What is Technophilosophy?

Technophilosophy (or technological philosophy) may be defined in a variety of ways. It may include the philosophy of technology (“tech philosophy”), the philosophy of engineering, the philosophy of computer science, and cyberphilosophy, as well as technofeminism, technocultural futurism (including Afrofuturism, Latin@futurism, and other futurisms), and other cultural or aesthetic movements embracing the philosophy of technology, the philosophy of science, and social philosophy.

      It may also be a philosophy based on, or supported by, technology. Thus, it may be a philosophy founded on, or supported by, computers.

      It may also be a philosophy aimed at promoting the use of technology (in various settings and in society as a whole).

      It may also be the philosophy of a technological society or era.

      It may also be a philosophy inspired by technology. Thus, it may be a philosophy of the technological self (e.g. the online identity, anonymity, or reality of the self) and technological others. It may also be a philosophy of the machine (e.g. regarding the ability of machines to think or to act intelligently) and machine-like beings.

      Technophilosophy may also be any philosophy disseminated by technological means (e.g. by online philosophy encyclopedias, journals, blogs, podcasts, or videos). Thus, it may be an electronic or e-philosophy, an integral component of the world of e-books, e-learning, and other online technology.

      Technophilosophy may also be a discipline analogous to technoart, technodance, technomusic, technoscience (including technobiology, technochemistry, and technophysics), and technopolitics.

      It may be conventional or unorthodox, aboveground or underground.

      Technophilosophy (and the philosophy of technology) may include the study of the ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, and politics of technology. Thus, technophilosophy may include technoethics, technoaesthetics, technometaphysics, technoepistemology, and technopolitics.

      Peter A. Angeles (1992) explains that in ancient Greek philosophy, techne (art, skill, or craft) referred to (1) anything deliberately created by humans, in contrast to anything not humanly created, (2) any skill in making or doing things, (3) knowledge of how to do or make things, as opposed to knowledge of why things are as they are, and (4) professional knowledge of the procedures involved in making or doing things. Such terms as “technique," “technical,” and “technology” are derived from the Greek concept of techne.¹

      Technology is pervasive in modern culture and society. Thus, the philosophy of technology may include the study of agricultural, educational, energy, and environmental technology, as well as film and video, financial, communications, medical, military, and space technology.

      Philosophers of technology include Plato (Laws), Aristotle (Physics), Francis Bacon (New Atlantis, 1627), Ernst Kapp (Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik, 1877), José Ortega y Gasset (Meditación de la técnica, 1939, translated as “Thoughts on Technology,” 1972), Martin Heidegger (Die Frage nach der Technik, translated as “The Question Concerning Technology,” 1977), and Lewis Mumford (Technics and Civilization, 1934). 
      Philosophers of technology also include Marshall McLuhan (Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, 1964), Michel Foucault (Technologies of the Self, 1988), Donna Haraway (Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, 1991), Avital Ronell (The Telephone Book: Technology—Schizophrenia—Electric Speech, 1989), Don Ihde (Technics and Praxis, 1979; Bodies in Technology, 2001), Jacques Ellul (The Technological Society, 1964), Carl Mitcham (Thinking through Technology: The Path between Engineering and Philosophy, 1994), Fernando Broncano (Nuevas Meditaciones sobre la Técnica, 1995; Mundos Artificiales: Filosofía del Cambio Technológico, 2000), and Shannon Vallor (Technology and the Virtues: A Philosophical Guide to a Future Worth Wanting, 2016).

