Maimonides, on Divine Attributes

Moses ben Maimon, known as Maimonides (1135-1204), was a Jewish rabbi, philosopher, physician, and astronomer. He was born in Córdoba, Spain, but due to religious persecution, his family was forced to move to Fez, Morocco and later to Palestine and Egypt. He studied the Torah under his father, Maimon ben Joseph, who was a rabbinic judge and scholar, and he also studied medicine, mathematics, and Greek philosophy. He eventually became court physician to Saladin, the sultan of Egypt. He died in Fostat, Egypt and was buried in Tiberias, Israel. His many writings included his Treatise on Logical Terminology (1154), Commentary on the Mishnah (1168), the Mishneh Torah (1178), and The Guide for the Perplexed (1190).

      Maimonides says in The Guide for the Perplexed that while Genesis 1:27 tells us that God created man in his own image, that act of creation doesn't imply that God himself had human form. It is because of man's capacity for rational awareness that he is said to have been created in the likeness of God, not because God has a body or shape.¹ God transcends all likeness, and he is incorporeal.

      God has no attributes or qualities, says Maimonides. There are no attributes that can be predicated of God, because predicates signifying the essence or "whatness" of a thing are inapplicable to God.² There are no factors prior to God's existence by which he might be defined. Indeed, the very term "God" is indefinable.³

      God has no accidental attributes, because he is not a substrate of accidents. There is nothing accidental about his nature or essence. Moreover, he has no essential attributes, because he does not have a composite essence. He is one in every way, without internal complexity.⁴ 

      God's supposed attributes are nothing but his acts, says Maimonides. God's acts can be known, but not God himself. To say that God has attributes is merely to assign traits to him that seem to be expressed by his actions. Thus, we may try to be virtuous by emulating God and modeling our conduct on his actions.

      There is nothing passive about God. God is not affected or changed by any causes or conditions. There is also nothing potential about God. All of God's perfections are fully actualized.⁵

      Existence, knowledge, and will are not essential attributes of God, because God has no essential attributes. There is no analogy or likeness between his existence and the existence of other things. No predicates can be applied to him, as they can be applied to other things. For anything whose existence has a cause, its existence is accidental and distinct from its essence.⁶ But for God, who necessarily exists, his existence is his essence, and his essence is his existence.

      Unity and multiplicity are accidents of whatever is one or many.⁷ God is one, but not by way of oneness or unity.⁸ God is one in the sense of being unique, not in the sense of being a unity of composite attributes. 

      The only proper way of characterizing God, according to Maimonides, is by using negative predicates.⁹ We can only know or say that God is, not what God is. The more that we affirm about God, the further we are from knowing him.¹⁰ God's perfections should not be viewed as traits or attributes, because he has no traits or attributes. Indeed, he transcends all traits or attributes. Only negative predications, such as "God is not corporeal" or "God is not a contingent being," can bring us closer to knowing God.¹¹ 

      God created the world out of absolute nothingness, and he also created time. His creation of the world was not an event in time, because time was part of what he created. Thus, Maimonides rejects eternalism regarding the world's existence.

      God is perfect in his being, says Maimonides. Since there is nothing lacking in God, there is nothing that God fails to know.¹² God is his knowledge, and his knowledge is one, although it is of many things of different kinds.¹³ 

FOOTNOTES

¹Moses Maimonides, The Guide to the Perplexed, translated by Lenn E. Goodman and Phillip I. Lieberman (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2024), p. 21.

²Ibid., p. 87.

³Ibid., p. 87.

⁴Ibid., p. 91.

⁵Ibid., p. 100.

⁶Ibid., p. 102.

⁷Ibid., p. 102.

⁸Ibid., p. 102.

⁹Ibid., p. 103

¹⁰Ibid., p. 106.

¹¹Ibid., p. 111.

¹²Ibid., p. 389.

¹³Ibid., p. 194.

Mencius and Xunzi, on Human Nature

Mencius (Mengzi, c. 371-289 BCE) and Xunzi (c. 310-238 BCE) were two Chinese Confucian philosophers who had very different views of human nature. Their dispute had an influence on the subsequent development of Confucianism, since Mencius had a greater influence on Neo-Confucian philosophers such as Zhu Xi (1130-1200 CE), while Xunzi had a greater influence on Legalist philosophers such as Han Feizi (c. 280-233 BCE).

      Mencius believed that human nature is good, insofar as all human beings tend to have a sense of compassion, a sense of shame, a sense of deference and compliance, and a sense of right and wrong. Without these moral capacities, we would not be fully human. The sense of compassion is the "sprout" of humaneness (ren), the sense of shame is the "sprout" of righteousness (yi), the sense of deference and compliance is the"sprout" of propriety (li), and the sense of right and wrong is the "sprout" of wisdom (zhi). All human beings have these four sprouts, says Mencius, just as they have four limbs (2A6).¹

      The four sprouts are innate potentials for human goodness.They must be nurtured and cultivated if they are to flourish and we are to become fully human. If they are not nurtured, then we may lose our innate potential for goodness. However, goodness (humaneness) can always overcome evil (inhumaneness), just as water can overcome fire (6A18).² Everyone is capable of becoming good.
      Xunzi, on the other hand, says that human nature is inherently evil. If a son defers to his father or a younger brother defers to his older brother, then this is not because the son or the younger brother are naturally unselfish and compliant. It is because they have overcome their inborn disposition to be selfish and noncompliant. Any good actions that we are able to perform require us to exert deliberate effort in order to overcome our inborn tendency to be selfish. Only by following the example of moral teachers and moral standards of conduct can we become deferential and compliant.³ If human beings were naturally unselfish and compliant, then there would be no need to follow the benevolent example of the ancient sage kings.⁴
      Mencius's position on human nature has an advantage over Xunzi's insofar as it encourages us to look within ourselves for kindness and compassion, as opposed to seeking external models or standards. It also has an advantage insofar as it allows for compassionate actions that are performed spontaneously, as opposed to actions that are only performed after careful deliberation. Mencius sees human beings as having a heart of compassion, and as being able to perform actions from the heart, as opposed to Xunzi, who sees human beings as being able to perform virtuous actions only after conscious deliberation. Thus, Mencius may better explain than Xunzi why we may be emotionally affected or moved when we are confronted by the spontaneous kindness and generosity of others, because such kindness and generosity seems to come from the heart, rather than from conscious deliberation.

