Philippa Foot and Jonathan Harrison, on the Nature of Moral Principles

In a dialogue between Philippa Foot and Jonathan Harrison (1954) regarding the question of "when is a principle a moral principle?", Foot seems to be rather evasive in her response to the question. She describes the following sentences as examples of what we might mean when we talk about moral principles: (1) "To me, it is a matter of moral principle," (2) "I don't know much about his moral principles," and (3) "He seems to me to be a man without moral principles."¹ She says that a moral principle may be a special case of a principle of conduct. It may be a principle through which we come to understand what a person feels about what is right and wrong. However, in order for a principle to be moral, it must have some kind of background that distinguishes it from other kinds of principles (although Foot doesn't say exactly what that background might be). She also suggests that if we call a principle moral, then it must have some connection with other principles that we call moral or must have some connection with modes of conduct that we call virtuous. She concludes that the comparison of a moral principle with a moral imperative is fundamentally misleading, and that we won't be able to find suitable criteria for moral principles if we try to base our inquiry on this model.²

      Harrison responds by saying that some principles that we may hold as obligatory may not actually be obligatory. Thus, there may be a difference between what is subjectively a moral principle and what is objectively a moral principle. We may hold a principle as a moral principle without its necessarily being universalizable (applicable to everyone). However, ultimate moral principles may be applicable to everyone, while derivative moral principles may not be. Derivative moral principles may be derived from ultimate moral principles; they are contingent and variable in a way that ultimate moral principles are not.³

      Harrison explains that Foot's assessment of moral principles is rather circular, insofar as she doesn't address the question: "If the "background" of a moral principle consists of other moral principles, then what can we say about those other principles?"  Moreover, if a principle can be moral only if it has a connection with other moral principles, then how can we establish that those other principles are moral?⁴

      He also notes that we may not always act on our moral principles. Moral principles are not laws of nature; they can be disobeyed. Nor are they rules of skill, since acting morally is not the same as acting skillfully (although moral obligations may be fulfilled skillfully or may not be fulfilled through sheer ineptitude).⁵

      He also claims that a hypothetical imperative can't be a moral principle, although he admits there may be hypothetical non-moral imperatives or duties (such as the duty to practice a certain skill if it will make us better at that skill). He says the difference between a hypothetical and a categorical imperative is that a hypothetical imperative is necessary as a means to some end, while a categorical imperative is not.

      Contrary to his view, however, it can be argued that if I hold it as a moral principle, all things being equal, that I should perform some action that's morally advisable, even though that action may not be morally obligatory, then I may believe in a principle that's a hypothetical, but not categorical, directive. A categorical directive might take the form: if I see someone suffering, then I should try to alleviate that suffering and comfort the person who's suffering. This would be an example of a directive to perform an action that's obligatory, universally applicable, and not contingently a means to some end other than itself.

      Harrison notes that actions that are based on principle may not necessarily be moral actions, and that moral actions may not necessarily be based on principle (rather than the contextual variables of a particular situation). We don't always act on our moral principles, but we must do so at least occasionally if we're going to truthfully say we hold them as principles. On the other hand, if we're lacking in conscience or false to our sense of moral duty, then we may not act on our moral principles and may not feel any remorse for doing so.⁶ But we may also act on principles that we don't feel a moral duty to act on. Merely acting on principles doesn't necessarily make them moral principles. So our acting or not acting on a principle can't be an adequate criterion of whether we regard it as a moral principle. Nor can our feeling of obligation to follow a principle be an adequate criterion of whether we regard it as a moral principle. He therefore dismisses as a "terminological question" whether there may in fact be any adequate criteria for a moral principle.

FOOTNOTES

¹Philippa R. Foot and Jonathan Harrison, "Symposium: When is a Principle a Moral Principle?," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 28, 1954, p. 98.

²Ibid. p. 110.

³Ibid., p. 125.

⁴Ibid., pp. 112-113.

⁵Ibid., pp. 117-118.

⁶Ibid., pp. 127-128.