The Śūraṅgama Sūtra

The Śūraṅgama Sūtra ("Heroic March" or "Heroic Progress" sutra) is a Mahayana Buddhist sutra that Śramaṇa Paramiti (Dharma Master Paramiti) brought back from India to China, where he translated it into Chinese at Chih Chih Monastery in Guangzhou in 705 CE. The original Sanskrit text is not extant. Since the 8th century CE, many commentaries on it have been written, including those of Chan Master Han Shan (Hānshān Déqīng, 1546-1623) and more recently the  Venerable Masters Xuyun (1840-1959), Yuanying (1878-1953), and Hsuan Hua (1918-1995). 

      Most of the Śūraṅgama (Shurangama) Sutra consists of a dialogue between Buddha and his disciple Ananda before an assembly of bhikkhus (monks), arhats, and bodhisattvas. The Buddha's teachings in the sutra include discourses on the illusory nature of phenomena, the unreality of the self, the sources of misconceptions about the nature of reality, and the path to enlightenment.

      The Buddha explains that all phenomena are manifestations of mind, and that they have no inherent existence. They do not exist inherently because they are not self-caused or self-existent. All phenomena depend on causes and conditions of existence, and they are therefore empty of self-existence. They appear to exist inherently, but their appearance is illusory. The way they appear to us is not the way they are in true reality. 

      Emptiness (sūnyatā) is the true nature of all things. Emptiness (voidness) is also a door to liberation. It is the realization of the illusory nature of all existence, and the realization that all things are empty of inherent existence and self-nature.

      All phenomena (things, dharmas) arise from conditions and cease because of conditions. Thus, they are devoid of self-nature, and they lack any real, permanent, or essential attributes that would distinguish them from other phenomena. They do not exist on their own, and they are all interdependent.

      All phenomena are actually like flowers in the sky, illusory appearances that we misperceive because of our ignorance,

      The three meditative studies (or expedient practices) that lead all Buddhas in the ten directions¹ to enlightenment are śamatha (the meditative study of all as void or immaterial), samāpatti (the meditative study of all as unreal), and dhyāna (the meditative study of the mean between delusion and enlightenment). This threefold study aims to remove ignorance, and its most suitable point of departure is the One Mind (which is the source of both delusion and enlightenment).² 

      Meditation (dhyāna) is also one of the six pāramitās (perfections). The six pāramitās are generosity (dāna), moral conduct (sīla), patience (kṣānti), perseverance (viriya), meditation (dhyāna), and wisdom (prajñā). 

      The six perfections are practiced in order to cross over from the shore of mortality (saṃsāra, the karmic cycle, the cycle of birth and death) to the other shore (nirvāṇa, the cessation of saṃsāra).³ Nirvāṇa (the cessation of desire or craving) is also the extinction of the three poisons or unwholesome roots: rāga (greed or sensuality), dvesha (hatred or aversion), and avidya (ignorance or delusion).⁴ 

      When we cling to the illusory body and mind made up of the five aggregates, we fail to know the One Mind or True Mind. The five aggregates are form (rūpa), sensations or feelings (vedanā), perceptions (saṃjñā), mental formations (sanskaras), and consciousness (vijñāna).

      The five aggregates form the illusory self or ego, and they include everything that we experience in the mental and physical world. Each of them may be an object of clinging, and each may also be a source of falsehood and delusion. While clinging to them causes suffering, dissolving them leads to enlightenment.

      Clinging or attachment to the illusory self or ego may be coarse (when it arises from discrimination related to the sixth and seventh consciousnesses) or subtle (when it arises from the store of previous experiences that give rise to the illusory perception of an ego).⁵ 

      The eight consciousnesses are the six sense consciousnesses (the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental consciousnesses), the deluded consciousness (kliṣṭamanovijñāna), and the storehouse consciousness (ālāyavijñāna), which is the basis of the other seven.

