On the Origins, Nature, and Extent of Epistemic Rights

Epistemic rights may include the right to believe, or the right not to believe, a given proposition, as well as the right to hold, or the right not to hold, a particular belief or set of beliefs. Epistemic rights may also include the right to assert, or the right not to assert, something, as well as the right to claim, or the right not to claim, knowledge of something. Thus, there may be positive as well as negative epistemic rights.

      Epistemic rights may also include the right to affirm or deny the truth of a proposition. They may also include the right to take the truth of a proposition as evidence for the truth of other propositions. They may also include the right to withhold judgment about the truth or falsehood of a proposition.

      They may also include the right to expect a particular event to occur, given the occurrence of previous events as a result of which that event could reasonably, safely, and reliably be expected to occur. If our expectations of the occurrence of an event turn out to be unjustified, then we must question whether we did indeed have a right to expect that event to occur, given the occurrence of the previous events on which our expectations of its occurrence were founded.

      According to Fred Dretske (2000), the epistemic right to believe a proposition p (or to accept p as true) may entail an epistemic duty (obligation, or responsibility) to justify that belief in the truth of p. From an epistemic standpoint, we may have the right, or may be entitled, to believe p only if we can epistemically justify that belief in the truth of p. However, there may be cases in which we believe p or accept p as true (perhaps because p’s truth has been established by reliable methods), despite the fact that we may have good reasons for believing p to be false. In such cases, we may perhaps have a right to believe things that we are not completely justified in believing.¹

      Thus, Dretske raises the question of whether there may in some cases be epistemic rights to hold beliefs without corresponding epistemic duties to justify those beliefs.

      It may be argued to the contrary, however, that the extent of any epistemic right that we may have to hold a particular belief or set of beliefs depends on the extent to which we are able to epistemically justify that belief or set of beliefs. We may have an epistemic duty not to believe a proposition p unless there is sufficient evidence of the truth of p. We may also, before believing p, have an epistemic duty to consider any evidence that may refute or disprove p.

      From an epistemic standpoint, we are therefore not entitled to believe whatever we want to believe (about p, or about some other proposition, occurrence, or event) and not consider whether our beliefs are epistemically warranted or justified. We are only entitled to hold those beliefs for which there is sufficient epistemic warrant or justification (although such warrant or justification may be defined in a variety of ways).

      The epistemic right to believe p may also depend on the absence of significant defects in our perceptual status or cognitive function that could impair the epistemic merits of our belief in the truth of p.

      From an internalist standpoint, the extent of any epistemic right to believe in something depends only on factors internal to the believer (e.g. the believer’s ability to justify his/her beliefs on the basis of previous experience or on the basis of what he/she already knows). From an externalist standpoint, however, the extent of any epistemic right to believe in something depends on factors external to the believer (e.g. the facts that actually hold in the given situation, regardless of the believer’s ability to justify his/her beliefs on the basis of previous experience or on the basis of what he/she already knows).

      Thus, a number of consequences logically follow from epistemic deontologism (the theory that knowledge requires the fulfillment of principles of epistemic duty) and from the recognition by Descartes, Locke, William K. Clifford, and others that epistemic rights and duties may be inseparable and may go hand in hand.

      If we have an epistemic right or entitlement to believe in the truth of a proposition p, then we must be epistemically justified in believing p. We are within our epistemic rights to believe p only if we have good reasons or sufficient epistemic grounds to believe p. If we have fulfilled our epistemic duty to believe p only on the basis of sufficient evidence of p, then we may have the epistemic right to believe p.

     If we believe p but p turns out to be false, then our justification for believing p may be questioned, and so may our epistemic right to believe p. P’s turning out to be false may indicate that we were not actually justified in believing p. Our purported or alleged justification for believing p may have been merely a supposed and not an actual epistemic justification for believing p.

      It may also be argued that the epistemic right to believe p depends on the epistemic rationality, defensibility, and justifiability of believing p. Thus, approaches to epistemic rationalization and justification include epistemic foundationalism, reliabilism, coherentism, and reliance on authoritative or expert testimony.

      It may also be argued that even if we are not aware or do not know that we believe p, we may still have an epistemic duty not to believe p unless there is sufficient evidence of p.  Our unconscious beliefs may influence our conscious beliefs, and may in some cases function as motives for our actions, and thus we may be obligated to ensure, to the extent that this is possible, that all our beliefs (conscious or unconscious) are epistemically justified.

