On Certainty

Certainty is the state of being or feeling certain, and is freedom from doubt. If something is certain, then it is free from, or beyond, doubt.

To claim absolute certainty about the truth of a proposition may be to claim the right to ignore or be blind to further evidence affirming or denying the truth of that proposition.

Logically, if you say that you're certain about something, then you should be prepared to wager everything on it. If you're not prepared to wager everything on it, then you must not really be certain about it (unless there are psychological, social, or other factors that prevent you from making such a wager, despite your alleged certainty).

Of course, if you say that it's not in your nature to wager everything on something, then your reluctance to wager everything (or to wager anything at all) may be due to your recognizing that you can never be absolutely sure of, or certain about, anything.

Benjamin Franklin's well-known saying (now so often quoted that it has become a cliché) regarding certainty appeared in a letter to the French scientist Jean-Baptiste Leroy, written on November 13, 1789: "In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes."¹

Other certainties may include mathematical certainties (such as "2+2=4"), physical certainties (such as "marble is harder than limestone"), cosmological certainties (such as "Ganymede is the largest moon of Jupiter"), and historical certainties (such as "The Battle of Bosworth Field was fought in 1485").

F.W.J. Schelling (1800) says that "for certainty in theory we lose it in practice, and for certainty in practice we lose it in theory" ("über der theoretischen Gewissheit geht uns die praktische, über der praktischen die theoretische verloren").²

I can't be more certain of anything than I am of the fact that some (though perhaps not all) lost opportunities are lost permanently. Perhaps this is merely certainty of my own (and more generally of human) finitude. I may only be certain of my own fallibility and uncertainty.

Believable fiction may depend on fictionalization of the real and realization of the fictional.

If to be thoughtful is to be careful, and to be thoughtless is to be careless, then you might suppose that to think is to care. But unfortunately that's not the case.

Isn't the term "certain knowledge" redundant? Either we know something or we don't. If we're certain that we know something, then we may more precisely be said to have attained "certainty of knowledge" or "epistemic certainty."

It may always be possible to say "I don't know" with greater certainty than "I know."

If I'm feeling pain, and it's a pleasurable pain, then I may be uncertain whether I'm actually feeling pain.

Epistemic duty (or the ethics of knowledge) may require that we have adequate grounds for saying we're certain about something. It may also require that we have adequate grounds for saying we're doubtful about something.

Wittgenstein asks, "Doesn't one need grounds for doubt?"³ But it may be argued that we aren't required to believe a proposition to be true just because we can't prove it to be false.

If we qualify our statements about certainty by saying, "We think (but aren't sure) we're certain about that," then we may be saying we're relatively certain, but not absolutely certain. Relative certainty may be susceptible to doubt, while absolute certainty may be immune to doubt. The former may be much easier to attain than the latter.

If we tell others that we know something, then we may have a duty to let them know when we're not absolutely certain that we know. Our claim to know something requires some degree of certainty on our part. We don't always have to be absolutely certain about something in order to properly claim to know it. Relative certainty may be sufficient in some cases. But we must at least have met some threshold level of certainty about something in order to properly claim to know it.

The term "objective certainty" may be ambiguous, insofar as it may refer to either the objectivity of the fact that certainty has been attained or the objectivity of the reasons for which certainty has been attained. In the first case, certainty can objectively be said to have been attained, while in the second, certainty can be said to have been attained objectively. It may be important to distinguish between the two cases. For example, Bill can objectively be said to be certain about something without his having objective reasons for being certain about that thing.

Subjective certainty may include psychological and intuitive certainty. Objective certainty may include epistemic, propositional, and evidential certainty. 

One way of expressing subjective certainty may be to say, "I'm certain, but I could be wrong." This way of hedging one's bets about certainty may be a way of immunizing oneself from error—or it may just be a way of equivocating.

Subjective certainty doesn't entail objective certainty. We may be subjectively certain about something, but objectively wrong about it.

There may be various kinds of certainty (psychological, moral, epistemic, deductive, and statistical). There may also be various degrees of certainty (which may be expressed by such adjectives as "absolute," "high," "low," or "relative.")