      Wrong views, such as belief in the reality of the self or ego, belief in permanence and annihilation, and denial of the law of causality are causes of suffering (dukkha). The four mistakes or misapprehensions are mistaking impermanence for permanence, mistaking suffering for happiness, mistaking something having no identity for something having an identity, and mistaking something impure for something pure.

      The two inversions are (1) the wrong use of a clinging mind, which people mistake for their own nature, and (2) attachment to causal conditions, which screen the basically bright essence of consciousness. The non-rising of these inversions is the Tathāgata's (The Enlightened One's) true state of samādhi (meditative absorption or concentration).⁶ 

      Delusion can be caused by mistaking birth and death, arising and ceasing, beginning and ending for reality. Thus, delusion leads to transmigration through illusory realms of existence. When the discriminating mind is mistaken for self-nature, the true mind of enlightenment is screened and obscured by delusion.⁷

      The Eternal Mind or One Mind is beyond birth and death, and it is the common source of all Buddhas and all living beings.⁸ It transcends all dualities and all discriminations regarding the appearances of things. Thus, the subject and the object, the self and the nonself, "is" and "is not," being and nonbeing, existence and non-existence, thisness and thatness are all unreal and illusory.

      The Buddha ties six knots in a flowered cloth, symbolizing the obstructions that can block the path to enlightenment, and he explains that both tying and untying the knots (delusion and liberation) come from the same cause, the mind.⁹ The six knots represent the six sense organs (sight, hearing, taste, touch, smell, and mind) that can be sources of illusion. The six entrances of illusions into the mind are the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the body, and the intellect. If we disengage the sense organs and disentangle the knots that obstruct our path to enlightenment, then we realize that all phenomena are void.¹⁰ 

      Bodhisattvas (enlightened beings) remain in harmony with all beings in the ten directions. They work for the welfare of all living beings, and before their own liberation, they set their mind on freeing others. Their own enlightenment and their enlightenment of others are therefore free from contradiction. Their preaching is free from all clinging (upādāna), and their teaching reveals the non-duality of all Dharma doors.¹¹

      Of the ten highest stages of bodhisattva attainment, the last stage is that in which the bodhisattva provides sheltering clouds of compassion for all those who are suffering and are seeking nirvāṇa. This is the stage of Dharma clouds (Dharmamegha).¹²

      The Buddha always responds to the needs of others, like the tide that never fails to rise and fall.¹³ Thus, he rescues others from suffering, ensuring their liberation and attainment of enlighenment.

FOOTNOTES

¹The ten directions are north, south, east, west, northeast, northwest, southeast, southwest, up (above), and down (below).

²The Śūraṅgama Sūtra, with commentary (abridged) by Chan Master Han Shan, translated by Upāsaka Lu K'uan Yu (Charles Luk) (London: Rider & Company, 1966), pp. 3, 116.

³Ibid., p. 242.

⁴ Robert E. Buswell Jr. and Donald S. Lopez Jr., The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2014).

⁵The Śūraṅgama Sūtra, translated by Upāsaka Lu K'uan Yu, pp. xviii-xix.

⁶Ibid., pp. 13-14.

⁷Ibid., p. 14.

⁸Ibid., p. 19.

⁹Ibid., p. 117.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 121.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 168-169.

¹²Ibid., p. 172.

¹³Ibid., pp. 146-147.

The Mind of God

As a final assignment in the philosophy of religion class I took this semester, we were given the task of writing a paper in the format of a medieval disputation. This is my paper.

Whether there are ideas in the mind of God?

      Objection 1. To attribute mental properties to God may be to describe God as having human properties, and thus to engage in anthropomorphic thinking. If we describe God as having ideas, then we inevitably attribute human thinking and reasoning processes to the way in which God exists. Any conception we may have of thinking and reasoning processes inevitably reflects the way in which humans engage in thinking and reasoning. We don't really know what non-human thinking and reasoning may consist of or what form it may take.

      Objection 2. To describe God as having a mind may be to attribute some kind of executive agency to God's mind over the rest of his being. It may also lead to the question of wheher God is a mind or merely has various attributes or faculties of mind.

