Aquinas's Proofs for the Existence of God

Thomas Aquinas says in "The Treatise on the Divine Nature" that God's existence can be known not only by faith, but also by reason. In order to show that God's existence can be known by reason, he gives five proofs.

      His first proof is that whatever is moved is moved by something else. The chain of movement must lead back to a first mover, and the first mover is God.

      His second proof is similar to the first. Nothing can be the cause of itself. Every cause may be caused by something else, so there must be a first cause of things, and the first cause is God.

      His third proof is that not all being can be merely possible, some being must be actual. But there could not have been any actual being without some other being necessary for it to become actual. The chain of necessary being must lead back to some being necessary through itself, and this necessary being is God.

      His fourth proof is that among all things, there can always be found one thing that is more true, more good, more perfect, etc than some other thing, but there must also be one thing that is the most true, most good, most perfect, etc. of all things, and which is the greatest in being. This being, which no other being can be greater than, is what we call God.

      His fifth proof is that everything is governed by something else and acts for the sake of some end. The end toward which things move is governed by something that is intelligent, and so there must be some intelligent being by whom all things are governed or directed toward an end, and this intelligent being is God.

      The first proof is called the argument from motion. The second proof is called the argument from causation. The third proof is called the argument from contingency. The fourth proof is called the argument from degree or gradation. The fifth proof is called the argument from design (or the teleological argument). 

      Aquinas's first three proofs are cosmological arguments (arguments regarding the nature of the universe). He is critical of the ontological argument (proposed by Anselm, whom he doesn't mention) that God is that than which nothing greater than can be thought, and that therefore God exists because if God existed only as a thought in the mind and not in actual reality, then something else could be greater than God, which would be impossible. Aquinas says it isn't self-evident that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought, and that some people may not necessarily think of God in this way. Furthermore, even if God were that than which nothing greater than can be thought, this would only confirm God's existence in the world of thought and not in the world of actual reality.

      All of Aquinas's proofs are based on the premise that the chain of movement, causality, necessary being, comparative quality, or intelligence cannot be infinite and must have an end, and that when we arrive at the end of the chain we arrive at God. But if the universe is infinite, then there may be an infinite number of lovers, causes, necessary beings, comparative qualities, and intelligences, and by definition there isn't any place where infinity ends. Thus, to say that there is God, under the premises adopted by Aquinas, is to say that the universe ends somewhere, and that it is not infinite. And indeed, Aquinas says in Question 7 of the Treatise, on "Divine Infinity," that God is absolutely infinite, but no created thing is absolutely infinite.

      Whether the universe is actually finite or infinite may be both a metaphysical and a scientific question, and one for which we're still seeking an answer.

RESOURCES

Anselm, Proslogion, translated by M.J. Charlesworth (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979.

Thomas Aquinas, "The Treatise on the Divine Nature," in Thomas Aquinas: Basic Works, edited by Jeffrey Hause and Robert Pasnau (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2014), pp. 36-49.

Weaknesses of Pascal's Wager

One of the most famous arguments for belief in God is Pascal's Wager. But it has several weaknesses that limit its persuasiveness and coherency.

      Pascal says that we're usually more persuaded by reasons we discover for ourselves than by reasons given by others to persuade us (Section I, 10). So his wager that we have more to gain from believing in God than from disbelieving in God is a rational argument that has an inherent weakness insofar as it's less likely to convince us than if we had discovered it for ourselves.

      He also says that we can know truth through reason or sensory experience, but the passions of the soul can sometimes disturb the senses and cause us to have false impressions (Section II, 84). Isn't his wager, to some extent, an appeal to emotion (and therefore to the passions of the soul), intended to persuade us to believe in God by making us fearful of what we might lose if we don't believe in God? He says that we should, by diminishing our passions, convince ourselves of the existence of God, but isn't he to some extent calling on us to be moved by our passions?

      At the same time, he claims that by faith we can know that God is (that God exists) without knowing exactly who or what God is. The existence of God cannot be proved by reason, because God is infinitely incomprehensible to us (Section III, 233). But if we can only know by faith that God exists, then why is Pascal trying to persuade us by rational (and perhaps emotional) argument? If knowledge of God is not within the power of human reason, then why should knowledge of the necessity of belief in God be within the power of human reason?