However, Peter Unger (1975) argues that there are no degrees of certainty, and that "certainty" is an absolute term, like "flat." Just as nothing (or hardly anything) in the world is (absolutely) flat, nothing (or hardly anything) in the world is (absolutely) certain. Unger thus argues for scepticism regarding the possibility of knowledge, by saying that since knowledge entails (absolute) certainty, nothing (or hardly anything) is known.^4,5

Peter Klein (1981) also argues that knowledge entails absolute (psychological and evidential) certainty, and that if S knows that p on the basis of some evidence e, then e renders p absolutely certain for S. Klein argues that S knows that p only if p is absolutely certain for S, but he makes clear that he's not saying that the ordinary understanding of the meaning of the term "knowledge" restricts the term to only those cases in which a proposition p is absolutely certain.⁶ There may be relative as well as absolute uses of the term "certainty."

Harry Frankfurt (1962) says that there may indeed be degrees of certainty, and that some things may be regarded as more certain than others. We may be willing to wager more on the truth of one proposition than we're willing to wager on the truth of another proposition, if we regard the one's truth as more certain than the other's.⁷

Jason Stanley (2008) says that knowledge doesn't entail certainty, and as an example he provides the statement, "I know that Bill came to the party. In fact, I'm certain that he did," which seems to show that we can know something without being certain of it. As another example, he provides the statement, "John knows that Bush is a Republican, though, being a cautious fellow, he's only somewhat certain of it," which seems to show that we can know something without being completely certain of it. Stanley explains that there's nothing strange or odd about ascribing knowledge of something to someone who's not completely confident that she does indeed know that thing. We don't automatically object when someone is described as knowing something of which she isn't certain.⁸

Stanley also explains that fallibilism in epistemology (the theory that knowledge is compatible with a lack of certainty) is compatible with both "the knowledge norm for assertion" (that we should assert p only if we know that p) and "the certainty norm for assertion" (that we should assert p only if we're certain that p). Thus, while fallibilism holds that we can know p without being certain that p, it doesn't hold that we can say we know that p if we don't know or aren't certain that p.⁹

Gaining greater knowledge of something may sometimes lead us to feel less certain about that thing. By learning more about that thing, we may sometimes develop a greater appreciation of the limits of our knowledge. 

Second-order certainty may be exemplified by such statements as, "I feel certain that I'm certain."

The certainty of faith may be an example of psychological, moral, theological, or doctrinal certainty. It may be based on belief in truths that cannot be proved by reason or that surpass our understanding. It may be based not on empirical proof or scientific testing, but on the power of authority, scripture, testimony, or revelation.


FOOTNOTES 

¹Benjamin Franklin, The Works of Benjamin Franklin, Vol. XII, Letters and Miscellaneous Writings, 1788-1790.
²F.W. J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, translated by Peter Heath (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,1978), p. 11.
³Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, translated by Denis Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1969), p. 18c.
⁴Peter Klein, Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981), p. 131.
⁵Peter Unger, Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 49.
⁶Klein, Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism, p. 117.
⁷Harry G. Frankfurt, "Philosophical Certainty," in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 (July 1962), pp. 303-327.
⁸Jason Stanley, "Knowledge and Certainty," in Philosophical Issues, Vol. 18, Issue I (September 2008), pp. 41-42.
⁹Ibid., p. 56.

The Dispositional-Occurrent Distinction

What exactly is a disposition? Tim Crane (1996) offers the following preliminary definition: 

“a disposition is a property (such as solubility, fragility, elasticity) whose instantiation entails that the thing which has the property would change or bring about some change, under certain condtions.”¹ 

      Stephen Mumford (2011) offers another preliminary definition by saying that the term “disposition” may refer to a type of property, state, or condition that, under certain circumstances, provides for the possibility of some further specific state or behavior.² 

      Thus, for example, if we say that “ice cubes have a disposition to melt at room temperature” (or simply that “ice cubes melt at room temperature”), we are saying that under those conditions (room temperature), the disposition of ice cubes to melt will be manifested.

      Jennifer McKitrick (2003) explains that some marks of dispositionality include the following: (1) a disposition has a characteristic manifestation, (2) a disposition is triggered in certain types of circumstances (it has certain circumstances of manifestation), (3) if something has a disposition, then certain subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals are typically true of it (e.g. if a fragile glass has a disposition to break when dropped, then the conditional “If it were dropped, then it would break” is true of it), and (4) once the manifestation and the circumstances of the manifestation have been identified, the disposition can be referred to by an overtly dispositional locution, such as “the disposition to so and so” (e.g. “the disposition to break when struck” refers to fragility, and “the disposition to dissolve in water” refers to water-solubility).³

      Dispositions may be ascribed to kinds (e.g. “paper is flammable”), objects (“that sheet of cardboard is flexible”), persons (“I tend to agree with you”), and conditions (“the weather’s likely to turn chilly today”).

