Carl Wellman is an American philosopher who was born
on Sept. 3, 1926, in Lynn, Massachusetts. He grew up in Manchester, New Hampshire. He earned a B.A. degree in philosophy and political science at the
University of Arizona (1949), and an M.A. degree in philosophy at Harvard
(1951). He did a year of study at Cambridge University (1952) before returning
to Harvard to earn his Ph.D. in philosophy (1954). He served as instructor at
Lawrence University in Appleton, Wisconsin from 1953-1957, assistant professor
from 1957-1962, associate professor from 1962-1966, and then professor and
chairman of the Department of Philosophy from 1966-1968. He served as professor
of philosophy at Washington University, St. Louis from 1968-1988, Hortense and
Tobias Lewin Distinguished Professor in the Humanities from 1988-1999, and
Hortense and Tobias Lewin Distinguished Professor Emeritus from 1999.
His publications have included The Language
of Ethics (1961), Challenge and
Response: Justification in Ethics (1971), Morals and Ethics (1975),
Welfare Rights (1982), A Theory of
Rights: Persons Under Laws, Institutions, and Morals (1985), Real Rights (1995), An Approach to Rights: Studies in the Philosophy of Law and Morals
(1997), The Proliferation of Rights
(1999), Medical Law and Moral Rights
(2005), The Moral Dimensions of Human
Rights (2010), Terrorism and
Counterterrorism: A Moral Assessment (2013), and Constitutional Rights: What They Are and What They Ought to Be
(2016). He has also published articles in such journals as Mind, Ethics, Philosophical Review, Journal of Philosophy, and American Philosophical Quarterly.
In The Language of Ethics, Wellman asks, “What do ethical sentences
mean?” He admits that the term “ethical sentences” may actually be difficult to
define, but he explains that the kinds of ethical sentences he’s most concerned with are those that express judgments of value or judgments of obligation.
(The term “ethical sentences” may in fact be ambiguous, insofar as it may refer
to either sentences that are used in an ethical manner or sentences that are
about something ethically right or wrong.) So the question of what is the
meaning of ethical sentences is also the question of what is the meaning of
judgments of value and judgments of obligation. Wellman says that an adequate
answer to this question should explain not only what properties ethical
sentences have in common, but also how they differ from other
kinds of sentences, how they may differ among themselves, and what kinds of
purposes they may have.1
He describes four basic approaches
to understanding the meaning of ethical sentences: ethical naturalism, ethical
intuitionism, emotivism, and ordinary language theory. Ethical naturalism is
the theory that ethical properties are natural properties, and that ethical
sentences describe empirical characteristics. Thus, according to ethical
naturalism, the primary use of ethical language is empirical description.2
Ethical intuitionism is the theory that ethical properties are non-natural
properties, and that ethical sentences describe direct insights of reason. Thus,
according to ethical intuitionism, some ethical truths are knowable by reason,
without the need for empirical demonstration. The rightness or wrongness of
some actions may be known intuitively, regardless of the consequences of those
actions. Emotivism is the theory that ethical sentences are not primarily
descriptive, and that they express or evoke emotions. Ordinary language
theory is the theory that ethical sentences have their own kind of meaning, and
that they cannot be reduced to other kinds of sentences. Thus, according to
ordinary language theory, ethical sentences are neither empirical descriptions
nor non-empirical descriptions nor emotive utterances.3 Their
meaning depends on the linguistic purposes for which they are used. The way to
clarify their meaning is to examine their uses as instruments of language.
According to Wellman, none of these
theories (naturalism, intuitionism, emotivism, and ordinary language theory)
provides an adequate means of understanding the meaning of ethical sentences. He therefore describes five basic kinds of meaning that ethical sentences may have:
descriptive, emotive, evaluative, directive, and critical. Other kinds of
meaning may also belong to ethical sentences, but investigation of these five
basic kinds of meaning may be necessary in order for us to develop a better
understanding of the nature of ethical language.
Descriptive meaning belongs to sentences
that tell us something about a state of affairs. Every description indicates or
refers to some thing or things, and is about some thing or things. Descriptions
may be of more or less generality, of which there are (at least) four kinds:
universality, indeterminateness, abstractness, and applicability.4
They also presuppose that the thing or things they refer to actually exist (at
least in some sense).