      Objection 3. A plurality of ideas in the mind of God may be contradictory to God's unity, insofar as these ideas may be contradictory to one another or may include disparate conceptions of objects, persons, or things. The unity of divine ideas would therefore seem to include a plurality of conceptions of the world, and if God is the One, then he would also include the Many. The unity of divine ideas would have to include a plurality of constituents, which may be contradictory to God's not being constituted by various elements or parts.

      Objection 4. If we suppose that God has a mind, then we may be imposing limits upon what God can will or cause to happen. If God's powers are truly beyond our understanding, then he may transcend all concepts of mind, and he may have supramental powers beyond any that we can imagine.

      Reply to Objection 1. If God is a being with infinite powers, then we would assume that he is capable, to an infinite degree, of everything that human beings are capable of, such as thinking, reasoning, knowing, willing, and other acts of mind. We would also assume that he is capable of being addressed as a divine person, and that as such he has divine personhood. We would also assume that he is capable of entering into a personal relationship with us, and that his being for us is therefore to some extent relational in nature.

      Augustine says in the Eighty-Three Different Questions (De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, 388-396) that the original or principal forms of things, which Plato called ideas, are eternal and unchangeable, and that they are contained in the divine intelligence or mind. These divine ideas do not come into being or pass away, but everything that does come into being or pass away is formed in accord with them. And everything that comes into being has its being by participating in them.¹

      Thomas Aquinas says in the Summa Theologiae (1265-1273) that if the world was made by God acting through his understanding, then there had to have been ideas or forms in God's mind, in the likeness of which the world was made.² Divine ideas are the exemplar causes of all things.³ The exemplarism of divine ideas consists in the fact that all things in the world God created are likenesses or examples of ideas that he had in his mind before he created them.

      Aquinas also says in the Disputed Questions on Truth (Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, 1256-1259) that an idea is nothing but the exemplary form (of whatever is created by God.)⁴

      If God is omniscient, then he must have a mind. If God is infinite, then his mind must also be infinite. If God's mental faculties are infinite, then he must be capable, to an infinite degree, of perception, intuition, reasoning, thinking, memory, imagination, judgment, understanding, and other acts of cognition that we may not be aware of or be able to comprehend.

      While we may not be able to say anything with certainty about what God's mind is or what is in God's mind, we may attempt to determine what would have to be true if God does indeed have a mind.

      If God has a perfect mind, then he also has perfect thoughts, ideas, intentions, desires, reasoning, judgment, emotions, and other cognitive faculties.

      While God may know every thought in our minds, he doesn't think our thoughts, because he doesn't have any wrong or imperfect thoughts. We can only know God's thoughts insofar as he reveals them to us.

      God knows things that we cannot know. He knows what we know and what we don't know. He knows what we will know and what we will never know.

      J.I. Packer (1993) argues that if God is omniscient, then he knows everything about everything, all the time. He knows everything that has happened, everything that could have happened but didn't happen, everything that is presently happening, everything that could happen but won't happen, and everything that will happen. If we remember that God is always aware of us, then we may be reassured that we've not been forgotten by God, but we may also be reminded that we can't hide ourselves or conceal our mistakes or errors from God.⁵

      Linda Zagzebski (2013) argues that if God is omniscient, then he must also be omnisubjective (capable of knowing the conscious experience of every conscious being). He is therefore capable of perfect empathy, because he knows exactly what it feels like for someone to experience life in the way they experience it.⁶

      God not only knows everything about the world he created, he also knows everything about all possible worlds he could have created.

      Are all ideas in God's mind actually perfect ideas? Why then did God create an imperfect world if he knew all its imperfections before he created it?

      The world may have been a thought in God's mind before he created it, but in its subsistence it must be more than that, because there is evil and corruption in the world, but no evil or corruption in God. So the world in its subsistence must have some other existence than in the mind of God.

      The existence of ideas in the mind of God is incompatible with physicalism as it is understood in the philosophy of mind. The theory that mental properties are reducible to physical properties (reductive physicalism) or that they at least depend or supervene on physical properties (nonreductive physicalism) is incompatible with the existence of ideas in God's mind, since God has no physical attributes or properties. If God had physical attributes or properties, then he would be governed by the laws of physics, which would be incompatible with his having created a universe governed by the laws of physics.

