His Sunyatasaptativritti ("Commentary on the Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness") and Yuktisastikavritti ("Commentary on the Seventy Stanzas on Reasoning") also examined and interpreted Nagarjuna's teachings.
In the Prasannapada, Chandrakirti says that Nagarjuna teaches that the true nature of things is that they are neither arising nor perishing, neither coming nor going, neither temporary nor eternal, neither differentiable nor non-differentiable.1 The true nature of things is that they are without self-existence.
In the Prasannapada, Chandrakirti says that Nagarjuna teaches that the true nature of things is that they are neither arising nor perishing, neither coming nor going, neither temporary nor eternal, neither differentiable nor non-differentiable.1 The true nature of things is that they are without self-existence.
Things do not arise spontaneously or independently; rather, they are caused to exist, and they depend on causes and conditions of existence. Thus, they arise through a process of dependent origination (and not spontaneous origination).
The true nature of things is marked by eight characteristics: not arising independently, not perishing, not coming, not going, not terminating, not enduring eternally, not being differentiable, and not being non-differentiable.
Nothing is self-caused or arises of itself. Everything is interdependent. The concept of a divine being as someone or something that is self-existent and not caused by anything other than itself is therefore unintelligible.2
The self-existence of things is illusory. There is no self, and there is no other, so it doesn't make sense to say that things arise from themselves or from what is other than themselves.
Nothing truly arises at all, insofar as if something exists, it cannot be said to have been brought into existence, because it must have already existed (at least in some respect).
Everything is unreal, in the sense that all our perceptions of things as existing in their own right are illusory.
Motion is illusory, in the sense that if something were in motion, then it would have to be conceived of as having already traversed a path of motion or as not yet having traversed a path of motion or as traversing some path that is distinct from what has already or has not yet been traversed. But there is no motion in what has already been traversed or in what has not yet been traversed or in what is somehow distinct from these two alternatives.
Rest is illusory, in the sense that a mover does not come to rest, nor does a non-mover. Rest cannot be said to be the cessation of motion, if there is no such thing as motion.
The sensory faculties of vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch do not exist, insofar as if they do not see, hear, smell, taste, or touch themselves, then they do not see, hear, smell, taste, or touch other things (because the self and the other don't exist).
The self as a subject of perception is also illusory, because it neither exists nor does not exist in its own right. All subjects (and all objects) are unreal, because they are not what they seem to be. All things are without self-nature, insofar as they are not self-caused, and insofar as their essential nature is impermanent and changeable. If the essential nature of things were invariable or unchangeable, then their transformation would be impossible, because the alteration of things that continue to exist as they did in their previous state is impossible.3
Material objects don't exist, because matter can't be understood as their cause, and because if they existed apart from matter as their cause, then they would be uncaused, which is impossible (because nothing is ever without a cause).
Space doesn't exist, because if it did, then it would have to be a subject of characterization or a characteristic itself, but since neither subjects of characterization nor characteristics exist, space doesn't either.4 A subject of characterization is unintelligible without definable characteristics, and since we can't establish the existence of any subject of characterization (because nothing inherently exists or is self-existent), we can't establish the existence of any characteristics either. Thus, space neither exists nor does not exist, because there is nothing of which we can say that it inherently exists or does not exist.
Time is unreal, insofar as it depends on the self-existence of things. While the present and the future may not be able to be established independently of the past, the past may also not be able to be established independently of the present and the future, so the nature of things that apparently exist independently of each other in the past, present, or future is illusory.
Emptiness of self-existence is therefore a characteristic of all things (although it neither exists nor does not exist). There are no non-empty things, and there is no state of non-emptiness. All things are empty, and there are no self-existent things; and just as there is no self-existence, there is no other-existence.5
Eternalism holds that things exist inherently, and that they never do not exist. Nihilism, on the other hand, holds that things that previously existed can cease to exist.6 However, to be entangled in either of these two dogmas is also to be entangled in the realm of samsara (the endless cycle of death and rebirth).7 The Madhyamaka view (the Middle Way) is a path between the two dogmas, and it holds that the existence or non-existence of things is only appearance and not true reality.
Chandrakirti argues that Madhyamaka is not a form of nihilism, although it holds that nothing is real in itself or has any inherent existence, because it accepts the conventional reality of things for the purposes of the everyday world.
But even though Madhyamikas (adherents of the Madhyamaka school) accept the conventional reality of things in the everyday world, they recognize the difference between conventional reality and ultimate reality. The ultimate reality of things is that they do not exist in their own right, and that their apparently self-existing nature is illusory. The ultimate reality of things is also that they are neither real nor unreal, insofar as reality is seen (by naive realists) as belonging to things in the everyday world.
Thus, there are two truths (or distinct kinds of truth): the truth of the everyday world, and the truth of ultimate reality.
Basic afflictions, such as desire, aversion, and illusion, are causes of suffering, and their eradication leads to release from the realm of samsara. When we extirpate these basic afflictions and understand the true nature of things, we no longer mistake ignorance for true knowledge, or conventional reality for ultimate reality.