Emotive meaning belongs to sentences
expressing emotions that we feel or could feel. Emotive sentences are
characterized by four main features: emotionality, expressiveness,
indicativeness (although indicative meaning may not belong to all emotive
sentences5), and partiality6 (they may express positive
or negative emotions about or toward certain things, although this may not be true for all emotive sentences, and there may be emotive sentences that express
neither positive nor negative emotions about or toward certain things). The strength of
the emotionality of an emotive sentence may correspond to the intensity of the
expressed emotion.
Evaluative meaning belongs to sentences
that express attitudes toward objects (things, or persons). Every evaluative
sentence is about one or more objects, and takes some sort of position on the
claim that the attitude it takes is the correct or appropriate one.7
This taking of a position on the claim to correctness or appropriateness may
distinguish evaluative sentences from emotive sentences that express emotions
but do not necessarily take a position on the claim that the emotions they
express are the correct or appropriate ones.8 Evaluative sentences
are like descriptive sentences insofar as they take some sort of stand on the
claim to objective validity, but they are unlike descriptive sentences insofar
as partiality (favorable or unfavorable attitudes) toward their objects is (are)
at the core of their meaning.9
Directive meaning belongs to sentences that direct us to do, or not to
do, something. Every directive sentence is addressed to one or more agents who
are called upon to perform, or not to perform, some action. Directive sentences
presuppose that the agent(s) to whom they are addressed is (are) capable of
doing as they are told.10 They also presuppose that at the moment
they are spoken or written, there is still time for them to be fulfilled.11
Critical meaning belongs to sentences
that modify, challenge, reject, or reaffirm the rationality of something. By
making explicit the claim to rationality that may be implicitly made by someone
or something, critical sentences make their own implicit claim to rationality.12
The kinds of things that may be made objects of criticism include statements,
actions, emotions, and attitudes.
Wellman doesn’t mention, however,
that the lack of rationality of something may not be the only grounds for ethically
criticizing it. The lack of fairness, justice, prudence,
practicality, truthfulness, honesty, etc. of something may also be grounds for ethically criticizing it. Wellman says that “To say that an action is right is to assert
that its claim to rationality is justified; to say that an action is wrong is
to assert that the claim is mistaken.”13 But there are other
criteria besides the rationality of an action that may determine whether it’s ethically
right or wrong to perform that action in a given situation. For example, a judgment that
we have an obligation toward someone in a given situation may be motivated not
only by rationality, but also by such principles as beneficence, altruism, civility, generosity,
or reciprocity. The absence of these principles of ethical conduct may become
grounds for ethical criticism.
While judgments of value have
evaluative meaning, says Wellman, judgments of obligation have critical
meaning. He argues that value judgments are without descriptive or emotive
meaning, and that judgments of obligation are without descriptive, emotive,
evaluative, or directive meaning. But why can’t judgments of obligation
sometimes express an emotional sense of obligation toward someone or something,
and thus have emotive as well as critical meaning? Why can’t value judgments
sometimes be judgments of the comparative rationality of various modes of
ethical conduct, and thus have critical as well as evaluative meaning?
He does explain, however, that a
single sentence may have different meanings in different contexts (for example,
a sentence may have descriptive meaning in one context, and directive meaning
in another context). More than one of kind of meaning may also belong to the
same sentence within a given context (a sentence may have both evaluative and
emotive meaning within a given context, just as it may have both descriptive and
evaluative meaning within a given context).
FOOTNOTES
1Carl Wellman, The Language of Ethics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961),
p. 8.
2Ibid.,
p. 25.
3Ibid.,
p. 130.
4Ibid.,
p. 174.
5Ibid.,
p. 205.
6Ibid.,
p. 202.
7Ibid.,
pp. 213-214.
8Ibid.,
p. 219.
9Ibid.,
p. 220.
10Ibid.,
p. 242.
11Ibid.,
p. 243.
12Ibid.,
pp. 264-265.
13Ibid.,
p. 270.