      The existence of divine ideas may also be incompatible with some non-physicalist theories of mind. Thus, it may be incompatible with substance dualism (the theory that the mental and the physical are two different substances), since God isn't a substance that can belong to other substances. It may also be incompatible with property dualism (the theory that the mental and the physical are two different kinds of properties that can belong to the same substance), since divine ideas aren't properties that can belong to substances having physical properties. It may also be incompatible with emergentism (the theory that mental states  may emerge from physical states without being reducible to them), since divine ideas don't emerge from anything other than God.

      The existence of divine ideas may also be incompatible with panpsychism (the theory that all constituents of reality have mental or proto-mental properties), insofar as panpsychism sees mental or proto-mental properties as belonging to physical matter (unless it takes a pantheistic view and sees divine ideas as belonging to physical matter).

      However, the existence of divine ideas may be compatible with some forms of idealism (the theory that the world depends upon the mind for its reality, and that the world is not real independently of mind). Thus, it may be compatible with Platonic, subjective (Berkeleyan), transcendental (Kantian), and absolute (Hegelian) idealism, although perhaps not with pluralistic (Leibnizian) idealism (insofar as the latter sees reality as consisting of a plurality of monads or minds). From an idealist standpoint, reality consists of mind, spirit, or ideas, and the world isn't real independently of them. Thus, the reality of the world is ideal rather than material, and the world is only real insofar as it represents or consists of ideas.

      Reply to Objection 2. If God is the first cause of things and not an effect of some other cause, then his mind doesn't have a causal effect over his being. His mind therefore doesn't have an executive function with regard to his way of being. And if he's capable of acting as well as willing, then he's not merely a mind, he's also an actor or agent who can direct (or not direct) the world according to his will.

      Since we can only know what's in God's mind by what he reveals to us, we can't otherwise say or know anything about the nature of God's self-consciousness. God's consciousness of his own infinite being is beyond our finite powers of understanding. God knows everything about himself, as well as everything about the entire universe.

      Aquinas says that God perfectly understands and comprehends himself. God knows everything about himself, and everything about things other than himself.⁷

      John Duns Scotus says in his Ordinatio (1300-1304) that God also knows himself as three persons, and that God's unity therefore includes a plurality of persons. (Duns Scotus cites Matthew 28:19, which says that Jesus said to his disciples, "Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.")⁸ God's oneness and unity is shown by his having infinite intellect, infinite will, infinite goodness, infinite power, absolute infinity, necessary being, and omnipotence.⁹ God could not have all these attributes unless he were one and an absolute unity.

      Duns Scotus also says that God not only has determinate knowledge of all things, including their conditions of existence, he also has certain, infallible, and immutable knowledge of all things, including their conditions of existence.¹⁰

      Reply to Objection 3. Aquinas says that the plurality of ideas in God's mind isn't contradictory to his unity, since God's understanding of those ideas is unitary. It isn't contradictory to God's unity that he knows or understands many things. What would be contradictory to his unity would be if his knowledge or understanding were formed by many things.¹¹

      Reply to Objection 4. If God's mind is infinite, then there isn't any real distinction between his having infinite mental powers and his having supramental powers. There are no limits to what he can do or cause to happen. He can do whatever he wants, whenever he wants. His infinite mind transcends any concepts we may have of what a mind is or how it functions.

FOOTNOTES

¹Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, translated by David L. Mosher (Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1977), p. 81.

²Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part One, Question 15, Article 1, translated by Alfred L. Freddoso, 2024, p. 129, online at https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201/st1-ques15.pdf

³Ibid., Part One, Question 44, Article 3, p. 351, online at https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201/st1-ques44.pdf

⁴Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, Question Three, Article 3, translated by Robert W. Mulligan (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952), online at https://isidore.co/aquinas/QDdeVer3.htm

⁵J.I. Packer, Concise Theology: A Guide to Historic Christian Beliefs (Carol Stream, Ill.: Tyndale House Publishers, 1993), pp. 31-32.