      Crane (1996) explains that there has been much debate about the question of whether the ascription of a dispositional property to a thing entails that certain counterfactual conditionals are true of it. If this is indeed a criterion of dispositional properties, then, for example, saying that a glass is fragile entails the conditional: “if the glass were struck with sufficient force, then it would break.”⁴

      Another example of a conditional analysis of dispositions would be to say that the elasticity of a rubber band entails the conditional, “if the rubber band were pulled, then it would stretch, and if the pulling force were removed, then it would return to its original length.”

     However, C.B. Martin (1994)⁵ introduces the notion of a “finkish” disposition in order to show that the ascription of a dispositional property to a thing does not necessarily entail that an associated conditional is true of it. Thus, the testing of a “finkish” disposition may not result in the manifestation of the disposition, because the testing itself may cause the disposition to be lost. Alternatively, in a reverse finkish case, a disposition may be absent, but may be gained when it is tested for.⁶

      Sungho Choi (2011) explains that dispositional maskers have also been introduced as counterexamples to the notion that dispositional properties can be analyzed in terms of simple counterfactual conditionals. If a disposition is masked, or if there is an antidote to it, then it may not be manifested, even under the appropriate stimulus conditions. Choi argues, however, that the absence of dispositional maskers may be implicitly or explicitly implied by dispositional ascriptions, and that the failure of masked dispositions to be manifested does not necessarily threaten the simple conditional analysis of dispositions.

      Choi (2009) also explains that the two most widely debated versions of the conditional analysis of dispositions are the simple conditional analysis of dispositions (SCA) and the reformed conditional analysis of dispositions (RCA). The SCA may be expressed as follows:

      “Something x is disposed at time t to exhibit manifestation m in response to being situated in stimulating circumstance c iff, if x were to be situated in c at t, it would exhibit m.”⁷

The RCA, formulated by David Lewis (1997)⁸, may be expressed as follows:

      “Something x is disposed at time t to exhibit manifestation m in response to stimulus s iff, for some intrinsic property B that x has at t, for some time t’ after t, if x were to undergo stimulus s at time t and retain property B until t’, s and x’s having of B would jointly be an x-complete cause of x’s exhibiting manifestation m, where an x-complete cause is a cause complete in so far as havings of properties intrinsic to x are concerned, though perhaps omitting some events extrinsic to x.”⁹

Lewis’s RCA is designed to resist refutation by finkish dispositions or other counterexamples to the SCA. Choi argues that the intrinsic nature of dispositions doesn’t threaten either the SCA or the RCA.¹⁰

      Dispositions have been understood as persisting properties or states that make possible other properties or states, and they have been contrasted with occurrences, which have been understood as more episodic or transient events. Mumford (2011) says that the distinction between dispositions and occurrences derives mainly from the work of Gilbert Ryle (1949), and that as the appeal of Ryle’s form of behaviorism has faded, interest has shifted from the distinction between dispositions and occurrences to the distinction between dispositional and categorical properties.¹¹

      Ryle (1949) distinguishes between dispositional terms (which may describe tendencies, propensities, potentialities, abilities, etc.) and occurrent terms (which may describe episodic or actually occurring events). He argues that it is mistaken to assume that any term that has a dispositional use must also have a corresponding episodic use.¹² For example, the dispositional terms “know” and “believe” may not have episodic counterparts, and the dispositional statements “I know” and “I believe” may not correspond to episodic acts of knowing or believing. (I can’t properly say, conceptually or grammatically, “I am, at this moment, knowing or believing such and such.”) Ryle thus argues that mental states are dispositions to behavior, rather than unseen and unobservable occurrences.

      Ryle also distinguishes between generic and specific dispositions. He offers the sentence, “He is a cigarette smoker” as an example of a disposition ascription, and the sentence, “He is smoking a cigarette now,” as an example of an occurrence ascription. To say that someone is a cigarette smoker is not say that he is currently smoking, but to say that he has a disposition or tendency to smoke. Cigarette smoking is a specific disposition, in contrast to more generic dispositions such as the disposition to seek a method of reducing stress, relieving pressure, managing anxiety, or producing euphoria. Dispositional properties, according to Ryle, are nothing more than habits, tendencies, or other behavior regularities.

