Hegel on Self-Consciousness

According to Hegel, self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein) is being-for-itself (Fürsichsein), but as an object for another self or consciousness, it is also being-for-another (für-ein-Anderes-Sein). But this "other" is inessential to self-consciousness. The essential reality of that which has being-for-itself is not in an "other," but in self-existence (Fürsichsein). The self-consciousness that is for-itself is independent, but the self-consciousness that is for-another is dependent.

      Hegel likens the relation between independent and dependent self-consciousness to that between Lordship and Bondage or between Master and Servant. The Lord or Master (der Herr) is the consciousness that exists for itself and is independent of being determined by an "other," but the Bondsman or Servant (der Knecht) is the consciousness that is held in subjection by the Master and depends on being determined by an "other." The consciousness of the "other" is inessential to independent self-consciousness (selbständige Selbstbewusstsein), but it's a determining factor for dependent self-consciousness (unselbständige Selbstbewusstsein).The self-consciousness that is conscious of being divided between the self and the "other" is described by Hegel as "the unhappy consciousness" (das unglückliche Bewusstsein), because it can't reconcile the self and the "other." The undivided consciousness, on the other hand, is a dual self-consciousness that reconciles and unifies the self and the "other." Thus, the object of this undivided consciousness is its own essential being, which is the immediate unity of being-in-itself (Ansichsein) and being-for-itself (Fürsichsein).¹

      The "unhappy consciousness" experiences itself as internally contradictory and inwardly disrupted, because it's divided between independent and dependent self-consciousness and hasn't yet realized that their unity is its essential nature.

      Could other causes of unhappiness, such as personal loss, frustration, disappointment, anger, guilt, social rejection, and stressful personal relationships also be seen be seen as resulting from internal conflicts between a self that recognizes its true reality and a self that doesn't? Perhaps the freedom of independent self-consciousness may also be a freedom from such causes of unhappiness. Thus, Hegel describes Stoicism as an example of the freedom of self-consciousness. He also describes Scepticism as the actual experience of what is involved in freedom of thought.

      Hegel further delineates the relation between independent and dependent self-consciousness by saying that self-consciousness exists in and for itself when it so exists for another self-consciousness.²

      (This delineation might lead one to think that another's self-consciousness could become an object for one's own consciousness, and that one's own self-consciousness could become an object for another's self-consciousness. But at the same time, one's own self-consciousness couldn't be experienced by another in exactly the same way that one oneself experiences it, nor could another's self-consciousness be experienced by oneself in exactly the same way that they experience it.)

      Consciousness may have moments (or stages) of being-in-itself (insofar as it is in-itself), being-for-itself (insofar as its essence is unconditioned universality),³ being-in-and-for-itself (insofar as it so exists for another), and being-for-another (insofar as it's conscious of another). These moments may take the form of Notions (or Concepts) of modes of Being. Being-for-self and being-for-another may have a reciprocal relation, but they may be unified by the Understanding (that the unconditioned universal is the true object of consciousness). Being-in-itself and being-for-another are actually the same,³ insofar as being-for-another becomes (or returns to the mode of) being-in-itself when consciousness becomes itself as the essential being of all reality.

      For Hegel, consciousness is spiritual. Self-consciousness is the Notion (Begriff) of Spirit (Geist), which knows itself to be all reality. Reality is also spiritual. Spirit is the inner being of the world, which may assume an objective, determinate form as an object of consciousness and enter into relations with itself.

      The spiritual is that which has being-in-itself, and which may have determinations of being-for-itself and being-for-another. In its external relations to itself, it is being-in-and-for-itself.⁴

      Consciousness is also rational. Self-consciousness is Reason (Vernunft), and Reason is the certainty of consciousness that it is all reality.⁵ Reason is Spirit, and it's conscious of itself. (We can reason about our reasoning, and Reason will reveal the self of self-consciousness.) Consciousness, self-consciousness, Reason, and immediate Spirit that is not yet self-conscious are moments of the totality of Spirit.⁶

      Sense-certainty (sinnliche Gewissheit), perception (Wahrnehmung) and understanding (Verstand) are moments (or stages) of consciousness. Sense-certainty is a pure immediacy of knowledge (that something is). Pure being constitutes the essence of sense-certainty.⁷ Perception is an awareness that an object is universal and unconditioned by sensation. Understanding is a recognition that the unconditioned universality (unbedingte Allgemeinheit) of the true object of consciousness transcends sensation and perception.