      José Ortega y Gasset (1939) defines technology as the improvement brought about by us on nature for the satisfaction of our necessities.² It is also a reform of those aspects of nature that place us in need. Thus, the concept of human necessity is fundamental to our understanding of technology.³ The mission of technology consists in releasing us for the task of being ourselves.⁴

      Michel Foucault (1988) says there are four major types of techniques or technologies that we can use to understand ourselves: (1) technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform, or manipulate things, (2) technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs and symbols to communicate meanings, (3) technologies of power, which determine our conduct and submit us to certain ends, and (4) technologies of the self, which permit us “to effect by [our] own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on [our] own bodies and souls, conduct, and way[s] of being, so as to transform [ourselves] in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.”⁵

      Foucault says these four types of technologies hardly ever function separately, although each of them may imply a certain mode of training or modification, not only in the sense of our acquiring certain skills, but also in the sense of our acquiring certain attitudes.⁶

      Carl Mitcham (1994) distinguishes between the engineering philosophy of technology and the humanities philosophy of technology. The former begins with an analysis of the nature of technology itself, while the latter begins with an analysis of the relation of technology to art, literature, ethics, politics, and religion.⁷

      Thomas A.C. Reydon (2018) describes three approaches to (or ways of conceiving) the philosophy of technology: (1) as systematic clarification of the nature of technology, (2) as systematic reflection on the consequences of technology for human life, and (3) as systematic investigation of the practices of engineering, invention, designing, and making of things.⁸

      Frederick Ferré (1995) describes a number of possible questions regarding the use of current technologies, such as (1) What should be the role of technology such as robotics and automation in the workplace? (These technologies may in some cases cause workers to lose their jobs, their sense of personal autonomy, or their input regarding their job duties.) (2) What are the risks of relying completely on computers? (In addition to security and privacy concerns, there may be concerns regarding responsibility for error when computers are required to make important decisions.) (3) What limits should be set on the development of nuclear technology? (4) What kinds of technologies need to be transferred to developing countries? (5) What limits should be imposed on genetic engineering and the development of reproductive technology?⁹

      David E. Nye (2006) asks, “Do we control technology or does technology control us?” Do we shape the machines and systems that surround us or are we shaped by them? (According to social constructivists, technology is shaped by us, but according to technological determinists or constructivists, we are determined or shaped by technology.) Are we using technology to destroy the natural world or to protect it? Are we trying through technology to undermine democracy or to enhance it? Are we trying to make the world more secure or to make it more dangerous?¹⁰

      Concerns that may arise regarding the use of new or existing technologies include their ability to fulfill particular needs, their impact on quality of life, their impact on human health, their impact on social equity (who will benefit from them, and who won’t?), their expense, their cost effectiveness, their ability to support economic growth, their environmental sustainability, their use of renewable or nonrenewable natural resources, and their energy efficiency.

      The risks of technology may include the rise of a technocracy (a non-elected ruling class of technicians or a technoelite) whose decisions can, or could, in innumerable ways, impact our daily lives. In politics, a technocracy (as opposed to a democracy, but perhaps in some ways similar to an aristocracy or plutocracy) might take the form of a government ruled or dominated by a class of technological executives or corporate directors. A technocracy might also be a government based on or guided by technological principles, or a form of control of (public, social, and cultural) resources and institutions by technological executives, companies, or industries.

      Technophilosophy should therefore not be left to fall into the hands of a wealthy and powerful technoelite. Technophilosophy may be avant-garde or futuristic in its embrace of technology and its interest in finding new ways of doing philosophy, but it should not avoid the responsibility to recognize and attempt to remediate social and cultural factors that contribute to inequitable access to technology. Another responsibility of technophilosophy may be that of recognizing, questioning, and challenging the methods by which technology becomes a means of social control.

      Other risks or possible pitfalls for technophilosophy (and for philosophy of technology) include technicism and technocentrism. Technicism, as defined by Egbert Schuurman (1997), is the attitude that all problems can be solved by scientific-technological methods.¹¹ (Technicism may be analogous to scientism, the attitude that all questions can be answered, and all problems can be solved, by scientific methods.) Schuurman explains that among the risks of technicism in the field of genetic engineering are that it may result in the technicization of living organisms, resulting in the loss of genetic and bio-diversity. This may in turn lead to a possible increase in susceptibility of genetically engineered organisms to unknown diseases. If we accept the technological model for plants, animals, and human beings, says Schuurman, then we may see them merely as technological artifacts that we can manipulate, and we may neglect their dignity and integrity.¹²

      Technocentrism, as defined by to Seymour Papert (1988), is the attitude that all questions center on the uses of technology.¹³ Technocentrism may focus on technological solutions to educational, economic, social, and cultural problems, to the extent that it disregards or neglects non-technological kinds of solutions.