      McKitrick (2003) explains that Ryle’s distinction between specific and generic dispositions also corresponds to the distinction between single-track dispositions (those that are triggered by only one kind of circumstance, and that have only one kind of manifestation) and multi-track dispositions (those that are triggered by more than one kind of circumstance, and that have more than one kind of manifestation).¹³

      Against Ryle’s view, it may be argued that there may indeed be occurrent, as well as dispositional, mental states. I may know or believe something at this very moment, and this knowing or believing may be an occurrent state.

      It may also be argued that dispositions themselves are occurrences. There may be occurrent dispositions and dispositional occurrences. Dispositions may not always be separable from occurrences.

      E.J. Lowe’s account (2006, 2009, 2013) of the dispositional-occurrent distinction may best be understood in the context of his four-category ontology. In this formal ontology, there are four fundamental ontological categories (or kinds of being): substantial universals (kinds), substantial particulars (objects), non-substantial universals (attributes), and non-substantial particulars (modes). Kinds (such as tomatoes) are characterized by attributes (such as redness), and are instantiated by objects (such as particular tomatoes). Attributes (such as redness) characterize kinds (such as tomatoes), and are instantiated by modes (such as the redness of a particular tomato). Objects instantiate kinds, and are characterized by modes. Modes characterize objects, and instantiate attributes.

      Lowe regards instantiation and characterization as the two fundamental or primitive metaphysical relations. Another metaphysical relation, that of exemplification, he does not regard as fundamental or primitive, since it may result from instantiation or characterization, and may come in two different varieties: dispositional or occurrent. An object (such as a particular tomato) dispositionally exemplifies an attribute (such as redness) when it instantiates some kind (such as tomatoes) that is characterized by that attribute, and it occurrently exemplifies that attribute (redness) when it (the particular tomato) is characterized by some mode (such as its own redness) that instantiates that attribute.¹⁴

      In addition to making a distinction between dispositional and occurrent exemplification, Lowe makes a distinction between dispositional and occurrent predication. The sentence, “This piece of salt is water-soluble,” is an example of the former, and the sentence, “This piece of salt is dissolving in water,” is an example of the latter.¹⁵ Universal terms (such as “salt”), as well as individual terms (such as “this piece of salt"), may serve as subjects of dispositional and occurrent predication.¹⁶

      Martijn Blaauw (2013) distinguishes between dispositional and occurrent belief. An example of the former would be John’s belief that physical exercise is good for his health, and an example of the latter would be John’s belief, as he looks at his watch and sees that it is 3 o’clock, that it is indeed 3 o’clock. Blaauw also distinguishes the disposition to believe from dispositional and occurrent belief. For example, John may have a disposition to believe something, without ever having dispositionally or occurrently believed that thing.

      David Rose and Jonathan Schaffer (2013) argue that knowledge entails dispositional belief, since “if s knows that p, then s dispositionally believes that p.” Knowledge is not merely occurrent belief (conscious endorsement of a thought), but dispositional belief (information available to mind for endorsement).¹⁷

      The distinction between dispositions and occurrences may be complicated by the fact that there may be many different kinds of dispositions (moral, aesthetic, behavioral, cognitive, emotional, behavioral, social, and cultural), and many different kinds of occurrences (historical, geographical, environmental, evolutionary, physical, biological, physiological, genetic, epidemiological, and statistical).

      Another question to be considered is whether dispositions can conflict with one another. Thus, Choi (2012) asks whether opposing dispositions can be co-instantiated. He defines conflicting dispositions as dispositions that have mutually consistent characteristic stimuli but inconsistent manifestations, and he concludes that opposing dispositions cannot be co-instantiated by one and the same object at the same time. He admits, however, that there are opposing viewpoints regarding this question of whether a single stimulus can trigger the manifestation of opposing dispositions.¹⁸

      There may also be disagreement about whether some dispositions are innate or acquired, intrinsic or extrinsic, “natural” or “unnatural.”

      There may also be positive and negative dispositions (“dispositions to” and “dispositions not to”).

