The Thinkable and the Unthinkable

The term “unthinkable” may be used in a variety of ways. It may, for example, be used to refer to that which is unimaginable, inconceivable, unquantifiable, unidentifiable, or indefinable. It may also be used to refer to that which is virtually impossible or almost completely out of the question (presupposing that there is indeed a corresponding question that may be formulated by thought).

      When we say that something is “unthinkable,” we may in some cases mean merely that we consider it to be very improbable or highly unlikely. For that thing to become actual reality may therefore be for it to be taken as an example of the "unthinkable" becoming thinkable.

      The “unthinkable” may also in some cases be merely that which is considered to be socially inappropriate for, or forbidden within, a given setting or context. The "unthinkable" within a given setting or context may be that which is barred or prohibited for a given person, group, network, or community. The occurrence of that which has previously been considered "unthinkable" may thus in some cases be perceived as disruptive, disturbing, unseemly, appalling, or shocking.

      The “unthinkable” may also sometimes be a specific thought content, idea, or concept that is forbidden and that we are told, taught, or ordered not to think about. It may also be that which it is illicit or impermissible to think about. To “think the unthinkable” may therefore be to disobey moral, religious, social, legal, or governmental dictates and to violate conventional norms. The “thinker of the unthinkable” may in some cases be a kind of ground breaker, innovator, or visionary, and in other cases a kind of law breaker, apostate, heretic, or revolutionary.

      A given mode of speech, thought, or conduct may be made "unthinkable" by a given moral, religious, social, or professional code or by a given religious, social class, political, or cultural ideology. For a given code or ideology to gain power or become predominant within a society may be for the thinkable to become "unthinkable" or for the "unthinkable" to become thinkable. The thinkable within a given code or ideology may be "unthinkable" within a different code or ideology.

      Under an authoritarian system of government, the “unthinkable” may also be that which has been declared by the state to be beyond the limits of the thinkable or sayable. To “think the unthinkable” or “say the unsayable” may therefore be to risk censure or incur punishment for having transgressed the limits of the sayable or thinkable. The thinkable may be a realm that is governed by the state and that is enforced by means of thought control.¹

      The “unthinkable” may also in some cases be merely that which we have been too shortsighted or careless to think about. We may in some cases describe a situation or event as “unthinkable” merely because we have been too thoughtless to conceive of its possibility.

      Some examples of events that are often described as “unthinkable” include natural disasters, environmental catastrophes, devastating industrial accidents, worldwide disease epidemics, stock market crashes, sudden collapses of government, mass shootings,² terrorist attacks,³ war crimes, and other acts of violence and destruction.

      The “ungraspability” or “unthinkability” of some facts, events, or situations may also be expressed by colloquial expressions such as “I don’t get that” or “I can’t quite get my head around that.”

      Thus, it may be important to distinguish between the literally unthinkable and the figuratively unthinkable, as well as between the unthinkable in theory and the unthinkable in practice. It may also be important to recognize and delineate those situations and contexts in which the unthinkable can become thinkable and the thinkable can become unthinkable.

      To say that something is literally unthinkable is to say that there are boundaries or limits to what we can think, and that there are boundaries or limits beyond which we cannot think of, or think about, something. What then are those boundaries or limits? How may we delimit or demarcate the domains of the thinkable and the unthinkable? May such domains overlap?

      If there are limits beyond which we cannot think, can we ever know or recognize those limits? If we were able to know or recognize those limits, then would we perhaps also have to be able to know or recognize not only the thinkable, but also the unthinkable? Thus, Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, says that in order to draw a limit to thinking, we would have to think what cannot be thought.⁴

      To say there are limits to what we can think may also be to say there are limits to what we can conceive of, imagine, hope for, desire, trust in, be disappointed by, be angered by, agree with, disagree with, believe, disbelieve, remember, forget, know, talk about, dream about, and understand.

      The literally unthinkable may be that which transcends words or concepts, and that which exceeds or surpasses the limits of thought. But if there are limits to the thinkable, are there also limits to the unthinkable?

      The thinkable is all that can be thought, including all that has been thought, all that is being thought, and all that has not been but will be thought. On the other hand, the unthinkable is all that cannot be thought, including all that is not being thought (because it is incapable of being thought), and all that has not been and never will be thought (because it is incapable of being thought).

      To think about something may be to make it an object of thought. The unthinkable may therefore be that which cannot be made an object of thought. To be able to distinguish between the thinkable and the unthinkable we may also need to be able to distinguish between what can and cannot be made an object of thought.