      Consciousness is the simple substance of Spirit, and Spirit is (or becomes) conscious of itself as Spirit. The self-knowing Spirit is, in its consciousness of absolute Being, its own pure self-consciousness.⁸ The representation of the Absolute as Spirit is the most sublime Notion.⁹ Absolute Being is the self-consciousness of Spirit.¹⁰ The Spirit that knows itself as Spirit is Science, and the coming-to-be of this Science is what is described by the Phenomenology of Spirit.¹¹

FOOTNOTES

¹G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit [1807], translated by A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 120.

²Ibid., p. 111.

³Ibid., p. 104

⁴Ibid., p. 14.

⁵Ibid., pp. 139-140.

⁶Ibid., pp. 412-413.

⁷Ibid., p. 59.

⁸Ibid., p. 411

⁹Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 410.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 14-15.

Some Objections to the Simulation Hypothesis

My first objection to the version of the simulation hypothesis described by David Chalmers (2022), that we are and always been living in a computer simulation of a world,¹ is that if we can't prove we're not living in a computer simulation, then that doesn't necessarily mean we're living in one. If Chalmers wants to convince us that we're most likely living in a computer simulation, then it's up to him to provide sufficient evidence for that hypothesis (and I don't think he does). The burden of proof is on him, because he's proposing something that isn't intuitively evident and that in fact contradicts what we'd assume from our daily experience (that the world we inhabit is the actual world, and not a computer simulation).

      If Chalmers wants us to entertain the possibility that we're living in a computer simulation, then it's up to him to provide sufficient evidence that this is the case (and I don't think he does). Merely describing the lack of proof that we're not living in a computer simulation isn't sufficient to prove we're living in one (and in fact he admits he can't prove it). Indeed, it's no more sufficient than saying that anything that can't be proven not to be the case may actually be the case (which is true, but trivial and doesn't account for how unlikely that case may be).

      My second objection to his version of the simulation hypothesis is that he says we're living in a computer simulation of a world, which could be taken to mean any world, virtual or actual. So we might only be living in a simulation of a simulation (or even a simulation of a simulation of a simulation, ad infinitum), which is rather implausible. His version of the simulation hypothesis doesn't say anything about the actual world or even that there is an actual world (perhaps because he's asking us to consider the possibility that the world we're actually living in is a simulation). However, a simulation of a world could be a simulation of any world at all, no matter how impoverished or bereft of possibility, and no matter how unlike the world of daily human experience. (Although, of course, the simulation would indeed be like the world of daily human experience if that world is in fact impoverished and bereft of possibility, as it may be for many people who live in severe poverty. But then it would be rather callous and unfeeling to suggest that people living in severe poverty are merely living in a simulated or virtual world, and not the world of actual reality. So that exigency might be another reason for rejecting the simulation hypothesis.)

      We must also ask, "If we can neither prove nor disprove that we're living in a computer simulation, then is the question of whether we're living in a computer simulation still a meaningful question?" Perhaps it's only meaningful insofar as we understand it as an aporia. On the other hand, if we can prove that we're not living in a computer simulation, then it may merely serve to remind us of the limitations of computer simulations.

      I think the simulation hypothesis may be an act of mental gymnastics, a means of suggesting we can't know anything if we can't prove that the world we're living in isn't a computer simulation. But that rhetorical strategy doesn't preclude the possibility of our having genuine knowledge of some simulated or virtual world, if that's the world we happen to be living in at the moment. And it doesn't preclude the possibility of a simulated or virtual (or even imaginary) world that seems as real to us as the actual world. Some simulated or virtual worlds may seem or may perhaps even be as real to us as the actual world, and I think we may draw meaningful conclusions from inhabiting them.