      If we have no epistemic grounds, reasons, or justification for believing p, then we may have no epistemic right to believe p. We may also have no right to believe p if we know p to be false. To knowingly hold false beliefs may be a dereliction of our epistemic duty to ensure, to the extent that this is possible, that all our beliefs are epistemically justified.

      William K. Alston (1988) offers a cautionary point of view with regard to epistemic deontologism by arguing that this approach to epistemic justification is viable only insofar as it holds that we are not blameworthy for beliefs that are epistemically justified. To the extent that we have not violated any epistemic rules or principles in forming our beliefs, we may be deontologically justified in holding those beliefs.²

       Alston maintains that many of our beliefs are not under our voluntary control, and that we may therefore not be blameworthy for holding those beliefs. Many of our beliefs may be involuntary and may be incapable of being deontologically justified. Moreover, even if we have fulfilled our duty to epistemically justify our beliefs, we may still not be justified in supposing that the grounds for those beliefs are in fact adequate.³ These findings, according to Alston, are not sufficiently accounted for by deontological theories of epistemic justification.

      Just as epistemic rights or entitlements may be relative rather than absolute, so may epistemic duties or responsibilities. A relative epistemic right to believe p may entail a relative epistemic duty to justify that belief. A (merely) relative epistemic right to believe p may also be grounded on a (merely) relative epistemic justification for believing p.

      With regard to the relation between epistemic and moral rights, an epistemic right to believe p may also be a moral right to believe p if the believer has fulfilled his/her epistemic duty to epistemically justify that belief, and if this epistemic duty is also a moral duty. In other words, if the believer is not only epistemically, but also morally obligated to epistemically justify a belief in order to rightly hold that belief, then the right to hold that belief is not only an epistemic, but also a moral right.

      However, epistemic rights may differ from moral rights insofar as there may be situations in which we have the moral right to assent to the truth of a proposition p even though we have no epistemic right to do so (such as when we do not actually know p to be true, or when we know p to be false). There may be situations in which moral duty is in conflict with epistemic duty, such as when telling the truth to a person may unnecessarily offend or cause harm to that person or to some other person(s). We may have the epistemic right, if we know p to be true, to affirm p as true, but we may not always have the moral right.

      With regard to the relation between epistemic and legal rights, an epistemic right to believe p may also be a legal right to believe p if it is legally protected (although most commonly, it is the freedom to believe p that is legally protected, rather than a particular form or expression of that belief in the truth of p).

      Epistemic rights may differ from legal rights insofar as some laws may be based on false premises or fallacious reasoning and may thus be epistemically unjustified. In such cases, we may have the epistemic right to affirm a proposition p as true (if we know p to be true), but we may not have the legal right.

      Legal rights may also differ from moral rights insofar as some laws may be morally unjust, cruel, inhumane, or deleterious to basic human rights. In such cases, we may have the moral right to affirm principles of charity and compassion, but we may not have the legal right.

FOOTNOTES

¹Fred Dretske, “Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LX, No. 3, May 2000, p. 595.

²William Alston, “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification,” in Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 2, Epistemology (1988), p. 284.

³Ibid., p. 292.

REFERENCES

Altschul, Jon. “Epistemic Entitlement,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011), at http://www.iep.utm.edu/ep-en/.

Alston, William, “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification,” in Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 2, Epistemology (1988), pp. 257-299.

Clifford, William K. “The Ethics of Belief,” in Contemporary Review, 1877, pp. 289-309.

Dretske, Fred. “Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LX, No. 3, May 2000, pp. 591-606.

Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Why Formulate a List of Black Philosophers?

Is there any purpose to be served by assembling a list of black philosophers? The assembling of such a list may indeed be useful, because there are, and historically have been, more black philosophers than is (or has been) generally known and appreciated. However, the assembling of such a list is also problematic in a number of ways.

      One of the principal advantages of assembling, even in a preliminary fashion, a list of black philosophers is that it may help to promote greater recognition of the fact that there are currently many black writers and scholars who are engaged in the practice of philosophy. There may, in fact, be many more black philosophers than we might at first suppose, and the names of those individuals may be easier for us to recall if we have some sort of readily available list. At present, most people would probably find it difficult to name, on the spur of the moment, more than one or two black philosophers. Most people would probably also find it difficult to describe any particular intellectual traditions or philosophical movements that have been established or contributed to by black philosophers. Name-recognition of a number of the less well-known black writers and scholars who have made important contributions to philosophy may be facilitated if we assemble, at least in a preliminary fashion, a list of individuals who may be described as “black philosophers.”