⁶Linda Zagzebski, Omnisubjectivity: A Defense of a Divine Attribute (Milwaukee, Marquette University Press, 2013).

⁷Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part One, Question 14, Article 3, translated by Alfred J. Freddoso, 2024, p. 110, online at https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201/st1-ques14.pdf

⁸John Duns Scotus, The Ordinatio of Blessed John Duns Scotus, Volume 1, On Revelation and Theology, Book One, Second Distinction, Second Part, translated by Peter Simpson, 2022, pp. 205-206, online at https://www.aristotelophile.com/Books/Translations/Ordinatio%20I.pdf

⁹Ibid., p. 197.

¹⁰Ibid., Book One, Thirty-Eighth Distinction, Single Question, p. 711.

¹¹Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part One, Question 15, Article 2, translated by Alfred J. Freddoso, p. 131, online at https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/Part%201/st1-ques15.pdf

Questions Raised by "The New Thinking"

In Franz Rosenzweig's essay, "The New Thinking" (Das Neue Denken, 1925), he distinguishes between the philosophical way of thinking about the essence of things and the unphilosophical way of thinking about their appearance in everyday reality. He calls the unphilosophical way of thinking "common sense" (das gemeine Denken), and he describes how the new (unphilosophical) way of thinking (the new philosophy) differs from the old (philosophical) way of thinking (the old philosophy).

      Rosenzweig says that while the old philosophy stands still and becomes fixed on the essence of things, the new philosophy "does nothing other than turn the "method" of common sense into the method of scientific thinking."¹ While "the old [way of thinking] poses the problem of whether God is transcendent or immanent, the new [way of thinking] tries to say how and when God turns from the distant to the near God and again from the distant to the near one."² While the old philosophy seeks timeless truths, the new philosophy knows "that it cannot know independently of time."³ 

      Can the difference between the new and the old philosophy be interpreted as the difference between the practical and the theoretical? Or as the difference between the scientific and the speculative? Or as the difference between the concrete and the abstract, the intuitive and the analytical, or the material and the spiritual? What other kinds of binary oppositions may possibly be established by the distinction between the new and the old philosophy, and what other kinds of issues may we have to resolve if we privilege one over the other?

      Perhaps we may also need to clarify how the distinction between the new and the old philosophy can be made more helpful than that between practical and theoretical philosophy or that (generally unhelpful distinction) between analytic and continental philosophy.

      We may also need to be very careful about the use of the term "common sense." What seems like common sense to one person may not seem like that to another. Just because an idea, attitude, or opinion is commonly shared doesn't mean it's true. Can common sense really be defined? What makes something a matter of common sense? Is common sense merely a matter of consensus or mutual agreement? What about false or spurious consensus in which people share inaccurate or false ideas due to their having cognitive, social, and cultural biases? What makes a matter capable of being resolved by common sense, and when does its resolution require critical thinking?

FOOTNOTES

¹Franz Rosenzweig, Franz Rosenzweig"s "The New Thinking", edited and translated by Alan Udoff and Barbara E. Galli (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1999), p. 83.

²Ibid., p. 82.

³Ibid., p. 83.

The Intentionality of Evil

Augustine says in his Confessions (397-400 CE, Book VII) that free will may be the source of evil, insofar as it may cause us to do evil things. Since God is good (and indeed is goodness itself), God is not the source of any evil. Everything that God created is good, but unlike God, every created thing is changeable and corruptible. God has created every substance, and every substance is good, but every substance is destructible or corruptible. Evil cannot therefore be a substance, because if it were, it would be good. Evil is rather a non-being of the good, and it has no being in anything that God has created.

      However, this theory (which describes evil as an absence of the good, and which is known as the privation theory of evil) doesn't seem to recognize that there is something active in evil, and that evil is something embodied, expressed, intended, or committed by a moral agent. Evil may therefore have some embodiedness, expressivity, intentionality, or capability of being performed or committed.