      Pascal also claims that if we accept his wager and believe in God, then we will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, generous, sincere, and truthful. But he doesn't show why all these moral virtues should necessarily follow from belief in God, because we may truly believe in God and yet through our own faults and weaknesses fail to demonstrate many or all of these virtues fully and consistently.

      His argument for the necessity of the wager is that atheists and agnostics are inherently unhappy, because they are estranged from God (Section III, 194). He says that they are negligent in seeking the truth, and that when they attack religion, they are attacking something they know nothing about. They have also failed to recognize the importance of knowing what constitutes the immortality of the soul, and they have likewise failed to understand that this matter is of such supreme importance that no one can avoid confronting it. The refusal to seek the truth about God's existence is, in his view, to be content with neglectfulness and ignorance.

      Pascal holds it to be a moral duty for all those who doubt God's existence to seek the truth of whether God exists or does not exist. But he doesn't allow for the rationality of those who see God's existence as something that ultimately can be neither affirmed nor denied, and who regard God's existence as a mystery that cannot be objectively investigated. Nor does he actually show why the indifference of some individuals to the question of God's existence should leave them objectively any worse off than anyone else. He doesn't consider the possibility that they may be morally virtuous without believing in God, because from his standpoint, no one can attain salvation without having faith in God. Thus, his wager that God exists is subjectively justifiable, but objectively unnecessary.

RESOURCES

Blaise Pascal, Pensées [1670], translated by W.F. Trotter (New York: E.F. Dutton, 1958).

Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther, on Human Understanding of God

Thomas Aquinas says in "The Treatise of the Divine Nature" (Summa Theologiae, Part I, Question 1) that theology is a philosophical discipline concerned with what can be known by reason about God. However, scripture inspired by God doesn't belong to the philosophical disciplines, because it concerns what cannot be known solely by reason. Our knowledge of theological truths may depend on reason, but our knowledge of sacred truths may depend on divine revelation. Revelation may also be necessary for our knowledge of some truths that can be investigated by reason, because our powers of reasoning may not always be dependable and may be susceptible to error (Article 1).

      While we may receive academic teaching through the philosophical and scientific disciplines, we may receive sacred teaching through divine revelation. Sacred teaching is not a science, insofar as it doesn't proceed from self-evident principles, but rather from articles of faith that aren't self-evident (since they're not accepted by everyone). On the other hand, sacred teaching may be called a science, insofar as it proceeds from principles known through a "higher science," "the science that belongs to God" (Article 2).

      Insofar as sacred teaching concerns itself with morality, it may also be called a "practical science." Thus, it may be both speculative (insofar as it concerns our knowledge of the divine) and practical (insofar as it concerns human action) (Article 4).

      Aquinas describes four senses or methods of interpretation of scripture: literal or historical, allegorical, moral or tropological, and anagogical (mystical or spiritual). Thus, any passage of sacred scripture may have multiple meanings or interpretations (Article 10). He may be preparing the ground here for biblical hermeneutics and the recognition that the meaning of scripture may be further clarified by an art or science of interpretation.

      I would say that his argument that sacred teaching is a science is rather weak. What exactly is "the science that belongs to God"? He doesn't really say. And what is "divine science"? Scientific truths or principles aren't articles of faith. Rather, they remain truths or principles only as long as they're verifiable by empirical testing. Moreover, God can never be made an object of scientific investigation. God is always a subject, never an object, because God transcends objective inquiry.

      Aquinas also says in Book I, Chapter III of the Summa Contra Gentiles ("In What Way It Is Possible to Make Known the Divine Truth") that there are some truths about God that can be known by reason, but others that surpass the capabilities of human reason. In Chapter V ("That Those Things Which Cannot be Investigated by Reason Are Fittingly Proposed to Man as an Object of Faith"), he explains that those truths that surpass the capabilities of reason must be known by faith.

      In contrast, Martin Luther, in his Disputation Against Scholastic Theology (1517), which also includes arguments about human understanding of God, is less interested in what is within (or beyond) the power of human reason than in what is within the capacity of divine grace. Luther says that God's grace is necessary for us to do anything good. Without God's grace, we can't do anything good, and we can only do evil (Thesis no. 7). By our very nature, we're unable to want God to be God, and we ourselves want to be God (Thesis no. 17). We aren't masters of our own actions, but rather servants (Thesis no. 39). We don't become righteous by doing righteous things, but rather by having been made righteous (by God's grace) we do righteous things (Thesis no. 40). Luther calls Aristotle, insofar as the latter describes virtue as arising from the habit of acting virtuously and happiness as arising from human reason, an enemy of this interpretation of divine grace (Thesis no. 41). No act of friendship can occur without God's grace. We fulfill divine justice through God's grace, and not through our own will (Thesis no. 68). Our own will would prefer to be free to do evil and to have nothing (no law) imposed on it (Thesis no. 85). But if our own will, by God's grace, conforms to God's will, then we can attain salvation.