      Another advantage of assembling such a list is that it may help us to answer the question, “Who (or what) is a black philosopher?” It may help us to broaden the definition of the term “black philosopher,” particularly when we realize that black thinkers, writers, and scholars in a variety of disciplines, such as philosophy, cultural studies, gender studies, political science, and sociology have engaged in and made important contributions to the practice of philosophy, and thus may be described as philosophers.

      An additional advantage of putting together a list of black philosophers is that it may help to promote recognition of the fact that there is an intellectual community of black thinkers and writers who are engaged in, and dedicated to, the practice of philosophy, and who have interests, concerns, and commitments (philosophical, ethical, theoretical, practical, and sociocultural) to share with each other and with the rest of the black community, as well as with society as a whole.

      The attempt to formulate, in a preliminary fashion, a list of black philosophers may enable us to rethink the notion of what it means to be a black philosopher. It may also enable us to reevaluate our assumptions about what it means to be a philosopher and what it means to engage in philosophy. Some of our unquestioned assumptions may not always promote the development of philosophy as a socially relevant and inclusive enterprise, an enterprise that will promote greater understanding of the conditions for, and the means to attain, social justice and human well-being.

      However, a number of arguments against, or objections to, the formulation of a list of black philosophers may also be made. One such argument is that the assembling of a list of black philosophers may marginalize a particular group of philosophers (those who are included in the list), because they are described as “black philosophers” rather than simply as “philosophers.” This argument, however, may assume that the philosophy practiced by “black philosophers” will be seen as inherently marginal compared to the philosophy practiced by other philosophers. It may also assume that the philosophy engaged in by “black philosophers” will not be seen as mainstream or conventional philosophy (a perception that may, to some extent, have good or bad effects for those who are described as “black philosophers”).

      The argument may also be made that the assembling of a list of black philosophers may marginalize those black philosophers who are not included in the list, by failing to recognize their contributions to philosophy. A counter-argument, however, is that no list of black philosophers can ever be considered to be finished or complete, and that there can be no conclusively authoritative and final list of “black philosophers,” just as there can be no conclusively authoritative and final canon of philosophy. Any list of black philosophers must be considered to be preliminary and subject to further revision. The formulation of such a list should always be done in a manner that is as thoughtful, respectful, and inclusive as possible.

      Another argument to be made against the assembling of a list of black philosophers is that the color of a person’s skin may have nothing to do with the way in which that person does philosophy. To describe a person as a black philosopher may be to make a “category-mistake” by conflating two separate and unrelated social categories.

      Similarly, the argument may be made that discourse about “black philosophy” may be as misguided as discourse about “black physics” or “black mathematics.” On the other hand, the counter-argument may be made that philosophy has always been practiced within the context of particular historical situations, and that philosophers have always been influenced by the prevailing social assumptions of the particular times in which they have lived. The ways in which white philosophers in the past viewed society were very much influenced by their assumptions regarding the proper allocation (or lack of allocation) of full citizenship to various members of society, and thus their skin color had a lot to do with the way in which they practiced philosophy.

      Philosophy may be an art as well as a science (or perhaps it is neither an art nor a science), and it may therefore be informed by a “black aesthetic” as well as by other kinds of aesthetics; in this sense, it may perhaps be worthwhile to reflect on what might constitute “black philosophy.”

      Another argument to be made against assembling a list of black philosophers is represented by the following question: “What is the point of assembling a list of black philosophers, when there are also many white philosophers who have made significant contributions to Africana philosophy?” However, a counter-argument may be made that to recognize the work of black philosophers in various fields of study is not to depreciate or disregard the work of white philosophers in those same fields of study.

      Another possible argument to be made against assembling a preliminary list of black philosophers is that some philosophers who are included in the list may be biracial or multiracial and may therefore not identify themselves simply as black. Some philosophers may, for other reasons, desire not to be included in the list. To the extent that a particular philosopher has expressed their preferences regarding being included or not included in a list of black philosophers, those preferences should indeed be respected.

      Another possible argument to be made against assembling a list of black philosophers is that the compiling of such list might facilitate the targeting of philosophers on the list by bigoted individuals who might desire to subject them to racial hostility or discrimination. This is a very serious concern, but it must be weighed against the need for members of all minority groups to be able to fully participate in society, openly and without fear of intimidation.