      Some important questions to be considered include: Are the limits of language the same as the limits of thought? Can language express everything that can be thought? Are there limits to the expressive capacity of language? Can pure intuition transcend the limits of deliberative thought? Are there things that can be recognized or known purely intuitively and that transcend our ability to think deliberatively about them?

 FOOTNOTES

¹Noam Chomsky, “The Bounds of Thinkable Thought,” in The Progressive, Vol. 49, Issue10 (Oct. 1985), pp. 28-31.

²Todd Zwillich, “Stop Saying Mass Shootings Are ‘Unthinkable,’” June 24, 2015, at http://www.thetakeaway.org/story/stop-saying-mass-shootings-are-unthinkable/

³Phil Rosenthal, “9/11 attacks unthinkable, not unimaginable, as events prior show,” Chicago Tribune, Sept. 11, 2011, at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-09-11/business/ct-biz-0911-phil-20110911_1_economy-contraction-federal-agency

⁴Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1922] (Mineola, Dover Publications, 1999), p. 27.      


Listen to radio news correspondent Todd Zwillich explain why we should "Stop Saying Mass Shootings are 'Unthinkable'"

When Should We Trust Our Intuitions?

What is the most accurate and reliable way for us to recognize those situations in which our intuitions are correct, well founded, and trustworthy? When should we rely on more preconscious and automatic, as opposed to more conscious and deliberative, modes of thinking? What kinds of situations are best approached intuitively rather than analytically?

      Intuitions may sometimes be referred to as “instincts,” but they should be distinguished from the latter, insofar as intuitions may be defined as “immediate apprehensions” or “direct perceptions, independent of any reasoning process,” while instincts may be defined as “natural or innate impulses or inclinations” or “inborn tendencies to action common to a given biological species.”¹

      Intuitions should also be distinguished from “hunches,” “suspicions,” or “gut feelings.” A hunch or suspicion may, in contrast to an intuition, involve deductive reasoning, while a gut feeling may be more generalized and nonspecific and more like an inclination or disposition than an intuition.

      Even the most committed intuitionism may recognize that in some cases deliberative decision-making may provide some advantages over intuitive decision-making. Intuition may not be the best means of making all judgments. Some cases of decision-making may require thorough consideration and thoughtful deliberation.

      In what kinds of situations then should we rely on our intuitions? Perhaps we can examine the suitability or unsuitability of proposals such as the following for assessing the reliability of cognitive, sensory, and mixed intuitions.

      (1) We should trust our intuitions when the rightness or wrongness of actions is self-evident.

      However, it may be argued that whatever appears to be self-evident to one person may not be self-evident to another person. People may have varying opinions about the nature of self-evidence. There may be controversy about whether any actions are self-evidently right or wrong, that is to say, right or wrong without any demonstration of their rightness or wrongness, just as there may be controversy about whether any actions are intuitively right or wrong, that is to say, right or wrong without any regard for, or consideration of, their motives or consequences.

      (2) We should trust our intuitions when we recognize that we may be receiving misinformation about a situation and that such misinformation may not serve as an adequate and proper foundation for making appropriate deliberative judgments about that situation.

      However, the possible unreliability of deliberative decision-making in such a situation does not guarantee the reliability of intuitive decision-making in that situation.

      (3) We should trust our intuitions when we are compelled to do so by time constraints that hinder our being able to make decisions more deliberatively.

      However, even this modest proposal for assessing the reliability of intuitions does not indicate that we should not subsequently reexamine and review our intuitions or that we should not subject them to further scrutiny when time permits.

      (4) We should rely on our intuitions when we are confronted by situations that demand immediate action as opposed to deliberative thought. The readiness and spontaneity provided by intuitive decision-making may be more appropriate to situations demanding immediate action than the reserve and formality provided by careful analysis and painstaking deliberation.

      However, this proposal is subject to the same limitations as (3).

      (5) We should trust our intuitions when we are presented with the alternative of trusting the intuitions of someone else whom we regard as less informed or less capable of making rational, fair, unbiased, and impartial judgments about the situation at hand. 

      However, it may be argued that both our intuitions and the intuitions of whomever we regard as untrustworthy may be mistaken. Both of us may be acting intuitively under a veil of ignorance of which we are unaware.

