According to Han Feizi, human beings are mainly motivated by their own self-interest. Thus, a ruler should disguise his true intentions from his ministers, so that they won't be able to betray him. He should take credit for any successes or accomplishments of his government, but he should hold his ministers responsible for any disappointments or failures. He should never be too generous in administering rewards or too lenient in administering punishments. If he is too generous or too lenient, then his ministers will not be as conscientious and diligent in fulfilling their duties.
Han Feizi also says that the most effective means of maintaining power and authority is through the administration of appropriate rewards for good conduct and punishments for bad conduct. Strict punishments are the best means of maintaining order and discipline. Thus, the "two handles" of government are reward and punishment, over which the ruler should maintain absolute control. If a ruler allows his ministers to administer rewards and punishments, then he will eventually find himself under their control. Whenever rulers are assassinated, intimidated, or forced into submission, it is invariably because they have surrendered control over rewards and punishments to their ministers.1
In a well-ordered state, if a ruler's ministers present proposals to him and he subsequently assigns them tasks to fulfill, then they should be rewarded when their words match their actions and punished when their words do not match their actions. Thus, the actions of the ministers should match the names or job descriptions that have been assigned to them. Ministers should neither exceed nor fall short of the responsibilities or duties that have been assigned to them.
In a well-ordered state, those who deserve to be rewarded are rewarded, and those who deserve to be punished are punished.2 Those who do not deserve to be rewarded are not rewarded, and those who do not deserve to be punished are not punished (so that the ruler may retain their allegiance and loyalty).
Han Feizi criticizes the Confucians for teaching that the ancient sage kings maintained social order by being benevolent and righteous, and he criticizes the Mohists for teaching that the sage kings maintained social order by promoting universal love. For Han Feizi, the "two handles" of reward and punishment are the only reliable means of maintaining power and authority. Only when severe punishments are administered for disobedience to the commands of the ruler will the state remain orderly. Thus, the best rewards for good conduct are generous and predictable, and the best punishments for bad conduct are severe and inescapable.3 The best laws are also those that are uniform and inflexible, so that they will not be misunderstood.4 A ruler should never delay in administering rewards or be merciful in administering punishments.5
Han Feizi also criticizes the teachings of the Confucians and Mohists because he says they lead to disagreements regarding the private and public responsibilities of the individual. The cultivation of benevolence and righteousness through the pursuit of such activities as literature and music may be in the private interest of the individual, but it may not be in the practical interest of the state (for example, if a minister's official duties require him to devote less time to activities such as literature and music). Moreover, if there is a conflict between private duty (such as duty to one's family) and public duty, then the fulfillment of private duty in preference to public duty may serve the interest of the individual but not the state. To engage in contradictory modes of reward and punishment by rewarding those who act in the public interest and also rewarding (and not punishing) those who act in their own private interest may be to ensure that a state will always be disorderly.6
Since the teachings of the Confucians and the Mohists may be contradictory to each other (for example, in their view of the importance of compliance with traditional rites and rituals), Han Feizi also argues that neither can claim with certainty to be the way of the ancient sage kings.
An argument that may be made against his theory of the ideal ruler, however, is that if a ruler trusts no one, then no one will trust him. A ruler must be able to assign various powers and responsibilities to his ministers. If he reserves all powers to himself, then his government will either be paralyzed or fail to function effectively whenever he is unable to make timely decisions. Han Feizi attempts unsuccessfully to justify a totally autocratic and authoritarian form of government.
Another argument against his theory of the ideal ruler is that he says that a ruler should be secretive about his intentions so that disloyal ministers will not be able to obstruct his aims. But in order to gain the full support of his ministers, a ruler must do something more than merely reward them for obedience and punish them for disobedience. He must provide them with some vision of what his true aims actually are. Disguise and secrecy will only take him so far, and they will not gain him the kind of loyalty that he will need to maintain political power.
Another argument against Han Feizi's theory of the ideal ruler is that his view of human nature is very pessimistic, and it may be unable to account for the role of altruistic motives in human behavior. A ruler who seeks only his own self-interest will not be capable of promoting the interests of others, and he will ultimately have to rely on some form of coercion (beyond the administration of rewards and punishments) in order to maintain social control.
FOOTNOTES
1Han Feizi, Han Feizi: Basic Writings, translated by Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) p. 3
2Ibid., p. 38.
FOOTNOTES
1Han Feizi, Han Feizi: Basic Writings, translated by Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003) p. 3
2Ibid., p. 38.
3Ibid., p. 104.
4Ibid., p. 104.
5Ibid., p. 105.
6Ibid., p. 108.