      To say that evil is the absence of good is like saying that hate is the absence of love or despair is the absence of hope. However, some people may be unloving without being hateful, and some people may be unhopeful without being despairing. Some people may be unloving by being indifferent, just as some things (like apples, oranges, or tomatoes) may be lacking in goodness by being indifferent. It also seems that some people or things may be neither good nor evil, neither loving nor hateful, neither true nor false, neither right nor wrong. So the absence of one doesn't mean the presence of the other. (The absence of goodness doesn't mean the presence of evil, the absence of love doesn't mean the presence of hate, and so on.)

      If evil were not something done by a moral agent or the evildoer had no moral agency, then we couldn't hold them morally responsible for the evil acts they committed.

      So-called "natural evils" (like earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, and diseases) are therefore misnamed. They may properly be called natural catastrophes, calamities, or disasters, but they're not properly moral evils. They lack intentionality, and they have no moral dimensions in themselves, unless they're caused by someone or something evil. Of course, they may have tragic and devastating consequences for their victims, but that doesn't make them morally evil, unless their causes can be traced to moral agents who can rightly be held responsible for them.

      Furthermore, all evils are moral evils. Evil is a moral category. There are no "natural evils," properly speaking. Describing natural events like hurricanes and earthquakes as disasters or misfortunes rather than evils isn't to try to reduce evil to disaster or misfortune, it's rather to distinguish between them. To describe natural events as natural evils may be to make a kind of category-mistake or to engage in a kind of naturalistic fallacy.

      The intentionality of evil consists in its being directed at persons or things, and in its being expressed in an agent's intentional states. Thus, it may be expressed in an agent's motives, desires, attitudes, actions, and the consequences of their actions. 

      An agent may have an intention to do evil and then actually do evil, but they may also have an intention to do evil and then do nothing. They may also do evil without having had a prior intention to do so. So the intentionality of evil isn't always expressed as intentionally evil actions. It may also be expressed as intentional states of mind (such as desires, attitudes, purposes, and goals) that are evil.

      Another way of describing the intentionality of evil may be to say that evil is willful or has a volitional character. Malevolence is involved in evil. This isn't to say that the evildoer always has some clearly defined goal toward which they are aiming or some clearly defined effect they intend to produce by their actions. But bad will (the will to do evil), as well as evil motives and intentions, and the lack of concern and empathy for others, are integral to acts of evil.

      This also isn't to say that evil is some kind of malevolent force that's engaged in a struggle with the forces of good or that there's some kind of Manichean struggle between good and evil that takes place in humanity and throughout the universe.

      But there couldn't be an "evil genius" (or for that matter, a criminal mastermind) anywhere in the world unless evil had a volitional or intentional character.

      For something to be evil is much worse than for it to be wrong. Wrong actions may not be evil, but evil actions are always wrong, and not merely wrong, but extremely or egregiously beyond the limits of morally acceptable behavior. Indeed, evil actions are so beyond the limits of morally acceptable behavior that the evildoer may seem to have ignored, subverted, rejected, or abandoned any accepted standards of right and wrong.

      Thus, it would be very callous and insensitive to say merely that "It was wrong for Robespierre to have sent thousands of innocent people to the guillotine," as if he merely made a mistake or tactical error, rather than "It was evil for Robespierre to have sent thousands of innocent people to the guillotine," recognizing his true moral depravity and culpability.

      Kant (1793) says that a person who is evil not only performs evil actions, but also performs actions with the conscious knowledge that they are evil and does so on the basis of evil principles. The capacity for evil may then be determined by weakness of the will to follow generally accepted moral principles, as well as by the propensity to mix immoral motives or values with moral motives or values, and the propensity to adopt evil principles.¹

      Kant, in discussing the origin of evil in human nature, says that we may originally be innocent and without any predisposition toward evil. However, the predisposition toward the good may be corrupted by the adoption of evil maxims or principles. There may be some hope of moral improvement for us, however, if despite having been corrupted, we still have some good will.