      However, a counter-argument to this might be that even if our intuitions are mistaken, if we rely on own intuitions rather than those of someone else whom we regard as untrustworthy, we may at least be able to take comfort in the fact that we made our own mistakes of judgment, rather than having repeated someone else's mistakes of judgment.

      (6) We should trust our intuitions when we know by previous experience (and therefore have sufficient evidence) that our intuitions are reliable and trustworthy in situations similar to the present one.

      However, the general or overall reliability of our intuitions in situations similar to the present one does not guarantee their reliability in every such situation. Each situation may present unforeseen challenges to our ability to make correct, appropriate, and reliable intuitive judgments.

      In some cases, we may find that our intuitions are dead wrong. Further examination may reveal that what we intuitively thought was true is unquestionably false. We may find that in acting intuitively we were simply being naïve, overconfident, rash, or imprudent.

      Although intuitive judgments may often be profitably reexamined, to insist that every intuitive judgment undergo rigorous scrutiny and deliberative reevaluation may in some cases amount to a kind of moral, aesthetic, or epistemic obtuseness. To deny that any propositions are obvious or self-evident may in some cases be merely to be obstinate, devious, or willfully blind.

      Since intuitive judgments may require less effort on the part of the evaluator than deliberative judgments, it may perhaps be easier to make correct or incorrect intuitive judgments than to make correct or incorrect deliberative judgments.

      To trust our intuitions in some cases is not to deny that they may be aided by deliberative thinking. Intuitive thinking and deliberative thinking are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they may be combined to produce morally, aesthetically, and epistemically reliable judgments. They may also augment and supplement each other.

FOOTNOTES

¹The Random House College Dictionary (New York: Random House, 1980).

Some Teachings of the Dao De Jing

The Dao eludes naming and namelessness. It cannot be conveyed by means of language. It transcends all attempts to formulate or conceptualize it. It cannot be spoken or thought. It cannot be seen, heard, or touched. It is a gate to ephemerality and durability, to impermanence and permanence, to transitoriness and eternity. It is the origin of all things, and the source of all mysteries (stanza 1).

      The Dao is neither a name nor a part of speech. Words or names cannot articulate or describe it. It is light within light, and darkness within darkness. Its presence is found in its absence, and its absence in its presence. 
      Inclusivity rather than exclusivity seems to belong to the Dao, but the former does not depend on the latter. The Dao is a doing and not-doing that does not need to, and cannot, be verbalized. Indeed, it transcends speech and verbalization (stanza 2).

      The Dao is not a construct, nor is it a way of acting on constructs. It is not to be found by searching for wisdom and knowledge. But to be wise and knowing is to follow the Dao and to be guided by it.

      The Dao is not a sign, nor is it a signifier of truth or meaning. It is rather a way of acting and not acting. It endures forever, because it is uncreated. It cannot be destroyed, because it does not destroy. It cannot be resisted, because it does not resist. By yielding to resistance, it overcomes resistance.

      Acting according to the Dao is not a way of seeking fame or making money. It is not a way of accumulating unnecessary things (stanza 9). It is also not a way of seeking admiration or recognition. Rather, it is a way of being gentle and kind, true and just, reliable and competent, selfless and trustworthy, compassionate and understanding (stanza 8).

      To act according to the Dao is to act virtuously, but not to strive for mere virtuosity. When virtues are actualized, mere virtuosities disappear. Thus, the Dao is elusive and indefinable (stanzas 21, 32). It transcends all boundaries of perception or knowledge, and it surpasses all limits of perceptibility or knowability.

      Forgetting or remembering does not lead to the Dao. Once remembered, the Dao is forgotten, and once forgotten, it is remembered. Following the Dao is not an act of intellect or mind. It is a way (or more accurately, The Way) of acting effortlessly and virtuously, as manifested by compliance with natural law and non-resistance to the ceaseless flow of events in the universe (stanza 28).

      To follow the Dao is to find that softness can overcome hardness, that gentleness can overcome roughness, that temperance can overcome intemperance, and that tolerance can overcome intolerance (stanza 43).

      In acting according to the Dao, less and less acting on constructs is done, until no acting on constructs is done, and thus everything that is in accordance with the Dao is done, and nothing that is in accordance with the Dao is left undone (stanza 48).

      Acting according to the Dao is not acting unnecessarily. It is also acting by not acting, and doing by not doing. It is also decreasing by increasing, and increasing by decreasing. It is also losing by gaining, and gaining by losing (stanza 63).