      Luther's Thesis no. 8, that the will is not by nature evil seems to be contradictory to his Thesis no. 9, that the will is "nevertheless innately and inevitably evil and corrupt."

      In his view, there isn't any "logic" of faith. Faith isn't "logical." If faith could be reduced to a syllogistic form of reasoning, then sacred truths would be demonstrable by reason, and faith wouldn't be necessary for knowledge of them. But faith is indeed necessary for knowledge of sacred truths that can't be demonstrated by reason.

RESOURCES

Thomas Aquinas, "The Treatise on the Divine Nature," in Thomas Aquinas: Basic Works, edited by Jeffrey Hause and Robert Pasnau (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2014), pp. 36-49.

Thomas Aquinas, "In What Way It is Possible to Make Known the Divine Truth," in Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I, Chapter III, translated by the English Dominican Fathers (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1924), online at https://archive.org/details/summacontragenti0001unse/page/4/mode/2up

Martin Luther, Disputation Against Scholastic Theology, translated by William Roach, 2017, online at https://williamroach.org/2017/08/20/martin-luthers-1517-disputation-against-scholastic-theology/

Artscape, 2024, Baltimore

Aaron Hill Trio, with Mariah Ash

Navasha Daya, with her band

Grounded in Love

The following is based on a reflection that I shared at the 8 a.m. service at church on Jan. 15, 2012. "Faith at Eight" is usually a small gathering of 15-20 people, in which we read from the scriptures, have a reflection period to discuss the readings, and have holy communion.

In today's reading from Paul's Letter to the Ephesians (3:14-21), Paul says, "grant that you may be strengthened in your inner being with power through his Spirit, and that Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith, as you are being rooted and grounded in love."

      What then does it mean to be rooted and grounded in love? What defines a state of rootedness or groundedness? What does it mean for someone or something to be uprooted or ungrounded? How should we respond when we're confronted with a sense of rootlessness or groundlessness?

      Pema Chödrön (2011), a Buddhist nun, teacher, and writer, described her concept of groundlessness as signifying a state of questioning and searching for meaning. She used the term "spiritual materialism" (which is an oxymoron, but that's the term she used) to describe a kind of misguided response to the experience of groundlessness. She said, 

"My understanding of spiritual materialism is using...spiritual teachings to build up your...ego...[and] as a way to get ground under your feet, rather than seeing spiritual teachings as stepping into groundlessness. Groundlessness keeps opening up as the teachings evolve...sometimes you see people...they're proclaiming their spirituality by how they're walking and dressing and things like that...That's what I think of as spiritual materialism. To avoid [this] would be to keep your mind open and always question and explore, be inquisitive, [and] curious...Materialism usually means material things. People use clothes and furniture and cars and everything you can think of to comfort themselves or to feel secure. Spiritual materialism is using spirituality the same way as materialism, instead of spirituality being something that introduces you to the true nature of reality, which is...impermanent and changing."¹

      In a televised interview with Bill Moyers in 2006, Pema Chödrön also said,

"if we could learn not to be afraid of groundlessness, not be afraid of insecurity and uncertainty, then it would be calling on an inner strength that would allow us to be open and free and loving and compassionate in any situation...What is groundlessness? Well, you experience it all the time...When my husband told me that we were breaking up, you know, he was having an affair and he wanted a divorce, that was a big groundless moment for me. [On 9-11] When the planes flew into the towers, everyone felt groundlessness. It was like our reality as we knew it wasn't holding together."²

      So I think that Pema Chödrön's concept of groundlessness is similar in some ways to the poet John Keats's concept of "negative capability." Keats, in a letter to his brothers in December 1817, said that negative capability is a state in which an individual "is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, [and] doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason." Thus, negative capability is a capacity to live with ambiguity and paradox, to be open to the world, to be receptive to new impressions, and to reconcile ourselves to doubt and uncertainty.