      Aside from my objections to the simulation hypothesis, I found Chalmers's Reality + (2022) to be a very enlightening and entertaining book, and it's a brilliant exposition of virtual worlds and the problems they pose for philosophy. Chalmers describes the approaches of Eastern and Western philosophy to the question of the difference between appearance and reality, and he shows how the Knowledge Question ("Can we know whether or not we're in a virtual world?"), the Reality Question ("Are virtual worlds real or illusory?"), and the Value Question ("Can you live a good life in a virtual world?") correspond to three of the central branches of philosophy (epistemology, metaphysics, and value theory).²

FOOTNOTES
¹David J. Chalmers, Reality +: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2022), p. 29.

²Ibid., p. 17.

This is My Church

Below is a reflection I shared at the "Faith at Eight" service at church on Sunday, May 12, 2024.

This past Thursday, I tuned into a webinar on Zoom that was attended by about 160 people. It was a follow-up to the "It's All About Love" festival of The Episcopal Church that was held in Baltimore last summer. The webinar was entitled "Empowering People of Color in Diocesan Life," and it was led by three Episcopal priests from the diocese of Washington State. One of the priests, the Rev. Rachel Taber-Hamilton, who's of indigenous and First Nations ancestry, spoke about how at various times in her ministry she's had to confront the Church's apparent lack of interest in promoting inclusiveness with regard to people of color. One thing she said that I found very meaningful was that when she had confronted exclusion in the past, she had responded by saying, "This is my Church."

      I think "This is my church" can be a very powerful, as well as empowering statement. At the same time, it's a reminder that being a member of a church shouldn't mean being disempowered because of your race, gender, ethnicity, age, socioeconomic status, or sexual orientation. 

      "This is my church" means that I'm just as much a member as you are, and that we're equally members of the church. It means that this is my church, just as it's your church, and that we both share in a community of faith, hope, love, and fellowship. It means that it's no more my church than your church, and no more your church than my church. It means that it's a church for everyone who wants to find a place of acceptance, fellowship, and belonging. It means that I have a right to speak and have my voice heard, just as you do. It means that I have a ministry within the church, just as you do, because every member of the church has a ministry by virtue of being baptized. It means that I feel I belong here, and that if the church hasn't yet empowered all its members to feel this sense of belonging, then it has work to do. It means that if this is my Church, then I should be able to fully participate at every level in the life of the church--in its mission, governance, stewardship, evangelism, and leadership.

      But "This is my church" is a statement that also entails a lot of responsibility. If this is my church, then I'm responsible for recognizing, telling the truth about, and responding to any instances in which the church has failed to promote equity, peace, and justice, as well as any instances in which the church has failed to acknowledge and respect the dignity of all human beings. If this is my church, then I'm also responsible for trying to heal the breach between the church and any of those whom it has ignored, shunned, disrespected, or marginalized. If this is my church, then I'm also responsible for trying to heal the brokenness and conflicts within myself, as well as within my local community and the broader society.

      Being able to say "This is my church" means that if I want the church to listen, then I must listen. If I want the church to be kind and welcoming, then I must be kind and welcoming. If I want the church to feed the hungry and protect the needy, then I must feed the hungry and protect the needy. If I want the church to promote fairness and justice, then I must promote fairness and justice.

      In a church with mostly white members, and in which the perspectives of its black members haven't always been fully taken into account, I've sometimes asked myself in the past whether I belong here. But my maternal great-grandparents had their children baptized in an Episcopal church, so being an Episcopalian is something that's been passed along through generations of my family and is in some ways my birthright. If I don't belong in this church, then where do I belong? This is the church where I've found acceptance, kindness, friendship, and community.

      I think I've asked others a few times in the past whether Memorial Episcopal Church thinks of itself as a white church or some other kind of church, and I think I've come away with the feeling that we're some other kind of church. But I think the correct, and perhaps the only viable, answer to what kind of church we are is that we're not a white church or a black church--we're God's church. And we all belong here.

Some of Plato's Views on the Art of Medicine

In Plato's Laws (Book 4, 720a-720e), he describes the differences between two types of doctors: the free-born doctor and the slave doctor. He says that both types of doctors acquire their art under the direction of their teachers or masters, by observation and practice, rather than by the study of nature. However, a free-born doctor is mostly engaged in visiting and treating the ailments of free people, and he does so by listening to their complaints, not prescribing any treatment without their consent. A slave doctor, on the other hand, is engaged in treating slaves and doesn't listen to any account of their ailments. He simply prescribes treatment based on his own experience and on what he thinks is best. He does so with the confidence and assurance of a tyrant or autocrat, then rushing off to see some other sick slaves so that his master won't be bothered by having to attend to them.