Chandrakirti describes four misbeliefs that lead to illusion: (1) the belief that there is something imperishable in the five perishable factors of personal existence (form, feelings, perceptions, mental formations, and consciousness), (2) the belief that whatever is perishable is subjected to suffering, so happiness rather than suffering can be found in the five factors of personal existence, (3) the belief that the body is pure, and (4) the belief that there is an enduring self among the five perishable factors of personal existence.8
The Four Noble Truths are (1) the truth of suffering, (2) the truth of the origin of suffering, (3) the truth of the cessation of suffering, and (4) the truth of the path to the cessation of suffering. Through the Four Noble Truths, clear knowledge of the nature of afflicted existence is possible, as is understanding of the way to overcome the source of affliction, the acceptance of the way leading to cessation of affliction, and the final realization of liberation.9 If the Four Noble Truths did not hold, then none of these stages would be possible.
Nirvana or release from suffering is attained by the extinction of the afflictions, and by the cessation of the perishable factors of personal existence. It is "neither something that can be extirpated, like desire, nor something that can be realized through action, like the fruit of moral striving...It is only by the dissipation of all named things that it is attained."10
Jay L. Garfield and Sonam Thakchoe (2025) criticize the view that Chandrakirti is a radical nihilist who denies the possibility of any knowledge, and they instead characterize his epistemological position as a moderate realism about the conventional world. However, they say that Chandrakirti also synthesizes this position with panfictionalism and illusionism. They argue that he believes that ordinary people may be warranted in their beliefs, because even if people are deluded with regard to the mode of existence of phenomena, this position does not entail that they are also deluded with respect to the conventional properties of phenomena, so it is possible for them to obtain valid knowledge of those properties.11
Garfield and Thakchoe also describe Chandrakirti's epistemological position as a pragmatic coherentism, insofar as he sees epistemic practices as recursively self-correcting on the basis of perception, judgment, and reasoning. They deny that his position is a form of global error theory, because he believes that we can distinguish between conventional truth and falsehood.12 This position also provides a middle way between foundationalism (the view that knowledge is based on foundational or self-evident truths) and relativism (the view that all truths are relative to a person's viewpoint), since conventional truths and ultimate truths aren't taken to be foundational to each other, and since they don't depend on anyone's particular viewpoint.13
FOOTNOTES
1Chandrakirti, Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters from the Prasannapada of Candrakirti, translated from the Sanskrit by Mervyn Sprung (Boulder: Prajna Press, 1979), p. 32.
The true nature of things is marked by eight characteristics: not arising independently, not perishing, not coming, not going, not terminating, not enduring eternally, not being differentiable, and not being non-differentiable.
Nothing is self-caused or arises of itself. Everything is interdependent. The concept of a divine being as someone or something that is self-existent and not caused by anything other than itself is therefore unintelligible.2
The self-existence of things is illusory. There is no self, and there is no other, so it doesn't make sense to say that things arise from themselves or from what is other than themselves.
Nothing truly arises at all, insofar as if something exists, it cannot be said to have been brought into existence, because it must have already existed (at least in some respect).
Everything is unreal, in the sense that all our perceptions of things as existing in their own right are illusory.
Motion is illusory, in the sense that if something were in motion, then it would have to be conceived of as having already traversed a path of motion or as not yet having traversed a path of motion or as traversing some path that is distinct from what has already or has not yet been traversed. But there is no motion in what has already been traversed or in what has not yet been traversed or in what is somehow distinct from these two alternatives.
Rest is illusory, in the sense that a mover does not come to rest, nor does a non-mover. Rest cannot be said to be the cessation of motion, if there is no such thing as motion.
The sensory faculties of vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch do not exist, insofar as if they do not see, hear, smell, taste, or touch themselves, then they do not see, hear, smell, taste, or touch other things (because the self and the other don't exist).
The self as a subject of perception is also illusory, because it neither exists nor does not exist in its own right. All subjects (and all objects) are unreal, because they are not what they seem to be. All things are without self-nature, insofar as they are not self-caused, and insofar as their essential nature is impermanent and changeable. If the essential nature of things were invariable or unchangeable, then their transformation would be impossible, because the alteration of things that continue to exist as they did in their previous state is impossible.3
Material objects don't exist, because matter can't be understood as their cause, and because if they existed apart from matter as their cause, then they would be uncaused, which is impossible (because nothing is ever without a cause).
Space doesn't exist, because if it did, then it would have to be a subject of characterization or a characteristic itself, but since neither subjects of characterization nor characteristics exist, space doesn't either.4 A subject of characterization is unintelligible without definable characteristics, and since we can't establish the existence of any subject of characterization (because nothing inherently exists or is self-existent), we can't establish the existence of any characteristics either. Thus, space neither exists nor does not exist, because there is nothing of which we can say that it inherently exists or does not exist.