      Cyberphilosophy has been described as the intersection of philosophy and computing.¹⁴ Cyberphilosophy may include cyberethics (including the ethics of hacking, identity theft, violations of privacy, and so on), cyberaesthetics (including the aesthetics of computer hardware, architecture, programming, and website design), cybermetaphysics (concerning the nature of cyberspace, computer-generated worlds, and virtual reality), cyberepistemology (concerning the relation between computing and the theory of knowledge, and also concerning the kind of collective building and sharing of knowledge that’s represented by openly editable websites like Wikipedia), cyberpolitics (including cyberactivism, journalism, and blogging regarding such issues as internet censorship, access, and net neutrality), and cyberphilosophy of mind (including examination of the relation between computation and thinking or consciousness). Cyberphilosophy may also be concerned with human-computer interaction, and with cyberculture studies.

      Technofeminism, according to Judy Wajcman (2004), may examine the role that gender plays in technology and the ways in which technology is gendered. It may also investigate and interrogate the sexual politics of technology, and it may examine the relationship between woman and machine.¹⁵

      The technosphere (the technological context in which we live¹⁶) consists of all the structures we’ve built in order to help us survive on the planet.¹⁷ It includes such structures as highways, buildings, machines, tools, equipment, and computer systems. The other spheres of the Earth are the lithosphere (the solid surface layer of the Earth), the atmosphere (the layer of air that stretches above the lithosphere), the hydrosphere (the Earth’s water—on the surface, in the ground, and in the air), and the biosphere (the part of the lithosphere, hydrosphere, and atmosphere that supports life). The physical technosphere includes the urban, rural, subterranean, marine, and aerial technospheres. Components of the technosphere include artifacts that may eventually become technofossils (preserved material remains of technological artifacts, which we may find nearly everywhere).¹⁸

FOOTNOTES

¹Peter A. Angeles, The HarperCollins Dictionary of Philosophy (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), p. 308.

²José Ortega y Gasset, “Thoughts on Technology” [1939], in Philosophy and Technology: Readings in the Philosophical Problems of Technology, edited by Carl Mitcham and Robert Mackey (London:  Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1972), p. 292.

³Ibid., p. 294.

⁴Ibid., p. 300.

⁵Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self,” in Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, edited by Luther H. martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (London: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988, p. 18.

⁶Ibid., p. 18.

⁷Carl Mitcham, Thinking through Technology: The Path between Engineering and Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 62.

⁸Thomas A.C. Reydon, “Philosophy of Technology,” in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002, https://www.iep.utm.edu/, 2018.

9Frederick Ferré, Philosophy of Technology (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1995).

¹⁰David E. Nye, Technology Matters: Questions to Live With (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006), p. x.

¹¹Egbert Schuurman, “Philosophical and Ethical Problems of Technicism and Genetic Engineering,” in Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology, Fall 1997, Vol. 3, No. 1, online at https://scholar.lib.vt.edu/ejournals/SPT/v3n1/schuurman.html.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Seymour Papert, “A Critique of Technocentrism in Thinking About the School of the Future,” in Children in the Information Age, 1988, pp. 2-18, online at http://www.papert.org/articles/ACritiqueofTechnocentrism.html.

¹⁴James H. Moor and Terrell Ward Bynum, “Introduction to Cyberphilosophy,” in Metaphilosophy, Vol. 33, Nos. 1/2, January 2002, p. 26.

¹⁵Judy Wajcman, Technofeminsim (Malden: Polity Press, 2004).

¹⁶Ferré, Philosophy of Technology (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1995), p. 1.

¹⁷University of Leicester, “Earth’s ‘technosphere’ now weighs 30 trillion tons, research finds,” Nov. 30, 1016, Phys.Org, online at https://phys.org/news/2016-11-earth-technosphere-trillion-tons.html.

¹⁸Jan Zalasiewicz, et al., “Scale and Diversity of the Physical Technosphere: A Geological Perspective, “ in The Anthropocene Review, Vol. 4, Issue 1, Nov. 28, 2016, pp. 9-22.