      In the same way, the Athenian lawgiver has a choice of two kinds of methods, persuasion or compulsion. The lawgiver has it in his power to use both methods, but he may mistakenly think that his legislation can be enacted by force alone. To ensure that those who are governed by his laws will actually obey them, the lawgiver must offer those whom he governs some kind of persuasion, just as a free-born doctor must offer his free-born patient a persuasive rather than despotic prescription.

      Plato's medical analogy has several implications for our current views of biomedical ethics. It indicates the need for doctors to listen to their patients, and to fully inform them about their conditions, as well as about possible diagnostic modalities, therapeutic options, and possible side-effects of treatment. It also indicates the need for doctors to obtain informed consent from their patients for treatment, and to fully engage and coordinate with their patients in order to ensure their compliance with treatment. It also indicates that the efficacy of treatment may depend on clear and effective communication between patients and providers, as well as on coordination of care, timeliness and appropriateness of care, compassionate care, respect for patient privacy and autonomy, respect for patient dignity, collaboration between patients and providers, and other components of the patient-provider relationship.

      In Plato's Republic, Socrates says that the physician studies only the patient's interest, and not his own (I. 342). Socrates also says that Asclepius treated patients by means of drugs or the knife in order to enable them to go on living as usual, but would not try to prolong the lives of those with advanced disease whose existence was miserable (III. 407). Socrates agrees with Glaucon that the best physicians may be those with the widest experience in treating healthy and sick patients, but he adds that physicians who have themselves suffered from various illnesses may be even more capable of treating those illnesses (III. 408).

Galen, on the Physician as Philosopher

Claudius Galenus (Kλάυδιος Γαληνός, 129-216 CE) was a Greek physician and philosopher who was born in Pergamum (now Bergama, Turkey). He traveled widely, to Smyrna, Corinth, Crete, Cyprus, and Alexandria, before becoming physician and surgeon to the gladiators in Pergamum (from 158-161 CE) and settling in Rome (in 161-162 CE), where he eventually became court physician to the Roman emperors Marcus Aurelius (161-180 CE), Commodus (180-192 CE), and Septimius Severus (193-211 CE). He died in Sicily in 216 CE.

      Galen combined the practice of medicine and philosophy, and he wrote an essay entitled Ὅτι Ἄριστος Ἰατρός καὶ Φιλόσοφος  ("That the best physician is also a philosopher"). In this essay, he argues that a physician must be practiced in logic in order to discover the nature of the body, as well as to know the differences between diseases and the indications for treatment. A physician must also be practiced in ethics in order to best serve his patient's best interests, rather than his own personal interests or financial gain. A physician must therefore know all the parts of philosophy: the logical, the scientific, and the ethical. If a physician doesn't put his own wealth before his moral virtue, then he won't put his own financial gain before his patient's benefit. If a physician despises money and practices temperance, then he will possess all the other moral virtues as well, since they all go together. Galen therefore asks: What grounds are left for any doctor not to be a philosopher?

      While Galen rightly explains that the pursuit of financial gain may be a corrupting influence on a physician and on the practice of medicine, some of the obvious defects in his argument that the best physician is also a philosopher include: (1) logic doesn't necessarily yield understanding of the physical nature of the body (although it may serve to promote consistency in thinking about the physical nature of the body), (2) he doesn't recognize ignorance as a cause of wrong actions on the part of a physician, (3) greed and intemperance aren't the only possible sources of wrong actions. Other vices, such as arrogance, carelessness, indifference, and bigotry may also act as sources of wrong actions, (4) possession of one moral virtue (at one moment or in one situation) doesn't necessarily guarantee possession of all the other moral virtues (at some other time or in some other situation), and (5) philosophy includes not only "the logical, the scientific, and the ethical," but also the metaphysical, the epistemological, the aesthetic, and the political, as well as other fields or domains.