      Existentialist philosophers like Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir also emphasize the importance of being able to reconcile ourselves to doubt and uncertainty. De Beauvoir, in The Ethics of Ambiguity, says that "Existentialism is a philosophy of ambiguity,"³ and Sartre, in Being an Nothingness, says that our awareness of our capacity to make choices may result in anxiety, because we become aware of our responsibility for our own free choices, and of the possibility of meaninglessness and nothingness.

      Thus, we may face that same ambiguity and uncertainty in whether we should embrace or avoid groundlessness. Being grounded in love doesn't necessarily mean that we must always strive to avoid groundlessness as a source of doubt and uncertainty. It may in fact help us to respond to situations in which we're confronted with ambiguity and uncertainty.

      I think that our desire to avoid the state of groundlessness may be seen in our rejection of statements that we consider to be unfounded, baseless, unsupported by adequate evidence, or presented without sufficient reason.

      Why do we experience such anxiety when we feel the ground shifting beneath our feet? Our fear of groundlessness may be a sense of impending catastrophe or a feeling that something unpredictable may happen. It may also be our fear of actions that we perceive as irrational, such as acts of vandalism, mass shootings, suicide bombings, and other acts of violence or terrorism.

      Another example of our fear of groundlessness may be our use of the term "ground zero" to describe the site of an earthquake, explosion, or natural disaster.

      Thomas Crum (1998), an expert in the field of stress management and conflict resolution, says we will always face struggles and conflicts in our lives, but that it's our relationship to those struggles and conflicts that can be changed. The feeling of groundlessness can be a feeling of uncertainty, a feeling of the rug being pulled out from under us. But Crum says that "instead of seeing the rug...pulled out from under us, we can learn to dance on a shifting carpet. The stumbling blocks of the past [can] become the stepping stones to the future."⁴

      The apostle Paul, in his Letter to the Ephesians (3:17-19), tells the Ephesians that he bows before God so that "Christ may dwell in your hearts through faith; that you, being rooted and grounded in love, may have power...to know the love of Christ which surpasses knowledge, that you may be filled with all the fullness of God."

      Thus, the answer to our feelings of groundlessness may be to let ourselves be grounded in love, and to let love become the ground of our being. If we do this, then we will recognize that our redemption through Christ is the ground of our hope and salvation.

      The feeling of being groundless may be a feeling that we have no adequate grounds for our beliefs, and that we aren't rationally justified in holding the beliefs we have about the world. It may also be a feeling that there is no God, no apparent reason or purpose in our lives, and no reason why things are as they are.

      Thus, the theologian Paul Tillich describes the term "God" as a term for the ground of our being. He says that "the religious word for what is called the ground of being is God," and that God is not only the ground of being, but also the ground of revelation. The mystery of revelation is its depth, its limitlessness, and its ineffable and inexhaustible character.⁵

      The solution to the problem of groundlessness may therefore be to find our ground in God's love, and to remember that another way of looking at groundlessness may be to see it as an opportunity to reorient ourselves toward the world of change and to be more open to the world of possibility.

      Thomas Merton, a Cistercian monk, writer, poet, and social activist, says,

"If the deepest ground of my being is love, then in that very love itself and nowhere else will I find myself, and the world, and my brothers [and sisters] in Christ. It's not a question of either/or--but of all in one...of wholeness...and unity...which finds the same ground of love in everything."⁶

      We might also consider the meaning of the slang expression, "rock my world." If  someone or something rocks your world, then you may have a feeling that your world has become unstable, that you have had groundless preconceptions of things, and that you need to change your way of thinking about the world. What kinds of things can rock your world? Has someone's kindness and generosity ever rocked your world? Has an unexpected word of encouragement from a parent, teacher, or friend ever rocked your world? Why do we so often feel a need to have our feet on the ground and to have a clear sense of direction? What then does it mean to be grounded in love?

FOOTNOTES

¹Pema Chödrön, "Stepping into Groundlessness: Interview with Pema Chödrön," by Monty McKeever, Tricycle, December 13, 2011.

²Pema Chödrön, "Bill Moyers on Faith & Reason" (Public Affairs Television, August 4, 2006), online at https://www.pbs.org/moyers/faithandreason/print/faithandreason107_print.html

³Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, translated by Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), p. 9.

⁴Thomas Crum, The Magic of Conflict: Turning a Life of Work into a Work of Art (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1998), p. 15.

⁵Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Volume I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 156.

⁶Thomas Merton, Contemplation in a World of Action (New York: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 155-156