Frames as Ways of Seeing the World

Some possible definitions of the word “frame” include (1) “a rigid structure surrounding a picture, door, or windowpane,” (2) ”a metal or plastic structure holding the lenses of a pair of glasses,” and (3) “a rigid supporting structure of a vehicle, aircraft, or other object.” Other possible definitions include (4) “a person’s body, with reference to its size or build,” (5) "a basic underlying structure of a system, concept, or text,” and (6) “a single complete picture in a series forming a cinema, television, or video film.”¹  

       Erving Goffman, a noted Canadian-American sociologist who, in his book Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (1974), explores the extent to which social frameworks enable us to organize and interpret experience, describes frames as principles of organization that govern our subjective involvement in events. Frame analysis is thus the examination of those principles of organization.² Some frames are neatly ordered and arranged as systems of rules, while others are more loosely arranged and articulated. Frames may be primary or secondary, implicit or explicit, and they may function as guides to our understanding of social events or situations. Every social group may utilize its own frames (viewpoints, attitudes, or belief systems) for the purpose of dealing with and understanding social reality.

      Goffman says that framing may be subject to vagueness, ambiguity, or error, which may lead to uncertainty or dispute regarding whether a given event or situation has been correctly framed. There may also be uncertainty or dispute regarding the nature and range of subjects that can be included within a given frame, and the nature and range of viewpoints that can be accommodated by a given frame. Thus, some interpreters may describe some examples of framing (of intuitions, perceptions, concepts, etc.) as examples of misreading or misframing.

       Goffman also says that a frame “organizes more than meaning; it also organizes involvement…All frames involve expectations of a normative kind as to how deeply and fully the individual is to be carried into the activity organized by the frames. [And] Of course, frames differ quite widely in the involvement prescribed for participants sustaining them.”³

      Charles J. Fillmore (1976), an American linguist who founded frame semantics, describes framing as “the appeal, in perceiving, thinking, and communicating, to structured ways of interpreting experiences.”⁴ He says that “in characterizing a language system we must add to the description of grammar and lexicon a description of the cognitive and interactional "frames" in terms of which the language-user interprets his environment, formulates his own messages, understands the messages of others, and accumulates or creates an internal model of his world.”⁵

      Robert M. Entman (1993), an American political scientist, public policy analyst, and communication theorist, describes framing as an activity in which some aspects of a perceived reality are "made more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item[s] described.”⁶

      George Lakoff (2004), an American cognitive scientist and linguist, explains that

      “Frames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world. As a result, they shape the goals we seek, the plans we make, the way we act, and what counts as a good or bad outcome of our actions. In politics, our frames shape our social policies and the institutions we form to carry out policies. To change our frames is to change all of this. Reframing is social change.”⁷

      So, what kinds of frames are there? What kinds of things can be framed? What is or can be inside or outside a frame? How does a frame demarcate the inside from the outside, the delimited from the undelimited, the defined from the undefined?
      Frames may be cognitive or psychological, linguistic or conceptual, semantic or pragmatic, theoretical or practical. They may also be elemental or structural, literal or metaphorical, contemporary or historical, vertical or horizontal, cross-sectional or longitudinal.
      Frames may also be visual, textual, conversational, literary, theatrical, cinematic, social, or cultural.

      When we frame something we may be presenting a particular way of looking at it or delineating a particular perspective from which it may be viewed. We may also be defining the terms in which it may be examined, or describing a particular context in which it may take on certain implications or meanings.
      A frame of mind may be a particular attitude or viewpoint, a particular mood, or a particular way of looking at the world that influences a person’s behavior.

      A frame of reference may be “a set of criteria in relation to which judgments can be made” or “a system of geometric axes in relation to which measurements of size, position, or motion can be made.”⁸

      A frame of reference may also be ”any set of lines, directions, planes, etc., such as the coordinate axes, relative to which the position of a point in space can be described.”⁹       

      A picture frame (e.g. for a drawing, painting, photo, or diploma) may be square, rectangular, circular, or oval. It may be equiangular or non-equiangular, equilateral or non-equilateral, wooden or metal, flat or raised, sculpted or unsculpted, chiseled or unchiseled, carved or uncarved, painted or unpainted, plain or ornamented (decorated).