      Dispositions may vary in their duration, strength, stability, and susceptibility to change.  They may also vary in the consistency with which they are manifested.

      Occurrences may be variously described as frequent, occasional, rare, unusual, expected, unexpected, regular, irregular, variable, invariable, timely, untimely, concomitant, or coincidental.

      Jennifer McKitrick (2009) describes “dispositional pluralism” as the view that there are many different kinds of dispositions,¹⁹ and “dispositional essentialism” as the view that all dispositions are essential properties of the objects that instantiate them.²⁰ Dispositional pluralism is compatible with property dualism (the view that there are two fundamental kinds of properties: dispositional and non-dispositional) and with pandispositionalism (the view that all properties are dispositional), but not with anti-dispositionalism (the view that no properties are dispositional).²¹

      McKitrick (2003) says that there are extrinsic, as well as intrinsic, dispositions. Intrinsic dispositions are intrinsic properties of the things that have them, and do not depend on what is going on outside of those things. Extrinsic dispositions, on the other hand, are extrinsic properties of the things that have them, and depend on what is going on outside of those things.²²

      The dispositional-categorical distinction may be even more difficult to define than the dispositional-occurrent distinction. Dispositional properties may be categorical, in the sense that they may categorically (rather than hypothetically) belong to things. Categorical properties may be dispositional, in the sense that they may take the form of dispositions. Properties may have both dispositional and categorical aspects.

      On the other hand, dispositional properties may be conditional in a way that categorical properties are not.

      According to the identity theory of dispositional and categorical properties, dispositional properties are the same as categorical properties. All dispositional properties are categorical, and all categorical properties are dispositional.

      Stephen Mumford (1998) describes property dualism as the theory that there are two fundamentally different kinds of properties: dispositional and categorical. Categorical monism is the theory that all properties are categorical, and dispositional monism (pandispositionalism) is the theory that all properties are dispositional.²³

      Mumford also describes four types of property monism. Categorical reductionism is the theory that all dispositional properties can be reduced to categorical properties. Dispositional reductionism is the theory that all categorical properties can be reduced to dispositional properties. Categorical eliminativism is the theory that all properties are categorical, and that all reference to supposed dispositional properties should be eliminated. Dispositional eliminativism is the theory that all properties are dispositional (even those traditionally regarded as paradigmatically categorical), and that all reference to supposed categorical properties should be eliminated.²⁴

FOOTNOTES

¹Tim Crane, “Introduction,” in Dispositions: A Debate, by D.M. Armstrong, C.B. Martin, and U.T. Place, edited by Tim Crane (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 1.

²Stephen Mumford, “Dispositions,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011, http://www.umb.no/statisk/causci/Dispositions%20REP.pdf.

³Jennifer McKitrick, “A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions,” in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81:2 (June 2002), p. 157.

⁴Tim Crane, “Introduction,” in Dispositions: A Debate, p. 5.

⁵C.B. Martin, “Dispositions and Conditionals,” in Philosophical Quarterly, 44, (1994), 1-8.

⁶Mumford, “Dispositions,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011.

⁷Sungho Choi, “Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals,” in Mind 117 (2008), 795-841.

⁸David Lewis, “Finkish Dispositions” (1997) in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 133-151.

⁹Sungho Choi, “The Conditional Analysis of Dispositions and the Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 3, May 2009, p 571.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 568.

¹¹Mumford, “Dispositions,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011.

¹²Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 119.

¹³Jennifer McKitrick, Dispositional Pluralism,” in Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Mind, edited by Gregor Damschen, Robert Schnepf, and Karsten R. Stüber (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), p. 188.

¹⁴E.J. Lowe, More Kinds of Being: A Further Study of Individuation, Identity, and the Logic of Sortal Terms (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), pp. 10-11.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 142-143.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 144.

¹⁷David Rose and Jonathan Schaffer, “Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief,” in Philosophical Studies (2013), Vol. 166, Issue 1, Supplement, p. 22.

¹⁸Sungho Choi, “Can Opposing Dispositions be Co-instantiated?”, in Erkenntnis, Vol. 8, Issue 1, Feb 2013, pp. 161-1182.

¹⁹McKitrick, Dispositional Pluralism,” in Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Mind, p. 186.

¹⁹Ibid, p. 193.

²⁰Ibid., p. 201.