      Acting according to the Dao is also responding to harshness by offering mildness, responding to roughness by offering gentleness, responding to unkindness by offering kindness, and responding to enmity by offering friendship.

      To act according to the Dao is to avoid doing too little by doing too much, and to avoid doing too much by doing too little (stanza 75). It is to recognize the mutual dependence between acting and not acting, doing and not doing, rising and falling, gaining and losing.

      It is also to promote forgiveness rather than retribution, mercy rather than punishment, impartiality rather than partiality, and empathy rather than resentment (stanza 79). 

REFERENCES

Lao Tsu. Tao Te Ching. Translated by Gia-Fu Feng and Jane English, (New York: Random House, 1972).
Laozi. Tao Te Ching: On the Art of Harmony. Translated by Chad Hansen, (London: Duncan Baird Publishers,  2009.

Keping Wang. Reading the Dao: A Thematic Inquiry. New York: Continuum, 2011.


Some of my further thoughts about the Dao De Jing can be found here.

Medical Indications as Epistemic Justifications

A medical indication to perform a particular test or administer a particular treatment may be a medical reason to perform that test or administer that treatment. Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (2005) defines a medical indication as “the basis or rationale for using a particular treatment or diagnostic test,” and says that it “may be furnished by a knowledge of the cause (causal indication), by the symptoms present (symptomatic indication), or by the nature of the disease (specific indication).”¹

      A medical indication may also be a situation or condition in which a particular test or treatment is advised or recommended, based on the available scientific evidence. For example, according to the Physicians’ Desk Reference (2015), the indications for prescription of an albuterol inhaler include “Treatment or prevention of bronchospasm in patients 4 years of age and older with reversible obstructive airway disease,” and “Prevention of exercise-induced bronchospasm in patients 4 years of age and older.”²

      A medical indication may also be an evidence-based justification for a particular test or treatment. The strength of the indication may depend on the strength of the available scientific evidence for that indication.

      Factors affecting the indication for a particular test or treatment include not only the nature of the particular disease process under consideration, but also the potential benefits and efficacy of treatment, the age of the patient, the overall condition of the patient, the personal desires and preferences of the patient, the potential side-effects and burdens of treatment for the patient, the costs of treatment, the availability of treatment, and the projected goals of treatment.

      A medical non-indication for the performance of a particular test or administration of a particular treatment is an absence or lack of indication to perform that test or administer that treatment. Reasons that medical tests or treatments may not be indicated include: the non-health-threatening nature of some medical conditions, the lack of treatment efficacy with regard to some medical conditions, the potential side-effects of some treatments, the potential financial burdens of some treatments, and the personal desires of some patients not to undergo arduous tests and treatment.

      A medical contraindication to a particular test or treatment is a medical reason not to perform that test or treatment (because the test or treatment may be injurious or harmful to the patient). A contraindication may be described as relative or absolute. A relative contraindication to a test or treatment may sometimes be outweighed by the potential benefits of that test or treatment if the potential benefits are significant and the risk of harm is very low, but an absolute contraindication to a test or treatment is never outweighed by the potential benefits of that test or treatment (because of the severity and magnitude of the potential harms that the test or treatment may cause to the patient)

      What then is the relation between medical indications and epistemic justifications? To say that a particular test or treatment is medically indicated is to make an epistemic claim regarding the appropriateness, correctness, and advisability of that test or treatment. If we make such a claim, then we may have an epistemic duty to justify it by thoroughly examining all the available evidence for and against it. In order to be epistemically justified in saying that a particular test or treatment is medically indicated, we must have sufficient epistemic grounds for saying so.

      Let’s consider the following propositions (where the letter “T” stands for a medical test or treatment) as a method of investigating the role and function of medical indications as epistemic justifications:

1.     If T is medically indicated, then it is medically (and epistemically, and ethically) justified.

2.     If T is medically indicated, then there are good medical reasons for it that sufficiently outweigh any possible or actual reasons against it.

3.     If T is medically indicated, then there is sufficient scientific evidence in favor of it, and there is insufficient scientific evidence against it.

4.     If T is medically indicated, then there is sufficient scientific evidence of its benefit, safety, and efficacy.

5.     The proposition P that a particular test or treatment T is medically indicated is epistemically justified if there is sufficient scientific evidence in favor of the truth of P.

      The above propositions may all have their corresponding negations.  Thus, if T is not medically indicated, then it is not medically (and not epistemically, and not ethically) justified, and so on.

