen’s Royal College (QRC) during his secondary years. This was paid for by his aunt, Stella Mills, herself a teacher and later a headmistress of a successful primary school. QRC was the top school in its day, established by the colonial government and based on a very British grammar school model. Ken was in class with the author V.S. Naipaul, and they often took the train home together.
      Ken was not part of our lives growing up. For myself, there was undoubtedly much angst over the years, particularly because much remained unresolved. He died at the age of 52. He would have been 85 on his birthday this year. I was 25 at the time of his death and was living in London. He never saw his first two grandsons (I was already married with two young boys). Over the years, my mother made sure that we maintained close relationships with our great aunts in St. Joseph and with Ken’s sisters. There was genuine and mutual respect and affection between her and his family. Luncheons there were a time for great discussions and witty banter, and as children we were part of it. Over the years, his aunts came to rely on my mother for advice and support. Uncannily, almost all Ken’s aunts died during the 1980’s, and the family dwindled. The women were really the strong force in that family.
      Ken is buried in the churchyard at St. Joseph, in Trinidad. He became quite ill in London soon after I was born, and it was there that his condition was first diagnosed as Crohn’s and was treated through radical intestinal surgery. He enjoyed a 20-year period of remission and good health. However, I think in the late 70’s or thereabouts, the disease returned, and he was treated with steroids. Apparently, these took a toll on his heart. He died while reading on his bed, on the morning of January 31st, 1983. 
      I think that at some level my father was deeply troubled by not being part of our lives, but he seemed unable to alter the pattern. Apparently, he was not happy even discussing it with his wife. I have come to think of him as very complex. I believe that he was very disheartened by the episode at Yale, and I think his illness returned after that period. A year after his death, I travelled from London to Connecticut, and spent some days with Francelle in the house they shared. It was the first time I had been there, and I was overwhelmed by the outpouring of love and respect there was from a number of people who came to see me, his daughter. It was strange in some ways. I think that until his death, not many knew he even had children. However, I understand all that as part of his complexity. Maturity has helped me to come to terms with it all. I have already outlived him. I recall two visits he made to Trinidad, the first when I was 13 (1971), and again at 19 (1977), when I was in my first year as an undergrad at the Trinidad campus of the UWI. Those were awkward visits. He never returned to Trinidad again until his body was brought back for burial, and I never saw him again.”


Thanks to Michele Mills, for the biographical information and the very moving personal account that she contributed to this portrait of Kenneth Mills.

Thanks also to Francelle Carapetyan, for the biographical information and personal insights that she contributed to this portrait of Kenneth Mills.


1“Rest in Peace, Mrs. Mills,” Jan. 2, 2014, Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, online at,188611.html.
2”Therese Mill dies at 85,” Daily Express, Jan. 1, 2014, online at
3”I just wanted to write stories,” Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, Nov. 11, 2012, online at,169092.html.
4Therese Mills, Byline: The Memoirs of Therese Mills, edited by Suzanne Mills, 2016, p. 110.
5The Stanford Daily, “Viet Nam ‘Teach-In’ Begins At Noon,” by Joel Kugelmass, May 17, 1965, online at
6The Stanford Daily, “CSM to Run Vietnam Talk,” online at
7Kenneth I. Mills, “Towards a Phenomenology of Morals,” in Inquiry, Vol. 11, 1968, pp. 1-39.
8Ibid., p. 20.
9Ibid., p. 24.
10Lawrence Lifshultz, "Happy Birthday, Paul!", in Monthly Review: An Independent Socialist Magazine, Vol. 51, April 2000, online at 
11”Whose Movement?”, George Kannar, Yale Daily News, April 29, 1969, online at
12“Nine Colleges Vote to Strike, Respond to Solidarity Call,” by Thomas Kent and Richard Schwartz, Yale Daily News, April 22, 1970, online at
13”2500 Students at Mass Meeting Hear Pleas for Continued Strike: Non-Violence Emphasized,” by William Bulkeley, Yale Daily News, April 30, 1970, online at
14Austin Clarke, ‘Membering (Toronto: Dundurn, 2015), p. 432.
15Vietnam Protest Planned,” by Charles Cuneo, Yale Daily News, Oct. 22, 1979, online at
16David Cooper, "Beyond Words," in The Dialectics of Liberation, edited by David Cooper (London: Verso, 2015), online at
17Stokely Carmichael, "Black Power," in The Dialectics of Liberation, edited by David Cooper (London: Verso, 2015), p. 172.
18Herbert Marcuse, "Liberation from the Affluent Society," in The New Left and the 1960s: Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, Volume 3 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005), p. 76.
19"Bulldog and Panther: The 1970 May Day Rally and Yale," at Yale University Library Online Exhibits, 2014,
20"Kenneth Mills, interviewed by John Taft," 1971, in the May Day Rally and Yale Collection, Yale University Library Manuscripts and Archives.
21Henry Louis Gates, “Are We Better Off?”, PBS Frontline, 1998, online at
22Austin Clarke, ‘Membering (Toronto: Dundurn, 2015), pp. 429-430.
23Ibid., p. 430.
24Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1941), p. 6.
25”Island Interviews Study Mills Issue,” by Jim Liebman, Yale Daily News, Feb. 21, 1972, online at
26 “Philosophy Extends Term of Mills for One Year,” by Jim Liebman, Yale Daily News, June 26, 1972, online at
27”Yale to Release Decision on Mills,” by Jim Liebman, Yale Daily News, Feb. 2, 1972, online at
28”Does Yale Need Mills?”, by Jim Liebman, Yale Daily News, Feb. 8, 192, online at
29”Ban on Yale Professor Stirs Campus,” by James M. Markham, The New York Times, Feb. 29, 1972, online at
31”Education: The Moonlighter,” Time, Mar. 13, 1972, online at,9171,903367,00.html.
32”Mills review complete; outcome in question,” by Michael Spencer, Yale Daily News, Nov. 13, 1972, online at
33”Tenure Decision Stirs Objections,” Yale Daily News, April 13, 1972, online at
34Charlotte Allen, “As Bad as it Gets: Three Dark Tales from the Annals of Academic Receivership,” in Linguafranca, Volume 98, No. 2, March 1998, online at
35University of Bristol Graduate School of Education, “Members’ research interests and related activities,” online at
36”Suzanne Mills appointed Editor-in-Chief,” Trinidad and Tobago Newsday, Sept. 10, 2006, online at,44042.html.