²¹McKitrick, “A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions,” in Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81:2 (June 2002), p. 158.

²²Stephen Mumford, Dispositions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 18-19.

²³Ibid., pp. 172-175.

FURTHER REFERENCES

Martijn Blaauw, “Contrastive Belief,” in Contrastivism in Philosophy, edited by Martijn Blaauw (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 90-91.

Sungho Choi, “What is a Dispositional Masker?” Mind (2011), Vol.120, Issue 480, pp. 1159-1171.

Sungho Choi and Michael Fara, “Dispositions,” 2012, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dispositions/.

E.J. Lowe, The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

E.J. Lowe, Forms of Thought: A Study in Philosophical Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Non-signs and Non-signification

If a sign can be defined as anything that signifies or stands for something other than itself,¹ then a non-sign can be defined as anything that doesn’t signify or stand for something other than itself. A non-sign doesn’t signify, and also doesn’t indicate or represent anything.

      While a sign may consist of a signifier and a signified idea or concept,² a non-sign may consist of a non-signifier and a non-signified or absent idea or concept. While the term “signification” may be used to describe the relationship between a signifier and a signified idea or concept,³ the term “non-signification” may be used to describe the relationship between a non-signifier and a non-signified or absent idea or concept.

      Non-signs do not designate, denote, imply, or refer to anything. They may be described as blank spaces, unfilled slots, or empty placeholders in systems of signification. They may also be described as non-signifying interruptions, pauses, silences, or discontinuities. They may also be breaks, gaps, or holes in language and communication. They may belong to the realm of non-language and non-communication.

      While the linguistic world may be a world of signs and symbols, the non-linguistic world may be a world of non-signs and non-symbols. The linguistic world (the world of “meaning”) may be subjectively or objectively derived from the non-linguistic world (the world of “non-meaning”).

      The intelligible world may be a world of signs and non-signs. Semiotics may therefore need to consist of not only a theory of signs, but also a theory of non-signs.

      Signs may have signifying and non-signifying elements or parts. A thing that is a sign of something may also be a non-sign of something else. Non-signs may also in some cases be non-signifying coincidental events or “meaningless” epiphenomena associated with signifying events or “meaningful” phenomena.

      According to Charles W. Morris (1971), all signs are signals or symbols. Signals are signs that are not interpreted to signify other signs, but symbols are signs that are interpreted to signify other signs.⁴ Non-signs are therefore neither signals nor symbols.

      Morris describes five modes of signifying: identificative, designative, appraisive, prescriptive, and formative. Signs signifying in these modes may be described as “identifiors,” “designators,” “appraisors,” “prescriptors,” and “formators.”⁵ Non-signs demonstrate none of these modes of signifying.

      The modes of “non-meaning” or non-signifying belonging to a non-sign may also be denotative or connotative, literal or metaphorical.

      A sign may be empty if it can’t signify something or if there is nothing for it to signify. However, an empty sign (if there is such a thing) may signify nothing and still be a sign (e.g. a sign of unsignifiability, meaninglessness, emptiness, or nothingness).

      While a floating signifier has a variable or unstable form of signification,⁶ a non-sign has no signification at all. While signs may always have some “meaning,” even if that “meaning” is empty or undefined, non-signs have no “meaning” at all.

      While a sign may not signify an actually existing object or event,⁷ a non-sign does not signify anything at all.

      Objects qua objects do not signify or “mean” anything. They only signify or “mean” something as ideas or concepts signified or symbolized by signs or symbols. On the other hand, signifying objects (objects qua signs) may signify ideas or concepts, while non-signifying objects may not.

      Signs that have outlived or lost their usefulness may be destined to become non-signs (or things that no longer signify anything). Signs may also become non-signs if their conventionally accepted signification is shown to be unwarranted or unjustified. Things that have not yet become signs (pre-signs, pre-symptoms, and other pre-semiotic phenomena) may also be seen or interpreted as non-signs.

      A sign must be adequate for the purposes for which it is used, if it is to function as a sign. Some signs may become so inadequate for the purposes for which they are used that they no longer function as signs, and thus become non-signs. Some signs may also become so obscure or ambiguous that they become non-signs. Some signs may also become so unstable and unreliable in their signification that they become non-signs.

      Non-signs do not signify statements or propositions. Nor do they signify beliefs, attitudes, moods, emotions, feelings, or other states of mind.