FOOTNOTES

¹Mencius, translated by Irene Bloom, edited by Philip J. Ivanhoe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), p. 35.
²Ibid., p. 131.

³Xunzi, translated by Eric L. Hutton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 248.

⁴Ibid., p. 252.

Confucius and Mozi, on Ritual

Confucius (Kongzi, 551-479 BCE) sees the practice of ritual as a means of promoting virtue. He sees the sage kings of antiquity as exemplars of virtue, and thus he argues for adherence to the ancient rites and rituals that were practiced under their benevolent rule. He says that he is "A transmitter [of the traditions of antiquity] and not a maker, believing in and loving the ancients" (7.1).¹ 
      He also suggests that to adhere to ritual is to follow the Way and to obey the mandates of Heaven. He says, "There are three things of which the superior man stands in awe. He stands in awe of the ordinances of Heaven. He stands in awe of great men. He stands in awe of the words of the sages" (16.8).² 
      To adhere to traditional rites of mourning is also to be compliant with our moral duty to be respectful toward parents, elders, and ancestors. Confucius says, "Filial piety and respect for elders constitute the roots of Goodness" (1.2).³  Master Zeng says, "All the Master teaches amounts to nothing more than dutifulness tempered by sympathetic understanding" (4.15).⁴ 
      Confucius also says, "The gentleman puts rightness into practice by means of ritual, gives it expression through modesty, and perfects it by being trustworthy" (15.18).⁵ 
      At the same time, he explains that virtue is best acquired by applying the mean (6.29), and that perfect virtue is in accordance with the constant mean (6.27), so this would seem to suggest that there should be some moderation in ritual observances. He says that in festive ceremonies it is better to be sparing than extravagant, and that in ceremonies of mourning, it is better to be truly sorrowful (to feel true sorrow) than to pay attention to minute details (3.4).⁶ Thus, observance of traditional rites and rituals should not amount to a labored busyness or an ostentatious demonstration of piety for the sake of one's being recognized as pious and virtuous.
      Nevertheless, strict observance of ritual is necessary, according to Confucius, and if this observance is truly virtuous, then it will be effortless. "The superior man...does not set his mind either for anything or against anything; what is right he will follow" (4.10).⁷ 
      Adherence to ritual observances by benevolent rulers will also promote virtue among the people whom they govern, says Confucius. "When those who are in high stations perform well all their duties to their relations, the people will be aroused to virtue" (8.2).⁸ 
      Mozi (c. 470-c. 391 BCE) has a much different attitude toward ritual than Confucius, and he is sharply critical of him. Mozi says that universal love was the Way of the ancient sage kings (16.15), and that this is what should be emphasized. It was by means of universal love that the ancient kings brought prosperity to their kingdoms. The more elaborate that rituals and music became, the less well governed were the subsequent kingdoms. Ritual observances and music are not a useful means of promoting righteousness or bringing order to the world, says Mozi. What is necessary is universal mutual love.
      Mozi's criticism of traditional rites and rituals is due in part to what he sees as their practical consequences. They don't lead to a better standard of living for the common people. Excessive expenditure of time and effort on lavish mourning ceremonies by families of limited means may lead to depletion of their emotional and financial resources. Workers may also lose work opportunities by having to observe extended periods of mourning. Even rulers may have their financial resources dangerously depleted by having to observe prolonged and elaborate rituals for the dead. Mozi says that there should be moderation in observance of ritual (25.16), just as there should be moderation in other social customs.
      I would tend to favor Mozi's position. Confucius insists that three years of mourning for the death of one's parents is necessary, and that one year is not long enough (17.21). I agree with Mozi that this seems rather excessive. Confucius also seems to accept traditional rites unquestioningly and without looking at their justifications or practical consequences, seeing them as venerable expressions of the righteousness of the ancient sage kings. But Confucius's desire to return to the past seems to be rather regressive in its moral dimensions. Are ancient rites and rituals always appropriate for contemporary society? Shouldn't they evolve in some manner to meet contemporary social needs? Confucius doesn't fully answer the question of whether change can ever be appropriately instituted in traditional rites and rituals. Rather, he sees the failure to strictly adhere to ritual as indicative of a person's failure to be completely virtuous and to meet the moral standard of a "gentleman" or "superior man."

FOOTNOTES

¹Confucius, Confucian Analects, translated by James Legge (New York: Dover Publications, 1971), p. 195.

²Ibid., p. 313.

³Ibid., p. 139.

⁴Kongzi (Confucius), Analects, translated by Edward G. Slingerland, in Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, edited by Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2023), p. 14

⁵Ibid., p. 45.

⁶Confucius, Confucian Analects, translated by James Legge, pp. 155-156.

⁷Ibid., p. 168.

⁸Ibid., p. 208.

OTHER RESOURCES

Mozi, The Mozi: A Complete Translation, translated by Ian Johnston (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2010).