      To what extent may medical indications differ from epistemic justifications? Medical indications may be more than epistemic justifications, insofar as they may be not only epistemic, but also ethical (and practical) in nature. They may be not only situations or conditions in which particular tests or treatments are said to be appropriate or advisable, but also parameters and guidelines for performing tests and prescribing treatments.

      Medical indications may also differ from epistemic justifications insofar as in some cases an argument can be made that a test or treatment may be epistemically (and ethically) justified without clearly being medically indicated (its justification may not be apparent at first glance and may only be apparent on later examination). A test or treatment that was not clearly indicated at first glance may turn out to have an unanticipated beneficial effect. However, such a possibility may still not provide sufficient grounds for the argument that the performance of non-indicated tests or treatments can in some cases be medically justified. The justifiability of a medical test or treatment may in fact depend on the strength, clarity, and sufficiency of the indications for that test or treatment. Tests or treatments that have weak, unclear, or insufficient indications may be medically (and epistemically, and ethically) compromised by their weak, unclear, or insufficient justification.

      Non-indication, or lack of indication, for a test or treatment may in some cases be a contraindication to that test or treatment, insofar as that test or treatment may pose unnecessary risks to the patient and may expose the patient to unnecessary harms. Non-indicated tests or treatments may also cause unnecessary financial expenses for patients, for third-party payers, and for a whole healthcare system.

      Medical indications may constitute reasons to perform particular tests, procedures, or treatments, based on our knowledge of the potential benefits, safety, and efficacy of those tests, procedures, and treatments, and based on our knowledge of the natural history of the disease processes under consideration. Medical indications may also affirm the usefulness, appropriateness, and rationality of particular tests, procedures, and treatments within the context of particular medical illnesses, disease processes, and conditions.

FOOTNOTES

¹Stedman’s Medical Dictionary for the Health Professions and Nursing, Fifth Edition, edited by Thomas Lathrop Stedman (Baltimore: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, 2005), p. 735.

²PDR, LLC “Full Prescribing Information, ProAir HFA (albuterol sulfate),” 2015, at http://www.pdr.net/full-prescribing-information/proair-hfa?druglabelid=569.

James McCune Smith's The Destiny of the People of Color

James McCune Smith (1813-1865) was an African-American physician, abolitionist, educator, and writer. He was the first African-American to earn a medical degree and become a physician. He was born in New York City, where he attended the African Free School, a public school for the children of slaves and free people of color, which had been founded by the New York Manumission Society, an organization dedicated to the abolition of slavery. Other students at the school who went on to have distinguished careers included Henry Highland Garnet (1815-1882, African-American abolitionist, minister, and educator), Ira Aldridge (1807-1868, African-American actor), Alexander Crummell (1819-1898, African-American minister, missionary, and educator), and Samuel Ringgold Ward (1817-1866, African-American minister, abolitionist, and newspaper editor).

      After graduating from the African Free School, McCune Smith applied to Columbia College in New York City and Geneva Medical College, in Geneva, New York, but was unable to gain admission, due to racial discrimination.¹ However, with financial assistance from the New York City community, he was able to travel to Scotland to attend the University of Glasgow, where he was awarded a bachelor’s degree in 1835, a master’s degree in 1836, and a medical degree in 1837.² He returned to New York City in 1837 to start the first general medical and surgical practice by a university-trained African-American physician, and he opened the first pharmacy operated by an African-American.³ He was active in the abolitionist movement, and he worked with Frederick Douglass to establish the National Council of Colored People in 1853. He wrote the introduction to Douglass’ second volume of autobiography, My Bondage and My Freedom (1855). He also published articles in medical journals, and was a founding member of the New York Statistics Society, as well as a member of the American Geographic Society.² He was appointed a professor of anthropology at Wilberforce College, Ohio in 1863, but died two years later on Long Island, New York in 1865.