      W.H. Bailey (2002) describes the many functions of painting frames, and says that

“Of all the functions of a frame, the most significant is that of mediator between the viewer and the painting, both physically and aesthetically. On the practical side, an effective frame reconciles the world of the viewer to the world of the painting in both form and scale…As mediator, the frame must succeed in a challenging twofold role: it must invite us into the painting and prevent us from escaping its bounds once inside. The design must effect a transition from the existing physical location, usually a wall in a room or gallery, into the illusionistic realm of the painting. This should occur graciously and imperceptibly. The frame should also prepare the eye and mind of the viewer to accept and embrace the domain of the painting on its own terms.”¹⁰

      Choosing the right frame for something (e.g. for a drawing, painting, concept, argument, or set of arguments) may be a matter of the frame’s design, configuration, dimensions, ease of application, and ability to complement, enhance, and provide an appropriate setting for its contents.

      Frames (of meaning, reference, or representation) may be like windows to the world. To select a particular frame may be to select a particular way of looking at the world. To select a different frame may be to select a different way of looking at the world.

      When we frame a problem we may also be defining its limits or dimensions. An inadequate, unsuitable, or ill-fitting frame may not enable us to properly assess a problem’s complexities or fully appreciate and understand them.

      Cognitive framing provides us with a way of analyzing and evaluating things. When we frame something, we may provide ourselves with a way of approaching, interacting with, and responding to it.

      Stating premises or assumptions may be a way of framing statements, arguments, and conclusions.

      Conceptual framing may also enable us to frame (define, investigate, and elaborate) concepts in terms of other concepts.

      We may also flip through, rearrange, reorder, change, and reprioritize frames.

      A “time frame” may be a given period or duration of time, especially with respect to some action or project.¹¹ Thus, to ask “What time frame do you have in mind?” may be to ask “When or how long do you have in mind?” or “From what time to what time?” A possible answer could be “From 3 to 6 p.m.” or “Between this Tuesday and next Thursday,” or “Sometime before next month,” or “From August 1st until September 30th.”

       Many things (such as political agendas, economic policies, social obligations, financial investment risks, and medical treatment options) may be framed positively or negatively, depending on whether the objective is to get people to accept or reject them.

      To frame a debate may be to determine what the debate will be about, what its direction will be, what issues will be discussed, what it will attempt to resolve, and what the ground rules for engagement will be.

      Relations between frames may include: sameness, similarity, difference, congruity, incongruity, commensurability, incommensurability, interchangeability, succession, superimposition, overlap, agreement, conflict, competition, and opposition.

      When someone is “framed” for some offense, they may be falsely accused, falsely implicated, or unfairly “set up” by false witnesses, false testimony, false evidence, or corrupt police, prosecutorial, or judicial procedures.

      Frames may enclose fields of meaning and representation. They may also enclose fields of interest, concern, attention, perception, memory, and experience. They may also shut out or exclude extraneous domains or fields. They may also intersect with or be included (as subframes) within other frames.

      Gail T. Fairhurst, professor of communication at the University of Cincinnati, and Robert A. Sarr, business executive, consultant, and investment manager, explain (1996) that

      “Just like a photographer, when we select a frame for a subject, we choose which aspect or portion of the subject we will focus on and which we will exclude. When we choose to highlight some aspect of our subject over others, we make it more noticeable, more meaningful, and more memorable to others. Our framing adds color or accentuates the subject in unique ways. For this reason, frames determine whether people notice problems, how they understand and remember problems, and how they evaluate and act upon them (Entman, 1993).

