The Power of Language: Philosophy and Society: June 2013

The distinguished German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) investigates the relation between being-there and being-so in the second part of his Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie (1935, Toward the Foundation of Ontology).

The Grundlegung (the Foundation) is the first of a four-volume series by Hartmann, dealing with ontology. The other volumes of the series are Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit (1938, Possibility and Actuality), Der Aufbau der realen Welt (1940, The Construction of the Real World), and Philosophie der Natur (1950, Philosophy of Nature). Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit is the only one of these volumes that has, as of 2013, been translated into, and published in, English.

The Grundlegung is divided into four parts: (1) Vom Seinenden als Seienden überhaupt (Of "That Which Is" as "That Which Is," in General), (2) Das Verhältnis von Dasein und Sosein (The Relation between Being-There and Being-so), (3) Die Gegebenheit des realen Seins (The Givenness of Real Being), and (4) Problem und Stellung des idealen Seins (The Problem and Position of Ideal Being).

Hartmann distinguishes between ways of being, modes of being, and aspects of being. Ways of being (Seinsweisen) include ideality and reality. Modes of being (Seinsmodi) include actuality, possibility, and necessity (and their negative counterparts, nonactuality, impossibility, and contingency). Aspects of being (Seinsmomenten) include being-so (Sosein) and being-there (Dasein).

Hartmann also distinguishes between being and “that which is,” and thus between the ontological and ontic dimensions of philosophical inquiry. The difference between being (Sein) and “that which is” (Seiende) corresponds to the difference between truth and the true, actuality and the actual, reality and the real. The being of “that which is” may have many different particularizations of its way of being.¹

The distinction between being and "that which is" also corresponds to the distinction between being-there and "that which is there" (Daseiende), and between being-so and "that which is so" (Soseiende).
The central question with which ontology is concerned, “What is being qua being?” cannot therefore be confronted without also confronting the question, “What is ‘that which is’ qua ‘that which is’?”

In all of “that which is,” there are aspects of being-there and being-so.² Being-there and being-so are interconnected and mutually complementary aspects of being. There is no being-there without being-so, and no being-so without being-there.³

The being-there of “that which is” is constituted by the fact “that it is,” while the being-so of “that which is” is constituted by “what it is,” i.e. by its quiddity. Thus, being-there is the “that,” and being-so is the “what” of “that which is.”

There is also being-there in being-so, and being-so in being-there. Being-there “in” something is the particular form of being-there of all being-so, while being-so is the being-there of something “in” something.However, being-there and being-so are not substances in which “that which is” inheres; rather, they are aspects or "moments" of being.⁴

Being-there and being-so are indifferent to each other, insofar as it makes no difference to being-there whether being-so turns out in one way or another, and insofar as it makes no difference to being-so whether being-there turns out in one way or another.⁵ However, being-there and being-so are also not indifferent to each other, insofar as they are aspects of the same particular being and therefore share the same (ideal or real) way of being. Real being-there is always that of a real being-so, and real being-so is always that of a real being-there.⁶ Being-there and being-so can be indifferent to each other only if they belong to different ontological spheres, i.e. if being-so belongs to the ideal sphere and being-there belongs to the real sphere, or vice versa.

Hartmann explains that the epistemological basis of the (misleading) appearance of separation between being-there and being-so is that real being-so may be a priori or a posteriori knowable, while real being-there is only a posteriori knowable. Thus, the boundary between aprioristic and aposterioristic knowledge does not correspond to the (apparent) boundary between being-there and being-so. From real being-so, aprioristic as well as aposterioristic knowledge is possible, while from real being-there, only aposterioristic knowledge is possible. Conversely, aposterioristic knowledge is possible from the being-so, as well as from the being-there, of “that which is,” while aprioristic knowledge is possible only from the being-so of “that which is.”⁷

Aprioristic and aposterioristic sources of knowledge are also ways of givenness of “that which is.”⁸ Thus, there is a threefold superimposition of, or boundary relation between, (1) ways of givenness (aprioristic or aposterioristic) (2) ways of being (ideal or real), and (3) moments of being (being-there or being-so). Aprioristic knowledge is possible from ideal being-so, from ideal being-there, and from real being-so. Aposterioristic knowledge is possible from real being-so, and from real being-there. Real being-there can only be an object of aposterioristic knowledge. Ideal being (ideal being-so and ideal being-there) can only be an object of aprioristic knowledge.⁹

FOOTNOTES

¹Nicolai Hartmann, Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, Second Edition (Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1941), pp. 40-41.

