Weaknesses of Pascal's Wager

One of the most famous arguments for belief in God is Pascal's Wager. But it has several weaknesses that limit its persuasiveness and coherency.

      Pascal says that we're usually more persuaded by reasons we discover for ourselves than by reasons given by others to persuade us (Section I, 10). So his wager that we have more to gain from believing in God than from disbelieving in God is a rational argument that has an inherent weakness insofar as it's less likely to convince us than if we had discovered it for ourselves.

      He also says that we can know truth through reason or sensory experience, but the passions of the soul can sometimes disturb the senses and cause us to have false impressions (Section II, 84). Isn't his wager, to some extent, an appeal to emotion (and therefore to the passions of the soul), intended to persuade us to believe in God by making us fearful of what we might lose if we don't believe in God? He says that we should, by diminishing our passions, convince ourselves of the existence of God, but isn't he to some extent calling on us to be moved by our passions?

      At the same time, he claims that by faith we can know that God is (that God exists) without knowing exactly who or what God is. The existence of God cannot be proved by reason, because God is infinitely incomprehensible to us (Section III, 233). But if we can only know by faith that God exists, then why is Pascal trying to persuade us by rational (and perhaps emotional) argument? If knowledge of God is not within the power of human reason, then why should knowledge of the necessity of belief in God be within the power of human reason?

      Pascal also claims that if we accept his wager and believe in God, then we will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, generous, sincere, and truthful. But he doesn't show why all these moral virtues should necessarily follow from belief in God, because we may truly believe in God and yet through our own faults and weaknesses fail to demonstrate many or all of these virtues fully and consistently.

      His argument for the necessity of the wager is that atheists and agnostics are inherently unhappy, because they are estranged from God (Section III, 194). He says that they are negligent in seeking the truth, and that when they attack religion, they are attacking something they know nothing about. They have also failed to recognize the importance of knowing what constitutes the immortality of the soul, and they have likewise failed to understand that this matter is of such supreme importance that no one can avoid confronting it. The refusal to seek the truth about God's existence is, in his view, to be content with neglectfulness and ignorance.

      Pascal holds it to be a moral duty for all those who doubt God's existence to seek the truth of whether God exists or does not exist. But he doesn't allow for the rationality of those who see God's existence as something that ultimately can be neither affirmed nor denied, and who regard God's existence as a mystery that cannot be objectively investigated. Nor does he actually show why the indifference of some individuals to the question of God's existence should leave them objectively any worse off than anyone else. He doesn't consider the possibility that they may be morally virtuous without believing in God, because from his standpoint, no one can attain salvation without having faith in God. Thus, his wager that God exists is subjectively justifiable, but not objectively necessary.

RESOURCES

Blaise Pascal, Pensées [1670], translated by W.F. Trotter (New York: E.F. Dutton, 1958).

Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther, on Human Understanding of God

Thomas Aquinas says in "The Treatise of the Divine Nature" (Summa Theologiae, Part I, Question 1) that theology is a philosophical discipline concerned with what can be known by reason about God. However, scripture inspired by God doesn't belong to the philosophical disciplines, because it concerns what cannot be known solely by reason. Our knowledge of theological truths may depend on reason, but our knowledge of sacred truths may depend on divine revelation. Revelation may also be necessary for our knowledge of some truths that can be investigated by reason, because our powers of reasoning may not always be dependable and may be susceptible to error (Article 1).

      While we may receive academic teaching through the philosophical and scientific disciplines, we may receive sacred teaching through divine revelation. Sacred teaching is not a science, insofar as it doesn't proceed from self-evident principles, but rather from articles of faith that aren't self-evident (since they're not accepted by everyone). On the other hand, sacred teaching may be called a science, insofar as it proceeds from principles known through a "higher science," "the science that belongs to God" (Article 2).

      Insofar as sacred teaching concerns itself with morality, it may also be called a "practical science." Thus, it may be both speculative (insofar as it concerns our knowledge of the divine) and practical (insofar as it concerns human action) (Article 4).

      Aquinas describes four senses or methods of interpretation of scripture: literal or historical, allegorical, moral or tropological, and anagogical (mystical or spiritual). Thus, any passage of sacred scripture may have multiple meanings or interpretations (Article 10). He may be preparing the ground here for biblical hermeneutics and the recognition that the meaning of scripture may be further clarified by an art or science of interpretation.

      I would say that his argument that sacred teaching is a science is rather weak. What exactly is "the science that belongs to God"? He doesn't really say. And what is "divine science"? Scientific truths or principles aren't articles of faith. Rather, they remain truths or principles only as long as they're verifiable by empirical testing. Moreover, God can never be made an object of scientific investigation. God is always a subject, never an object, because God transcends objective inquiry.

      Aquinas also says in Book I, Chapter III of the Summa Contra Gentiles ("In What Way It Is Possible to Make Known the Divine Truth") that there are some truths about God that can be known by reason, but others that surpass the capabilities of human reason. In Chapter V ("That Those Things Which Cannot be Investigated by Reason Are Fittingly Proposed to Man as an Object of Faith"), he explains that those truths that surpass the capabilities of reason must be known by faith.

      In contrast, Martin Luther, in his Disputation Against Scholastic Theology (1517), which also includes arguments about human understanding of God, is less interested in what is within (or beyond) the power of human reason than in what is within the capacity of divine grace. Luther says that God's grace is necessary for us to do anything good. Without God's grace, we can't do anything good, and we can only do evil (Thesis no. 7). By our very nature, we're unable to want God to be God, and we ourselves want to be God (Thesis no. 17). We aren't masters of our own actions, but rather servants (Thesis no. 39). We don't become righteous by doing righteous things, but rather by having been made righteous (by God's grace) we do righteous things (Thesis no. 40). Luther calls Aristotle, insofar as the latter describes virtue as arising from the habit of acting virtuously and happiness as arising from human reason, an enemy of this interpretation of divine grace (Thesis no. 41). No act of friendship can occur without God's grace. We fulfill divine justice through God's grace, and not through our own will (Thesis no. 68). Our own will would prefer to be free to do evil and to have nothing (no law) imposed on it (Thesis no. 85). But if our own will, by God's grace, conforms to God's will, then we can attain salvation.

      Luther's Thesis no. 8, that the will is not by nature evil seems to be contradictory to his Thesis no. 9, that the will is "nevertheless innately and inevitably evil and corrupt."

      In his view, there isn't any "logic" of faith. Faith isn't "logical." If faith could be reduced to a syllogistic form of reasoning, then sacred truths would be demonstrable by reason, and faith wouldn't be necessary for knowledge of them. But faith is indeed necessary for knowledge of sacred truths that can't be demonstrated by reason.

RESOURCES

Thomas Aquinas, "The Treatise on the Divine Nature," in Thomas Aquinas: Basic Works, edited by Jeffrey Hause and Robert Pasnau (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2014), pp. 36-49.

Thomas Aquinas, "In What Way It is Possible to Make Known the Divine Truth," in Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I, Chapter III, translated by the English Dominican Fathers (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1924), online at https://archive.org/details/summacontragenti0001unse/page/4/mode/2up

Martin Luther, Disputation Against Scholastic Theology, translated by William Roach, 2017, online at https://williamroach.org/2017/08/20/martin-luthers-1517-disputation-against-scholastic-theology/