      Frames exert their power not only through what they highlight, but also through what they leave out. In framing, when we create a bias towards one interpretation of our subject, we exclude other aspects, including those that may produce opposite or alternative interpretations.”¹²

      Michael X. Delli Carpini (2005), professor of communication at the University of Pennsylvania, examines the question of what role the news media should play in the framing process. He asks, “From whose perspective should the news be framed?”¹³ He concludes that the news media may have the responsibility to (1) give the public a greater role in setting the (political, social, and cultural) agenda, (2) cover issues and events in a way that is meaningful and useful to the general public, (3) give the public a greater voice in the ongoing conversation about public affairs, and (4) see the media “as a member of the community in which it operates, responsible not only for identifying problems, but also for helping find solutions to these problems.”¹⁴

      Marie Maclean (1991), a research fellow in the Department of French at Monash University who was an English-language translator of the work of French philosopher Gérard Genette, explains that the verbal frame of any spoken or written text is its “paratext,” a concept developed by Genette to describe the threshold or “undecided zone” between the inside and outside of a text, the transactional zone between speaker and listener, between author and reader. Paratexts may include the cover of a book, its title page, its table of contents, its preface, chapter titles, appendix, and index. They may also include recommendations on the cover of a book that introduce the text to the reader. Thus, they act as frames for, or thresholds of, interpretation that may guide the reader’s approach to the text. They may also define, highlight, and contrast with the text.

FOOTNOTES

¹Concise Oxford English Dictionary, edited by Angus Stevenson and Maurice Waite (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 563.

²Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 10-11.

³Ibid., p. 345.

⁴Charles J. Fillmore, “Frame Semantics and the Nature of Language,” in Annals o the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 280, Issue 1, October 1976, p. 20.

⁵Ibid., p. 23.

⁶Robert M. Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured paradigm,” in Journal of Communication (Volume 43, Issue 4, December 1, 1993), p. 52.

⁷George Lakoff, Don’t Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate: The Essential Guide for Progressives (White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2004), p. xv.

⁸Concise Oxford English Dictionary, edited by Angus Stevenson and Maurice Waite (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 563.

⁹Collins Web-linked Dictionary of Mathematics, by E.J. Borowski and J.M. Borwein (Glasgow: HarperCollins, 2002), p. 221.

¹⁰W.H. Bailey, Defining Edges: A New Look at Picture Frames (New York: Harry N. Adams, Inc. 2002), pp. 16-17.

¹¹Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Merriam-Webster, Inc. 2018), online at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/time%20frame.

¹²Gail T. Fairhurst and Robert A. Sarr, The Art of Framing: Managing the Language of Leadership (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1996), p. 4.

¹³Michael X. Delli Carpini, “News From Somewhere: Journalism Frames and the Debate over “Public Journalism,” in Framing American Politics, edited by Karen Callaghan and Frauke Schnell (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), p. 11.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 14.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCES

Marie Maclean, “Pretexts and Paratexts: The Art of the Peripheral,” in New Literary History, Vol. 22, No 2, 1991, pp. 273-279.

Gérard Genette, “Introduction to the Paratext,” translated by Marie Maclean, in New Literary History, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1991, pp. 261-272.

Annapolis Ten Mile Run, 2018

The Annapolis Ten Mile Run was held Sunday, August 19, 2018. The weather was warm and cloudy, with a temperature of about 75 degrees at start time (7:00 a.m.). The course was very hilly, with the start and finish in the parking lot at Navy Marine Corps Memorial Stadium. One of the longest uphill and downhill sections was along Naval Academy Bridge (over the Severn River), which we crossed eastward at mile 4 and westward at mile 8. The continuous hills along the course made it a very difficult run.
      The overall first place finisher in the men's division was Jeffrey Stein, from Washington, D.C., with a time of 54:29:01 (he also won in 2016, and was third in 2017), and the overall first place finisher in the women's division was Julia Roman-Duval, from Columbia, MD, with a time of 59:10:29 (she also won in 2017). In the youngest age group (14 and under), the winner in the boy's division was 12-year-old Billy Foulk, with a time of 1:17:17, and the winner in the girl's division was 14-year-old Haley Walker, with a time of 1:25:03. In the oldest age group (75 and older), the winner in the men's division was Harold Rosen, with a time of 1:37:50, and the winner in the women's division was Molly Sherwood, with a time of 1:58:31.
      Julia Roman-Duval, the overall women's first place finisher, is an astrophysicist at the Space Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore. She runs with the Howard County Striders, and competed at the women's Olympic Marathon trials in 2016, finishing 50th out of 206 runners.
      I finished in 439th place out of 2529 finishers at the Annapolis Ten Mile Run, in 4th place out of 59 in my age group, with a time of 1:25:15 (for a pace of 8:31.15 per mile). I was pleased with the results, since this was a better time than I did in June over a course that wasn't nearly as difficult as this one.