²Ibid., p. 92.

³Ibid., p. 128.

⁴Ibid., p. 134.

⁵Ibid., p. 112.

⁶Ibid., p. 114.

⁷Ibid., pp. 144-145.

⁸Ibid., p. 145.

⁹Ibid., p. 148.

Sunday, June 2, 2013

E.J. Lowe's Four-Category Ontology

E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology (2006) is an attempt to answer the question of what are the fundamental categories of being, as well as the question of what are the basic distinctions between them. Lowe explains that ontological categories are kinds of being.¹ The distinctions between ontological categories include the distinction between universals and particulars, and the distinction between substances and non-substances. Thus, there are four basic ontological categories: substantial universals (kinds), substantial particulars (objects), non-substantial universals (attributes), and non-substantial particulars (modes).

Substantial universals are instantiated by substantial particulars, and non-substantial universals are instantiated by non-substantial particulars. Kinds are instantiated by objects, and attributes are instantiated by modes (or “tropes”). For example, a particular tomato is an instance of the kind, “tomato,” and a particular redness (e.g. the redness of a particular tomato) is an instance of the attribute, “redness.”²

Lowe explains that objects (individual substances) are particular instances of kinds (substantial universals). Modes (property or relation instances) are particular instances of attributes (property or relational universals).

The relations between the four basic ontological categories can be schematized as an “ontological square,” in which the category of “kinds” is in the upper left corner, the category of “objects” is in the lower left corner, the category of “attributes” is in the upper right corner, and the category of “modes” is in the lower right corner. Kinds are characterized by attributes, and are instantiated by objects. Attributes are exemplified by objects, and are instantiated by modes. Objects are characterized by modes (ways of being, or particular instances of properties and relations). Thus, there are three basic kinds of relations between members of the four basic ontological categories: instantiation, characterization, and exemplification.³

Lowe admits that there are at least two basic assumptions made by the four-category ontology: that universals exist, and that there is a basic distinction to be made between substantial and non-substantial universals.⁴

A problem that must be addressed by the four-category ontology is that of whether there can be second- or higher-order kinds of being, as distinguished from first-order kinds of objects. Lowe recognizes this problem, and he explains that according to his definition of “kinds” as universals that are instantiated by substantial particulars, kinds are instantiated by objects and not by other kinds (substantial universals). An ontological category, such as “kinds,” is a kind of being, but it is not a kind in the sense that a kind of object is a kind. However, the counter-argument can also be made that “kinds” as an ontological category can be instantiated not only by kinds of objects, but also by kinds of modes, properties, and relations.

Another problem is that of whether kinds, attributes, and modes may also be made objects (of perception, thought, observation, and investigation). If kinds, attributes, and modes themselves may be made objects, then objects may not be able to be defined exclusively as instances of kinds.

Another problem is that of whether there may be second- or higher-order properties and relations (properties of properties, and relations of, or between, relations). According to Lowe’s definition of attributes as universals that are instantiated by non-substantial particulars, attributes are instantiated by modes (property or relation instances), and not by other attributes (property or relational universals).

Another problem is that of whether the instantiation of kinds or attributes is any different from their exemplification. Particular instances of kinds or attributes may be individual examples of those kinds or attributes. For example, if a particular tomato instantiates the kind, “tomato,” then it also exemplifies it. If a particular redness (e.g. the redness of a particular tomato) instantiates the attribute, “redness,” then it also exemplifies it. On the other hand, a particular tomato may exemplify the property of “redness” without actually instantiating it (because the property of “redness” may be instantiated by the redness of that particular tomato, rather than by the tomato itself). What then is the nature of the difference between instantiation and exemplification?

Lowe recognizes all these problems, and he attempts, with varying degrees of success, to resolve them. His four-category ontology is a very thought-provoking attempt to define the nature and kinds of being, and it is a brilliantly conceived and clearly formulated effort to advance our understanding of the categorical construction of reality.

FOOTNOTES

¹E.J. Lowe, The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 20.

²Ibid., p. 22.

³Ibid., p. 23.

⁴Ibid., p. 28.

The Power of Language: Philosophy and Society

Friday, June 28, 2013

Black Philosophers Online

Thursday, June 13, 2013

Nicolai Hartmann's Theory of the Relation between Being-There and Being-So

Sunday, June 2, 2013

E.J. Lowe's Four-Category Ontology

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