      Claudia Card (2002) describes evils as "foreseeable intolerable harms caused by culpable wrongdoing."² Thus, evils have two basic components: (intolerable) harm and (culpable) wrongdoing, neither of which is reducible to the other.³ The severity of the harm and the magnitude of the wrongdoing may determine the degree to which someone or something is evil. Culpability may take the form of intending to cause intolerable harm, being willing to cause harm in the course of pursuing some otherwise acceptable aim, or failing to attend to the risks involved in a particular action or mode of conduct.⁴ Culpability may also take the form of intentional ignorance or disregard of the possible effects of a particular mode of conduct.

      Marcus Singer (2004) argues that evil acts are so horrendously bad or immoral that no ordinary decent human being could conceive of themselves as doing them. Those persons who knowingly perform or order such acts are evil, as well as those who remain indifferent to such acts when they are performed by others, and who take no action when something could be done to stop or prevent them.⁵

      Singer also says that evil acts arise from evil motives or intentions.⁶ Thus, the intention to deliberately inflict unnecessary pain or suffering on others is evil. Acts of wanton cruelty, willful infliction of pain or suffering on sentient beings, and cruelty inflicted because the perpetrator enjoys inflicting it, are evil. And those who engage in a pattern of such conduct are evil.⁷ 

      The term "evil," according to Singer, may be applied not only to persons, intentions, motives, and conduct, but also to institutions, practices, arrangements, agencies, endeavors, and programs.⁸ The nature of the evil act may be determined by (1) whether the evildoer knows it to be evil and does it because it is evil, (2) whether the evildoer knows it to be evil and doesn't care that it is evil, (3) whether the evildoer judges it to be evil when it is inflicted on themselves or people whom they care about, but not when it is inflicted on others or people whom they don't care about, (4) whether the evildoer knows it to be evil, but does it anyway for the sake of convenience or expediency, (5) whether the evildoer knows it to be evil but considers it to be for the sake of some greater good, and (6) whether the evildoer doesn't believe it to be evil, but in fact believes it to be good. It may be difficult in practice to determine which of these motives predominate in a given evil act.⁹ 

      Literary personifications of evil include Dante's Satan, Milton's Lucifer, Goethe's Mephistopheles, Shakespeare's Iago, Hawthorne's Chillingworth, Melville's Ahab, Dickens's Uriah Heep, Stoker's Dracula, Stevenson's Mr. Hyde, and Wilde's Dorian Gray. Some of the traits shared by some of these characters include their deviousness, dishonesty, unscrupulousness, predatoriness, treachery, mercilessness, cruelty, and thirst for vengeance or retribution. Perhaps their most evil traits may also include their enjoyment of their immoral or criminal behavior and their lack of conscience or remorse. Thus, evil may be characterized by a focal cluster or generalized constellation of traits.

FOOTNOTES

¹Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Book One, "Concerning the Indwelling of the Evil Principle with the Good, or, on the Radical Evil in Human Nature" [1793], translated by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, online at

https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/kant/religion/religion-within-reason.htm

²Claudia Card, The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 3.

³Ibid., p. 4.

⁴Ibid., p. 20.

⁵Marcus G. Singer, "The Concept of Evil,"in Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 308 (April 2004), p. 196.

⁶Ibid., p. 196.

⁷Ibid., pp. 197-198.

⁸Ibid., pp. 189-190.

⁹Ibid., pp. 205-206.

OTHER RESOURCES

Augustine, The Confessions, translated by Maria Boulding (Hyde Park: New City Press, 1997).

Hume and Augustine, on the Problem of Evil

In Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779), Demea (a devout religious believer), Philo ( a sceptic), and Cleanthes (a philosopher) discuss the nature and existence of God by considering the problem of evil.

      Philo says that nothing brings us closer to a sense of religion than the presence of human misery and suffering (Part 10, paragraph 2).

      Demea, however, says that much of this misery and suffering is self-caused, since human beings themselves are responsible for such problems as oppression, injustice, violence, war, treachery, and fraud (Part 10, paragraph 12).

