Monism and Pluralism

There may be many kinds of monism and pluralism: philosophical, religious, social, political, and cultural.

      Philosophical monism and pluralism include ontological, metaphysical, ethical, and epistemological kinds.
      Ontological monism may be a theory that the world consists of a single substance, while ontological pluralism may be a theory that the world consists of a plurality of substances. 

      Metaphysical monism may be a theory that ultimate reality consists of a single substance, while metaphysical pluralism may be a theory that ultimate reality consists of a plurality of substances. 

      Two important kinds of metaphysical pluralism are substance dualism (or Cartesian dualism), which holds that mind and matter are two different substances, and property dualism (or token physicalism), which holds that mind and matter are not different substances and that mental phenomena are merely properties of physical phenomena.
      Metaphysical monism, or the theory that only one kind of entity constitutes ultimate reality, may be of three kinds: idealistic, materialistic, and neutral.¹ Idealistic monism may a theory that all reality is mental or spiritual, and that the world consists of a single underlying substance that is mental or spiritual. Materialistic monism may be a theory that all reality is material or physical, and that mental phenomena are merely rearrangements of physical matter. Neutral monism may be a theory that physical and mental reality are not intrinsically different, and that all physical and mental phenomena are merely rearrangements of a single neutral substance or element.²
      Ethical monism may be a theory that ethical conduct is (can, or should be) guided by a single ethical principle or value system. Ethical pluralism, on the other hand, may be a theory that ethical conduct is (can, or should be) guided by a plurality of ethical principles or value systems. 

      Epistemological monism may be a theory that there is only one kind of truth or that there is only one consistent set of truths about the world. Epistemological pluralism, on the other hand, may be a theory that there are many kinds of truth and that there may be many consistent sets of truths about the world.

      Religious or theological monism may be a theory or attitude that there is only one true way of looking at God, that there is only one true religion, and that there is only one path to spiritual salvation. On the other hand, religious or theological pluralism may be a theory or attitude that there is more than one true way of looking at God, that there is more than one valid way of discovering ultimate reality, and that there is more than one path to spiritual salvation. 

     It is important to note that religious pluralism does not necessarily entail religious relativism.³ While religious pluralism may involve mutual respect among people of different religions, and may be guided by the principle that people of different religions should be able to live together peacefully in society, religious relativism may be a theory that religious truth is relative to the believer and that all religious beliefs are therefore equally valid. Acceptance of religious pluralism as a social goal or norm does not entail abandonment of the principle that there are absolute moral and religious truths that are not merely a matter of subjective opinion or personal viewpoint.

FOOTNOTES
¹Bertrand Russell, Theory of Knowledge: The 1913 Manuscript, edited by Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, in collaboration with Kenneth Blackwell (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 7.
²Ibid., p. 15.
³Jay Newman, Foundations of Religious Tolerance (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), p. 47.

Deontic modality schematized according to the semiotic square

Actions may be classified according to their deontic modality (using the Greimasian scheme of the semiotic square) as follows:

S₁                                                              S₂

those that we are                those that we are   required to do                      required not to do

those that we are               those that we are    not required not to do           not required to do

~S₂                                                            ~S₁

S₁                                                                S₂

those that we are               those that we are   advised to do                      advised not to do

those that we are               those that we are   not advised not to do          not advised to do

~S₂                                                           ~S₁

S₁                                                               S₂

those that we are                those that we are permitted to do                  permitted not to do

those that we are                those that we are not permitted not to do       not permitted to do

~S₂                                                            ~S₁

S₁ – S₂ is a relation of contrariety, ~S₁ - S₂ is a relation of complementarity, S₁ - ~S₁ is a relation of contradiction, S₂ - ~S₂ is a relation of contradiction, ~S₂ - ~S₁ is a relation of contrariety, and S₁ - ~S₂ is a relation of complementarity.¹

Relations of material equivalence may thus be stated as follows (where "↔" stands for “is materially equivalent to”):

1. Being required to do (having to do) ↔ not being permitted not to do ↔ not being permitted to do otherwise

2. Being required not to do (having not to do) ↔ being required to do otherwise ↔ not being permitted not to do

3. Not being required to do (not having to do) ↔ being permitted not to do ↔ being permitted to do otherwise

4. Not being required not to do (not having not to do) ↔ being permitted to do ↔ not being required to do otherwise.

FOOTNOTES

¹A.J. Greimas and J. Courtés, Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary, translated by Larry Crist, Daniel Patte, et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 309.

When You're at a Loss for Words

Remember Exodus 4:10-12:

"10 Moses said to the Lord, “Pardon your servant, Lord. I have never been eloquent, neither in the past nor since you have spoken to your servant. I am slow of speech and tongue.” 11 The Lord said to him, “Who gave human beings their mouths? Who makes them deaf or mute? Who gives them sight or makes them blind? Is it not I, the Lord? 12 Now go; I will help you speak and will teach you what to say.”"

Religious Language - A Reading List

Carson, D.A. The Inclusive Language Debate: A Plea for Realism. Grand Rapids: InterVarsity Press, 1998.

Chopp, Rebecca S. The Power to Speak: Feminism, Language, God. New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1989.

Cornwell, Hilarie, and Cornwell, James. Saints Signs, and Symbols: The Symbolic Language of Christian Art. Harrisburg: Morehouse Publishing, 2009.

Heather, Noel. Religious Language and Critical Discourse Analysis: Ideology and Identity in Christian Discourse Today. Oxford: Peter Lang Publishers, 2000.

Green, Garrett. Imagining God: Theology and the Religious Imagination. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1989.

Johnson, Elizabeth. She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse. New York: Crossroad, 1992.

Lindbeck, George A. The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984.

Long, D. Stephen. Speaking of God: Theology, Language and Truth. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 

Co., 2009.

MacQuarrie, John. God Talk: An Examination of the Language and Logic of Theology. New York: Harper & Row, 1967.

McFague, Sallie. Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982.

Ramsey, Ian. Christian Discourse: Some Logical Explorations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Ramsey, Ian. Religious Language. London: SCM-Canterbury Press, Ltd., 1967.

Scott, Alex. Christian Semiotics and the Language of Faith. New York: iUniverse, 2007.

Soskice, Janet Martin. Metaphor and Religious Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Stiver, Dan R. The Philosophy of Religious Language: Sign, Symbol, and Story. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.

Vanhoozer, Kevin J. Is There a Meaning in this Text? The Bible, The Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowledge. Grand Rapids, Zondervan, 1998.

Ware, Jr., James H. Not With Words of Wisdom: Performative Language and Liturgy. Washington, D.C., University Press of America, 1981.

Cases in which an expression can have contradictory meanings

      Some interesting examples of expressions that are in themselves capable of having opposite or contradictory meanings include the verb "stem" (which can mean either "stop" or "originate"), the phrase "to cleave" (which can mean either "to cling or attach to" or "to divide or separate"), the adjective "moot" (which can mean "disputable" or "indisputable"), the noun "oversight" (which can refer to an act of forgetting something or an act of being vigilant about something), the phrase "to garnish" (which can mean "to add something extra" or "to subtract something"), and the phrase "to sanction" (which can mean "to allow" or "to prohibit").