“Are All Philosophical Questions Questions of Language?” is
the title of an article by Stuart Hampshire that was published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary Volume XXII (1948, pp. 31-48). Hampshire says, first of all, that
in order to answer the question of whether all philosophical questions are questions
of language, we must be able to distinguish philosophical from
non-philosophical, and linguistic from non-linguistic questions.
Regarding the distinction between
philosophical and non-philosophical questions, there may be some questions that are borderline in nature; however, there are also many questions that are recognized as being distinctively philosophical. Regarding the distinction between linguistic and
non-linguistic questions, there may be some questions that are neither purely
linguistic nor purely non-linguistic, but are in fact both linguistic and
non-linguistic. Another way of saying this is that if non-linguistic questions
are “questions of fact” as opposed to “questions of language”, then there
may be some questions that are both “questions of fact” and “questions of
language.” There may also be some linguistic and non-linguistic questions that are neither purely “questions of
fact” nor purely “questions of language.”
Regarding the question of whether
the distinction between philosophical and non-philosophical questions is
identical to that between analytic and synthetic questions, Hampshire explains
that the answers to questions of language may include not only analytic, but
also synthetic statements (statements about the actual uses of words or sentences in a particular language), and that philosophical questions cannot
therefore be wholly analytic if they are questions of language.
If all philosophical
questions are questions of language, then all philosophical problems may be
regarded as linguistic problems, and philosophy may be regarded as an activity
involving the analysis of language in order to resolve linguistic confusions,
obscurities, or ambiguities. According to this view, problems created by
linguistic confusions may dissolve when subjected to linguistic analysis, and
such analysis may not require consideration of matters of fact, other than
facts about the ordinary uses of language.
However, Hampshire criticizes this
view, arguing that many important philosophical problems have been suggested by,
or refer to, developments in the physical sciences and mathematics.1
While such problems may be clarified by analyzing differences between the
terminology of ordinary language and the terminology of the physical sciences
and mathematics, they may not arise solely from confusions or ambiguities in
the uses of ordinary language.
Hampshire also criticizes the view
that if all philosophical questions are questions of language, then they constitute requests for definitions of, or criteria of use for, the terms they contain. He says that if all philosophical answers are prescriptions
for language use or rules for language translation, then we may still be left
with no explanation as to why we might, for some purposes, prefer one language
to another or why we might decide not to translate.2
Moreover, the question of whether a
given way of using language is confusing may in the final analysis be an
empirical question. Whether philosophical problems are resolved by clarifying
the meaning of words or sentences may also be an empirical question.
Hampshire explains
that a “question of language” may be a “question of definition” insofar as it
may be a question of how the meaning of words or sentences is to be defined. However,
he argues that it’s misleading to say that all philosophical questions are
questions of language if the term “questions of language” is taken to mean
merely “questions of definition.” Philosophical questions may be empirical, as
well as definitional questions.
He concludes that a definitive answer to the
question of whether all philosophical questions are questions of language may
depend on the particular language in which philosophical questions are expressed, and on whether philosophical questions that arise when one particular language is used also arise when other languages are used. Some philosophical questions may arise with the use of only some, and not all, languages. Whether all philosophical questions are questions
of language may therefore be an empirical, as well as analytic question.
FOOTNOTES
1Stuart Hampshire, “Are All Philosophical
Questions Questions of Language?”, reprinted in The
Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method, edited by Richard
Rorty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 287.
2Ibid.,
p. 289.