      Philo says that God's moral attributes, such as justice, benevolence, and mercy, cannot be inferred from human moral attributes. If God is omnipotent, then God has not willed that all human beings be happy, because so many are unhappy. He has also not willed that human beings be free of misery and suffering, since they are so often subjected to misery and suffering (Part 10, paragraph 24).

      Cleanthes replies that if God is willing to prevent evil but is unable to, then he is not omnipotent. However, if God is able to prevent evil but is unwilling to, then he is malevolent. But if God is both able and willing to prevent evil, then why doesn't he do so? (Part 10, paragraph 25).

      Demea replies that God may rectify present evil in the future (Part 10, paragraph 29).

      Phio says, however, that human happiness may always be exceeded by human misery. But why should there be any human misery at all? Is it God's intention that there be misery in the world? If it is, then God is not benevolent. If it is not, then why has God decided to allow misery and suffering to exist? (Part 10, paragraph 34).

      Philo concludes that there is no view of human moral attributes by which we can infer divine moral attributes There is no way to discover by reason the true nature of God's benevolence, power, and wisdom, which can only be discovered by faith (Part 10, paragraph 36).

      Augustine considers the problem of evil in "On Free Will" (391-395 CE), a dialogue between Augustine and his friend Evodius. He explains that God is good and therefore does not do evil. However, God may punish those who do evil.¹ God gave human beings free will, because without it, they wouldn't be capable of acting rightly or wrongly. If there were no free will, reward for right actions and punishment for wrong actions would be unjust.²

      Freedom of the will is good in itself, but it may be misused. Thus, evil may be caused by misuse of free will, and by the pursuit of evil ends.

      The natures of things created by God are good, but they may be weakened or corrupted by stronger or more corruptible natures. Human nature in itself is good, but it may become less good or be corrupted by vice.³

      Human beings are free to show good or bad will toward one another, and to act rightly or wrongly toward one another. They may (or may not) act in accordance with the common good. Evil may be caused by acting for a perceived private good, rather than for the public good. Good is a turning of the will toward the common and unchangeable good, but evil is a turning toward private and changeable goods.⁴ Good is also a turning toward God, but evil is a turning away from God.

      Pierre Masson (2000) examines Augustine's position on the problem of evil, noting that Augustine held that since God is good, evil does not come from God.⁵ Moral evil comes from human beings, because they have free will and therefore can do good or evil things.⁶ Natural evil may be caused by natural catastrophes, diseases, physical or psychological sufferings, and other natural phenomena, but the question of why God created a world in which there are natural evils is not fully answered by Augustine, says Masson.⁷

      Thus, some possible explanations for why God allows evil and suffering to exist may include:

1. God isn't omnipotent, and he doesn't have the power to end evil and suffering.
2. God, as a sign of his love, suffers with us when we experience pain and suffering.
3. God allows evil and suffering to exist because he gave human beings the power to end evil and suffering.
4. Good has the power to overcome evil, truth has the power to overcome falsehood, justice has the power to overcome injustice, and freedom has the power to overcome oppression.
5. God has enabled us to express our love and compassion for all who are experiencing pain or suffering.
6. If evil didn't exist, then good wouldn't exist. If falsehood didn't exist, then truth wouldn't exist. If injustice didn't exist, then justice wouldn't exist.
7. God loves us, but he doesn't control us. God loves the world, but he doesn't control the world. God is in charge of things, but he isn't in control of things. In order to resolve problems related to evil and suffering, we must seek God's help, support, guidance, grace, and redemption.

FOOTNOTES

¹Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will, On Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings, edited and translated by Peter King (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 3.

²Ibid., p. 32

³Ibid., p. 99.

⁴Ibid., p. 70.

⁵Pierre Masson, "Augustine and the Problem of Evil," in The Problem of Evil: An Intercultural Exploration, edited by Sandra A. Wawrytko (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), p. 44.

⁶Ibid., p. 44.

⁷Ibid., p. 45.

OTHER RESOURCES

David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, edited by Dorothy Coleman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).