Two of Nagarjuna's Most Radical Suggestions

Nagarjuna (c. 150–c. 250 CE) was an Indian philosopher who founded the Madhyamika school of Mahayana Buddhism. His best-known work is the Mulamadhyamakakarika (Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way). His other writings included the Yuktisastiki (Sixty Verses on Reasoning), and the Shunyatasaptati (Seventy Verses on Emptiness).

      His disciple Arydeva (c. 200-c. 250 CE) became a leader of the Madhyamika school. Arydeva’s best-known work was the Catuhshataka (Four Hundred Verses).

      In the Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way, Nagarjuna says that “whatever is dependently arisen is unceasing, unborn, unannihilated, impermanent, not coming, not going, without distinction, without identity, and free from conceptual construction.”¹ Nothing arises without causes or conditions (of its existence). Everything depends on causes and conditions of arising (or existence), and therefore the ultimate reality of things is that no real distinctions can be made between them. Our attempt to make distinctions between things is based on our perception of their conventional, but not their ultimate reality. When we make distinctions between things, we act as if they had self-nature or self-existence. But the ultimate reality of things is that they are dependently arisen. Their arising depends on causes and conditions beyond themselves. Everything shares unbornness (a lack of self-nature), impermanence, a lack of self-identity, and a lack of inherent existence. Nothing is self-caused or self-existent. Everything is empty of self-nature, self-causation, and self-existence.

      Nagarjuna also says that if everything is empty, then there is no (self-)arising and no (self-)ceasing or passing away (Chapter XXV). Thus, he makes the radical suggestion that if everything is empty, then nirvana is just as empty as samsara, and there is no real difference between them. Nirvana is not something that can be “attained,” and not something that “arises.” It's also not something that is permanent or compounded, and it's not something that can be possessed or relinquished. It's not self-caused or inherently existent, and neither is samsara. Nirvana is neither (self-)existent nor (self-)non-existent, so those who abide in nirvana are likewise neither said to be (self- or inherently) existent nor said to be (self- or inherently) nonexistent.

      Nagajuna also makes the radical suggestion that if everything is empty, then the Four Noble Truths are empty. The Four Noble Truths do not inherently exist, and neither does the Dharma (the teaching of the Buddha). Suffering doesn't inherently exist (it's not self-arisen or self-existent; its arising or existence depends on causes and conditions beyond itself), and neither do arising or ceasing. To be able to truly recognize suffering, as well as its “arising,” its “cessation,” and “the path to its cessation,” we must be able to recognize dependent arising (Chapter XXIV).

FOOTNOTES

¹Nagarjuna, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika, translated by Jay L. Garfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 2.

Baltimore Ceasefire Parade, Saturday, August 4, 2018

The Baltimore Ceasefire Parade took place from noon to 1 p.m. today on Park Heights Ave. This was the first Ceasefire event I've attended. It was very inspiring and uplifting. Baltimore Ceasefire 365 is a movement whose goal is to prevent murder and gun violence in Baltimore. This is the fifth Ceasefire weekend (the first took place in August 2017, and they've continued taking place every three months.) Among those who could be seen in the crowd at the corner of Park Heights and Belvedere prior to today's parade were Erricka Bridgeford, a Ceasefire organizer, and Catherine Pugh, Mayor of Baltimore. The goal for this weekend was for there to be no murders or shootings in Baltimore from Friday, August 3rd thru Sunday, August 5th. (Tragically, two people were killed and five were injured in multiple shootings by the end of the weekend.)