      The designification relation may be one in which the signification of a sign is destabilized, disrupted, revoked, or nullified. To designify a sign may be to render it a non-sign.

      Non-signs may in some cases be able to be ignored, because of their lack of “meaning” or signification. False signs, on the other hand, may require some degree of attention and response. For example, a false alarm may be a false sign of an emergency, but also a true sign of a defect in an alarm system requiring repair or correction.

      Non-signs have no “meaning” to be interpreted, but they may still need to be read or examined in some way in order to be understood as non-signs. They may also present a challenge to the hegemony and all-importance of signs and signification.⁸

      Signs may sometimes be misinterpreted as non-signs if their signification is overlooked or unrecognized. Thus, there may be some signs that are mistaken as non-signs, and whose supposed non-signification may be merely a matter of the interpreter’s ignorance or lack of understanding^.9

      The mode of non-signification belonging to a non-sign may also depend on the non-sign’s relation to signs and other non-signs. Changes in the non-sign’s relation to signs and other non-signs may result in changes in its mode of non-signification.

      There may be no adequate signs for that which transcends signification. “Signs” for that which transcends signification may not be signs at all, and may actually be non-signs.

      Unlike signs that signify through other signs, non-signs do not signify at all. Nor do they express anything.

      Although there may be sign systems of “meaning” and signification, there can be no non-sign systems of “non-meaning” and non-signification, since non-signs do not signify or refer to anything, and therefore cannot have cohesive or coherent relations with one another.

FOOTNOTES

¹Charles S. Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volume 2, Paragraph 228, 1897 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

²Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics [1916], edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye in collaboration with Albert Riedlinger, translated by Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 67.

³Ibid., p. 67.

⁴Charles W. Morris, Writings on the General Theory of Signs (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), pp. 366-367.

⁵Ibid., p. 364.

⁶Daniel Chandler, Semiotics: The Basics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2002), p. 74.

⁷Morris, Writings on the General Theory of Signs, p. 416.

⁸Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, translated by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1987), p. 15.

⁹Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life: Foundations for a Sociology of the Everyday, Volume 2, translated by John Moore (London: Verso, 2002), p. 276.

Pre-texts and Pretexts

What is the difference between a pre-text and a pretext, and what is the significance of their difference for our understanding of literary, religious, philosophical, scientific, and other kinds of texts? What are their respective roles in determining the pragmatic, ideological, rhetorical, pedagogical, and sociolinguistic features of texts?

      A pre-text may be a precursor of a text. It may anticipate or prepare the way for a text. It may also provide the foundation or establish the conditions for the being of a text. It may also serve other functions: it may inspire the creation of a text, and it may serve as a motive or stimulus for the production of a text. It may also be a (formal, structural, or empirical) model or prototype for a text, or an archetype from which subsequent texts are descended. It may also be an urtext (a source text from which a later text is derived, or an original text on which a later text is based).

      A pre-text may also serve as a metatext, explaining how a text is to be produced and interpreted. It may also be a stage in the composition of a text, and a stage in the textualization of elements (such as perceptions, thoughts, ideas, emotions, and feelings) that are to become a text. It may also be a stage in the becoming of a text (and in the becoming possible and becoming actual of a text).

      A pre-text may also be any kind of text that is presupposed by another text. A pre-text may in some cases be a pretext for something, and a pretext may in some cases be a pre-text for something.

      A pre-text may also be a “pre/text,” or a text that plays the role of both pre-text and pretext. Insofar as it is a pre/text, a pre-text is first and foremost a text, possessing its own kind of textuality.

      Pre-textuality may refer to the pre-textual nature of something or the state of being a pre-text. Pretextuality, on the other hand, may refer to the pretextual nature of something or the state of being a pretext.

      A pretext may be a supposed, but not actual, reason for something. It may also be a misleading explanation of something. Actions may be performed under the cover of false pretexts. A pretext may serve as a method of concealing the true motives for an action. A pretext may also be a text that is taken out of context¹ and that is used as an excuse or justification for something.

      Pre-texts and pretexts may share coextensive and codetermining texts. They may share various subtexts, and they may be produced and interpreted in various (social, cultural, and historical) contexts.

      A text may serve as both pre-text and pretext for some other text. The text that serves           as pre-text for some other text may be a pretext for a particular interpretation (or way of reading) that text. There may be a pretext for a given pre-text, and a pre-text for a given pretext.