Time is unreal, insofar as it depends on the self-existence of things. While the present and the future may not be able to be established independently of the past, the past may also not be able to be established independently of the present and the future, so the nature of things that apparently exist independently of each other in the past, present, or future is illusory.
Emptiness of self-existence is therefore a characteristic of all things (although it neither exists nor does not exist). There are no non-empty things, and there is no state of non-emptiness. All things are empty, and there are no self-existent things; and just as there is no self-existence, there is no other-existence.5
Eternalism holds that things exist inherently, and that they never do not exist. Nihilism, on the other hand, holds that things that previously existed can cease to exist.6 However, to be entangled in either of these two dogmas is also to be entangled in the realm of samsara (the endless cycle of death and rebirth).7 The Madhyamaka view (the Middle Way) is a path between the two dogmas, and it holds that the existence or non-existence of things is only appearance and not true reality.
Chandrakirti argues that Madhyamaka is not a form of nihilism, although it holds that nothing is real in itself or has any inherent existence, because it accepts the conventional reality of things for the purposes of the everyday world.
But even though Madhyamikas (adherents of the Madhyamaka school) accept the conventional reality of things in the everyday world, they recognize the difference between conventional reality and ultimate reality. The ultimate reality of things is that they do not exist in their own right, and that their apparently self-existing nature is illusory. The ultimate reality of things is also that they are neither real nor unreal, insofar as reality is seen (by naive realists) as belonging to things in the everyday world.
Thus, there are two truths (or distinct kinds of truth): the truth of the everyday world, and the truth of ultimate reality.
Basic afflictions, such as desire, aversion, and illusion, are causes of suffering, and their eradication leads to release from the realm of samsara. When we extirpate these basic afflictions and understand the true nature of things, we no longer mistake ignorance for true knowledge, or conventional reality for ultimate reality.
Chandrakirti describes four misbeliefs that lead to illusion: (1) the belief that there is something imperishable in the five perishable factors of personal existence (form, feelings, perceptions, mental formations, and consciousness), (2) the belief that whatever is perishable is subjected to suffering, so happiness rather than suffering can be found in the five factors of personal existence, (3) the belief that the body is pure, and (4) the belief that there is an enduring self among the five perishable factors of personal existence.8
The Four Noble Truths are (1) the truth of suffering, (2) the truth of the origin of suffering, (3) the truth of the cessation of suffering, and (4) the truth of the path to the cessation of suffering. Through the Four Noble Truths, clear knowledge of the nature of afflicted existence is possible, as is understanding of the way to overcome the source of affliction, the acceptance of the way leading to cessation of affliction, and the final realization of liberation.9 If the Four Noble Truths did not hold, then none of these stages would be possible.
Nirvana or release from suffering is attained by the extinction of the afflictions, and by the cessation of the perishable factors of personal existence. It is "neither something that can be extirpated, like desire, nor something that can be realized through action, like the fruit of moral striving...It is only by the dissipation of all named things that it is attained."10
Jay L. Garfield and Sonam Thakchoe (2025) criticize the view that Chandrakirti is a radical nihilist who denies the possibility of any knowledge, and they instead characterize his epistemological position as a moderate realism about the conventional world. However, they say that Chandrakirti also synthesizes this position with panfictionalism and illusionism. They argue that he believes that ordinary people may be warranted in their beliefs, because even if people are deluded with regard to the mode of existence of phenomena, this position does not entail that they are also deluded with respect to the conventional properties of phenomena, so it is possible for them to obtain valid knowledge of those properties.11
Garfield and Thakchoe also describe Chandrakirti's epistemological position as a pragmatic coherentism, insofar as he sees epistemic practices as recursively self-correcting on the basis of perception, judgment, and reasoning. They deny that his position is a form of global error theory, because he believes that we can distinguish between conventional truth and falsehood.12 This position also provides a middle way between foundationalism (the view that knowledge is based on foundational or self-evident truths) and relativism (the view that all truths are relative to a person's viewpoint), since conventional truths and ultimate truths aren't taken to be foundational to each other, and since they don't depend on anyone's particular viewpoint.13
FOOTNOTES
1Chandrakirti, Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters from the Prasannapada of Candrakirti, translated from the Sanskrit by Mervyn Sprung (Boulder: Prajna Press, 1979), p. 32.
2Ibid., p. 43.
3Ibid., p. 147.
4Ibid., p. 106.
5Ibid., p. 157.
6Ibid., p. 161.
7Ibid., p. 163.
8Ibid., pp. 214-215.
9Ibid., p. 225.
10Ibid., p. 249.
11Jay L. Garfield and Sonam Thakchoe, By the Light of the Moon: Candrakirti's Prasangika Madhyamaka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025), p. 50.
11Jay L. Garfield and Sonam Thakchoe, By the Light of the Moon: Candrakirti's Prasangika Madhyamaka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2025), p. 50.
12Ibid., p. 53.
13Ibid., p. 59.
