Socrates and the Good Life

In Plato's Protagoras, Socrates initially doubts whether virtue can be taught, but he ultimately decides that all the virtues, including courage, temperance, wisdom, justice, and holiness, consist in knowledge of the good, and that virtue can therefore be taught. Courage, temperance, wisdom, and justice are parts of virtue, in the sense that parts of gold differ from one another only in some parts being larger or smaller than others, rather than in the sense that parts of the face, such as the mouth, nose, eyes, and ears, are different from one another. All the parts of virtue consist in knowledge of what is good and what produces pleasure, and of knowledge of what is bad and what produces pain. To live a good life, we must therefore know how to make the right choices between pleasures and pains. If evil is caused by lack of knowledge of what is good, then no one knowingly chooses to do evil or is overcome by a desire for pleasure (because that would amount to doing evil because of being overcome by good). Weakness of will is therefore impossible. Rather, ignorance may consist in not knowing how to properly weigh pleasures against pains.

      I personally don't agree with the concept of the unity of the virtues--that all the virtues are identical, and that they're merely different names for the same thing. Nor do I agree with the concept of the reciprocity of the virtues--that the virtues are distinct, but if you have one of them, then you have them all. I agree with the concept of the separability of the virtues, insofar as it means that it's possible to have some of the virtues without having others, but I don't think the virtues are totally distinct or completely separable from one another. Rather, I think another view needs to be considered: the commonality of the virtues--that the virtues are different from one another, but they all have something in common. That's what I thought Socrates was getting at when he asked Protagoras whether courage, temperance, wisdom, and justice are parts of virtue or whether they're all merely names for the same thing. If Socrates is indeed proposing a theory of the unity of the virtues, then he's saying that the terms "courage", "temperance", "wisdom", and "justice" are actually synonymous, and that they all mean the same thing. Of course, that's just one example of his making statements that are puzzling, obviously false, or counterintuitive. 

      Another example is when he says that folly is the opposite of temperance, and that every virtue has one and only one opposite, even though folly isn't the opposite of temperance. Folly is actually the opposite of wisdom, and intemperance is the opposite of temperance.

       In Plato's Republic, Socrates sees the good life as a state of harmony or justice within the soul, as well as within a whole society. Justice in the state will be attained when no one takes what belongs to someone else, and when no one is deprived of what belongs to them. Thus, if a carpenter, cobbler, warrior, or legislator engages in the activities to which they are most naturally suited, then they will have and do what belongs to them, and if all do likewise, then there will be justice in the state. 

      Of course, we need to critique the concept that people are "naturally" suited for certain occupations. Who is to determine what occupations people are "naturally" suited for? Such determinations, when made by those in power and authority, may reflect implicit biases and prejudgements about people, and they may be influenced by racism, sexism, and classism. If everyone isn't allowed to choose for themselves the occupation they prefer, then more advantaged and privileged people may attempt to subordinate less advantaged and less privileged people by assigning them to occupations of lower social status, based on the presupposition that social hierarchies and conditions of oppression and domination are the "natural" order of things.

      When Glaucon asks Socrates how the ideal state can come into being, Socrates offers another explanation of how justice can be achieved: the ideal state will come into being when philosophers become kings, and kings become philosophers. When rulers combine philosophic wisdom with the exercise of political power, and when they're guided by the virtues of courage, wisdom, temperance, and justice, then the ideal state will come into being.

      According to Socrates, a philosopher is a person who seeks to know the true nature of things, rather than the mere appearances of things. The true nature of things (as revealed by their ideal Forms) is unchangeable, but the appearances of things are changeable. While it's possible to have knowledge of the ideal Forms of things (and of the Good itself), it's only possible to have beliefs or opinions about the appearances of things. While the true natures of things can become objects of knowledge, the appearances of things can only become objects of belief.

      Socrates illustrates the difference between the world of appearances and the world of true reality by presenting The Allegory of the Cave. If a group of prisoners is chained inside an underground cave, then they may not be able to distinguish the difference between the shadows moving along the walls of the cave and the real forms moving along a parapet above them. If one of the prisoners is released from his chains, and he goes to the entrance of the cave, then he may be dazzled by the light of the outside world, and he may still be unable to see things as they are in true reality. If the prisoner then returns to the cave, then he may be confused by the darkness, and he may still be unable to distinguish the real forms from the shadows inside the cave. An implication of the allegory is that if we are to have knowledge of true reality, then we must be able to distinguish objects in the world of knowledge from objects in the world of belief. A philosopher is someone who can distinguish between mere appearances and true reality, and who seeks to arrive not at mere beliefs about the appearances of things, but at actual knowledge of the true natures of things.

      I personally find it difficult to apply Plato's vision of harmony in the soul to what I would call the good life, because harmony for Plato means subordination of the spirited and appetitive aspects of the soul to the rational aspect of the soul. I don't believe that our moral lives are merely a matter of subordinating ourselves to reason.

      Our moral lives are in part determined by our commitments to our families, friends, neighbors, and communities. These commitments may be not only personal, psychological, moral, religious, and social, but also professional, financial, ideological, and political. Furthermore, when we're really committed to someone or something, our commitment is not only intellectual, but also emotional. The strength of our intellectual engagement or commitment may be matched by the strength of our emotional engagement or commitment. To say that our moral lives are a matter of subordinating ourselves to reason rather than emotion may therefore be to deny that our morality may be reflected by our emotional as well as intellectual commitments. It may be to deny that our emotional commitments may be as strong as or perhaps even stronger than our intellectual commitments. To be incapable of having emotional commitments as strong as our intellectual commitments would seem to make for a possible defect in our morality.

      A counterexample to Socrates's rejection of the concept of weakness of will in the Protagoras can be found in the Republic, Book IV, 439-440, when he tells the story of Leontius, son of Aglaion. Leontius, on his way up from the Piraeus, saw the bodies of some dead criminals who had been executed and left lying on the ground, and he wanted to go and take a look at them. However, he was also disgusted by his desire to take a look at the dead bodies, and he wanted to look away. He struggled with his desire to look at the dead bodies, and he finally surrendered to it, cursing himself in anger. Thus, we have an example of the appetitive aspect of the soul overcoming the rational aspect of the soul, and therefore of weakness of will, contradicting Socrates's assertion in the Protagoras that weakness of will is impossible.