      The pre-text of a pretext may include a desire to provide an excuse for performing an action whose justifiability is arguable or questionable. It may also include a desire to provide an excuse for performing an action, when there is a concomitant desire to conceal the true motives for performing that action.

      Every word in a given lexicon or dictionary may function as a pre-text for some other word in that lexicon or dictionary. Synonyms may serve as pre-texts for one another. Rules of grammar and word usage may function as pre-texts for the construction of well-formed sentences. Each phrase in a sentence may function as a pre-text for the subsequent phrases in that sentence. Each sentence in a paragraph may function as a pre-text for the subsequent sentences in that paragraph. Each paragraph in a narrative may function as a pre-text for the subsequent paragraphs in that narrative.

     Every text may also function as a pre-text for some other text.  A text may therefore have   pre-textual, as well as intertextual, properties, and may be part of the textual setting in which some other text is read and interpreted.

      An answer to the question, “What comes before the text?” may be: “The pre-text.” An answer to the question, “What comes before the pre-text?” may be: “The possibility of textualization.”

      Textualization may be described as the process whereby textual elements (such as words, phrases, or sentences) are assembled and integrated into texts. It may proceed in conjunction with narrativization (the process whereby narrative elements are assembled and integrated into oral and written narratives) and discursivization (the process whereby discursive elements are assembled and integrated into spoken and written discourse). The textual cycle or sequence may begin at a pre-textual level and continue through successive stages of increasing complexity and progressive textualization.

      A text is an event, and it may therefore have to be interpreted in the context of other events. Pre- and post-text events may shed light on a text’s meaning and historicity.

      A pre-text may incorporate extratextual elements, such as (1) production rules (or writing rules) for the text, (2) determining procedures for transmission of the text, and (3) a social, cultural, and historical context that conditions the reading and writing of the text. The pre-textual properties of an idea, emotion, feeling, experience, etc. may also allow the crossing of textual (as well as formal, thematic, and discursive) boundaries to become possible.

      “Pre-texting” may be a means of testing the suitability of the conditions under which texting or textualization will occur.

      A series of text messages exchanged between two people may be a pre-text of, or a pretext for, their continued dialogue and interaction.

      A text message that is in the process of being composed and that hasn’t yet been sent may also be called a “pre-text.”

      Marie Maclean (1991) describes a “paratext” as a frame for a text that guides the reader’s approach to the text, and that may also define, enhance, and contrast with the text.² Examples of paratexts include the title page of a book, the frame around a painting, and the wall on which a canvas is hung. A paratext may serve as a means of conditioning the reader’s expectations of the text, and of lending credibility and authority to the text.³ It may be a pre-text or context; it may also be a parallel text. It may also be an accompanying or companion text that brings further meaning to the text or that plays a metatextual role.

      Gérard Genette (1997) describes paratexts as “thresholds” of interpretation, and explains that they may include such elements of a book as its cover, title page, title, dedication, epigraphs, preface, chapter titles, notes, and publisher’s “epitext” or “peritext.”⁴ He also describes paratexts as transactional zones between the text and off-text, between the author and reader.⁵ Paratexts consist of “peritexts” and “epitexts.” Peritexts are texts (such as the book cover, title page, format, preface, and notes) that surround the core text of a book. Epitexts are texts (such as critical reviews not appended to the text) that externally present the text to the reader.⁶

      The relations between a text and its pre-texts, pretexts, and paratexts may also be dimensions of its intertextuality or transtextuality.⁷ A text and its pre-texts, pretexts, and paratexts may all be read intertextually or transtextually, and they may each be interpreted in light of their own, as well as one another’s meaning.

FOOTNOTES

¹D.A. Carson, Exegetical Fallacies (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1996.

²Marie Maclean, “Pretexts and Paratexts: The Art of the Peripheral,” in New Literary History, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1991, pp. 273-275.

³Ibid., p. 276.

⁴Gérard Gennette, Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 2.

⁵Ibid., p. 2.

⁶Gérard Gennette and Marie Maclean, “Introduction to the Paratext,” in New Literary History, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1991, pp. 262-264.

⁷Julia Kristeva describes the intertextual and translinguistic nature of texts in her collection of essays, Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, edited by Leon S. Roudiez, translated by Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), p. 66.