In some cases, the voice of conscience may take the form of
internal speech, and we may engage in dialogue with ourselves about our past and present actions. We may talk to ourselves about what we should or shouldn't do, and we may ask ourselves what we should or shouldn't have done.
Internal speech as the voice of conscience may precede external speech, which may take the form of
publicly acknowledged responsibility for our past actions. The voice of conscience may
in some cases bring to conscious awareness thoughts and feelings that wouldn't otherwise have been recognized and articulated. It may praise or condemn our past or present
actions, and it may serve as a guide to possible future courses of action.
The voice of conscience may tell us how to atone and make amends for our past errors and moral failures.
On the other hand, it may be silent if there is nothing to praise or condemn in
our moral conduct. It may also be silent if we are lacking in conscience, and if we are motivated by purely selfish or narcissistic desires and concerns.
Conscience as a moral faculty may
also reserve judgment about actions that are morally neutral or
inconsequential.
For each of us, the voice of
conscience may have distinctive characteristics. It may reveal a varying degree
of urgency, intensity, persistence, resonance, and persuasiveness. It may be only one of many inner moral voices to which we may listen: other voices may include the
voices of reason, wisdom, compassion, and understanding.
The voice of conscience may always
be present within us (or at least may always be accessible to us) if we retain the capacity for self-criticism and humility. However, it may have varying degrees of immediacy or remoteness with regard to our conscious awareness of it.
To the extent that it may reflect the attitudes, opinions,
and judgments of other individuals, we may engage in dialogue
with a variety of voices when we listen to it, and we may reflect on our
actions from a variety of viewpoints.
The voice of
conscience may also be the voice of inner experience, the voice of the internal world of thoughts and feelings, the voice of the
inner psychological world.
What then does the state of
speechlessness connote? That we are unprepared to express our thoughts and
feelings? That we are so surprised, amazed, or shocked by events
that we find ourselves unable to put our own thoughts and feelings into words? If
we can have experiences that truly render us speechless, then thinking and
feeling may not necessarily require speech as a medium of representation. There
may be “speechless thought,” or thinking that occurs without internal speech.
Indeed, internal speech as the voice of conscience may require the capacity to articulate thoughts and feelings.1 If we
cannot articulate our own thoughts and feelings, then we
may also not be able to coherently formulate our moral judgments, and we may not be
able to speak intelligibly to, or engage in substantive moral dialogue with,
ourselves.
However, we may in some cases hold
ourselves morally responsible for our inability to articulate our own thoughts and
feelings, and if we regard such an inability as a moral failure, then the voice
of conscience may bring this failure to our attention and censure or reprimand us.
On the other hand, there are some things that
we might very well say aloud but merely say silently to ourselves in order
to avoid social disharmony or conflict.
Internal speech produced by the voice of
conscience may be monologic or dialogic.2 Insofar as it simply dictates principles of moral duty, it may be monologic, but insofar as it allows moral questioning or invites moral reflection, it may be dialogic.
The Russian psychologist Lev
Vygotsky (1934) describes inner speech as speech for oneself. Inner speech is
directed inwardly rather than outwardly, in contrast to social speech,
which is addressed to others, and which serves the purpose of communicating with
others.3
The Canadian
psychologists Alain Morin and James Everett (1990) describe inner speech as a
mediator of self-awareness and self-knowledge. They suggest that the extent to
which we use inner speech may partially account for the extent to which we have
self-awareness and self-knowledge.4
The Spanish philosophers Agustín
Vicente and Fernando Martinez Manrique (2011) explain that the concept of inner
speech shouldn't be confused with the concept that there is a language of
thought (or the concept that thought requires a representational system
corresponding to a language).5 Thinking may occur with or without
inner speech.
The habit that we may often develop
of silently talking to ourselves while we are performing daily tasks may in
some cases be a consequence of our experience of internal speech as readers and
writers of verbal and non-verbal texts. Just as we may listen internally to the
sounds of the words we are reading, so we may listen internally to the
sounds of the words we are writing. Internal speech may occur when we
imagine ourselves reading a text aloud or when we imagine ourselves hearing the voice of
an author reading a text to us.
The imagined voice of the author may in fact be quite different from the
author’s actual voice. It may be tempered or conditioned by our own subjective
attitudes and personal experiences.
The voice of conscience may be singular, insofar as each person may have their own individual voice
that is in some way distinguishable from other voices.6 At the same
time, it may be plural, insofar as individual voices may unite to express a shared or collective conscience.
FOOTNOTES
1Caryl Emerson, “The Outer Word and Inner Speech:
Bakhtin, Vygotsky, and the Internalization of Language” in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Dec 1983, 245-264), p. 255.
2Simon McCarthy-Jones and Charles Fernyhough,
“The varieties of inner speech: Links between quality of inner speech and
psychopathological variables in a sample of young adults,” in Consciousness and Cognition, 20 (2011),
p. 1586.
3Lev Vygotsky, Thought and Language, edited by Alex Kozulin (Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press, 1986), p. 32.
4Alain Morin and James Everett, “Inner Speech as
a Mediator of Self-Awareness, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge: An Hypothesis,”
in New ideas in Psychology, Vol. 8,
No. 3, (1990) pp. 337-356
5Agustín Vicente and Fernando Martinez
Manrique, “Inner Speech: Nature and Functions,” in Philosophy Compass 6/3 (2011), p. 209.
6Dmitri Nikulin, On Dialogue (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), p. 41.
No comments:
Post a Comment