      The Destiny of the People of Color is a lecture that McCune Smith delivered to The Philomathean Society and The Hamilton Lyceum in 1841. It was published in 1843. (The Philomathean Society is a collegiate literary society that was started at the University of Pennsylvania in 1813. The Hamilton Lyceum was a literary society that was based in New York City.⁴)

      McCune Smith explains that in order for people of color to investigate their destiny, they must have some understanding of their present position in society. The basic truths of this position in society, and thus the basic premises for investigating the destiny of people of color, are: “First. We are a minority held in servitude by a majority. Secondly. That majority simulate a Republican form of Government. Thirdly. We, the minority held in servitude, are distinguished by a different complexion from the majority who hold us in thrall.”⁵

      The social position of people of color in America is unusual, says McCune Smith, insofar as they are held in servitude and yet live in a country that aspires to, or pretends to have, democratic principles of government. However, the proper destiny for people of color is not for them simply to leave the country and flee from oppression, but rather to remain and struggle against injustice by working to make sure that the American system of government lives up to its democratic principles.

      In order to overcome slavery and oppression, people of color must refute the principle that “might makes right,” by showing that “right makes right.”⁶ The power of the social majority to hold a minority in servitude does not make that majority morally right. The basis of a democratic system of government is that all citizens are recognized as having equal rights.

      In order to fulfill their destiny, people of color must think not only of the present, but also of the future. They must consider the welfare of future generations whose rights will be affected by their actions. They must show the moral wrongness of returning evil for evil, by showing the rightness of returning good for evil. Acts of injustice cannot rightfully be answered by further acts of injustice; they must be answered by acts of justice.

      McCune Smith quotes the words of the Roman playwright Terence (c. 190 – 159 BCE), “Homo sum humani nil a me alienum puto” (“I am human, and nothing human is alien to me”), which express a sentiment that McCune Smith finds particularly noteworthy, given that Terence was a slave who gained his freedom. McCune Smith regards Terence’s words as an affirmation of the common brotherhood and sisterhood of all humankind. The destinies of all human beings are inextricably intertwined. Thus the destiny of people of color, given their being held in servitude by a social majority that pretends to be democratic in its system of government but deprives them of their rights of citizenship, is to save that system of government from perishing as a result of its own contradictions, and to convert it into a system that is truly democratic.

      McCune Smith makes clear that people of color cannot overcome their oppression merely by overthrowing or becoming like their oppressors. Only by affirming the common brotherhood and sisterhood of all humankind can liberty and justice truly be achieved.

      The destiny of people of color is a subject also explored by other nineteenth-century abolitionists, including Frederick Douglass (1818-1895), Martin Robison Delany (1812-1885), and Henry Highland Garnet (1815-1882).

      Douglass (1849) says that the destiny of people of color and the destiny of white people are tied to each other, and that in order for society as a whole to flourish, both people of color and white people must flourish. White people and people of color can flourish only if they do so together.⁷

      Delany (1854) argues that people of color must be in control of their own political destiny if they are to secure the right to full citizenship. People of color will never secure the right to full citizenship unless everyone has an equal opportunity to participate in government. However, Delany considers it unlikely that there will ever be equality of opportunity in American society, and he therefore advises people of color to consider emigration and the pursuit of nationhood abroad.

      Garnet (1848) explains that the destiny of white people and the destiny of people of color are inseparable, insofar as distinctions between white people and people of color will eventually be erased by the advent of a society in which “mixed race” will be the norm. An increasing number of people will be “mixed race,” making it more difficult to separate people into distinct racial groups. Prejudice against people of color, or “colorphobia,” may therefore one day become an anachronism.

     

FOOTNOTES

¹John Stauffer, “Introduction,” in The Works of James McCune Smith: Black Intellectual and Abolitionist, edited by John Stauffer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. xxi.

²Ibid, p. xxi.

³Thomas M. Morgan, “The Education and Medical Practice of Dr. James McCune Smith (1813-1865), First Black American to Hold a Medical Degree,” in Journal of the National Medical Association, Vol. 95, No. 7, July 2003, pp. 603-614.

⁴William Henry Ferris, The African Abroad: Or, His Evolution in Western Civilization, Volume 2 (New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor Press, 1913) p. 866.

⁵James McCune Smith “The Destiny of the People of Color (1843)” in The Works of James McCune Smith: Black Intellectual and Abolitionist, edited by John Stauffer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 50.

⁶Ibid., p. 52.

⁷Frederick Douglass, “The Destiny of Colored Americans,” in The North Star, November 16, 1849.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCES

Delany, Martin Robison. “Political Destiny of the Colored Race on the American Continent” (1854), in Martin R. Delany: A Documentary Reader, edited by Robert S. Levine (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), pp. 245-279.

Garnet, Henry Highland. “The Past and the Present Condition, and the Destiny, of the Colored Race” (Troy, NY: J.C. Kneeland, 1848).