      Another possible argument to be made against assembling a list of black philosophers is that if the concept of race is merely a social construct or convenient fiction that has outlived its usefulness, then to categorize people on the basis of their skin color may be futile and meaningless. A counter-argument may be made, however, that the concept of race continues to be a significant sociocultural reality whose meaning is deeply rooted in human history.

      A concise answer to the question of why it might be useful to assemble a list of black philosophers may therefore be that such a project may enable us to become better acquainted with their work and with their contributions to philosophy.

Black Philosophers Online

Selected articles by contemporary philosophers

Kwame Anthony Appiah, "What Does It Mean to 'Look Like Me'?"

Avery Archer, "Wondering about What You Know"

Tina Fernandes Botts, "Legal Hermeneutics"

Juliana Uhuru Bidadanure, "The Political Theory of Universal Basic Income" 

Jacoby Adeshai Carter, "Alain LeRoy Locke"

Myisha Cherry, "Forgiveness, Exemplars, and the Oppressed"

Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color"

Angela Y. Davis and Gina Dent, "Prison as a Border: On Gender, Globalization, and Punishment"

Raff Donelson, "Three Problems with Metaethical Minimalism"

Kristie Dotson, "How is this Paper Philosophy?"

Delia Fara, "Possibility Relative to a Sortal"

Arnold Farr, "Herbert Marcuse"

Kathryn Gines, "Comparative and Competing Frameworks of Oppression in Simone de Beauvoir's The Second Sex"

Lewis Gordon, "Is Philosophy Blue?"

Kwame Gyeke, "African Ethics"

Randall Harp, "Collective Action and Rational Choice Explanations"

bell hooks, "The Oppositional Gaze: Black Female Spectators"

bell hooks, "Love as the Practice of Freedom"

bell hooks, "Toward a Worldwide Culture of Love"

Brandon Hogan, "A Hegelian Argument for Restorative Criminal Justice"

Bill Lawson, "The Value of Environmental Justice"

Celine Leboeuf, "The Social Constitution of the Body: Bodily Alienation and Bodily Integrity"

Fainos Mangena, "Hunhu/Ubuntu in the Traditional Thought of Southern Africa"

Dismas Masolo, "The Making of a Tradition: African Philosophy in the New Millenium"

Lee McBride, "Forays in Insurrectionist Ethics"

Alexus McLeod, "In the World of Persons: The Personhood Debate in the Analects and Zhuangzi"

Lionel McPherson, "Innocence and Responsibility in War"

Charles W. Mills, ""But What Are You Really?" The Metaphysics of Race"

Michele Moody-Adams, "Political Philosophy or Political Theory: A Distinction without a Difference?"

Jennifer Nash, "Re-Thinking Intersectionality"

Marina Oshana, "Autonomy and the Question of Authenticity"

Lucius Outlaw, "Africana Philosophy"

Elliot Samuel Paul, "Cartesian Clarity"

Adrian Piper, "Moral Theory and Moral Alienation"

John Pittman, "Double Consciousness"

Keisha Ray, "What are You Doing for Black Philosophy?"

Kevin Richardson, "On What (In General) Grounds What"

Ryan Preston-Roedder, "Kant's Ethics and the Problem of Self-Deception"

Neil Roberts, "The Critique of Racial Liberalism: An Interview with Charles W. Mills"

Tommie Shelby, "Race and Ethnicity, Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations"

Georgette Sinkler, "Ockham and Ambiguity"

Subrena Smith, "Is Evolutionary Psychology Possible?"

Darian Spearman, "The Philosophical Significance of Slave Narratives"

Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò, "Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference" 

Mariam Thalos, "Two Conceptions of Collectivity"

Briana Toole, "Demarginalizing Standpoint Epistemology"

Brianna Toole, "Objectivity in Feminist Epistemology"

Desiree Valentine, "Access and Relationality"

Cornel West, "The Dilemma of the Black Intellectual"

Ajume Wingo, "Akan Philosophy of the Person"

Kwasi Wiredu, "Toward Decolonizing African Philosophy and Religion"

Monique Wonderly, "On Being Attached"

George Yancy, "I am a Dangerous Professor"

George Yancy, "The Pain and Promise of Black Women in Philosophy," an interview with Anita Allen

Naomi Zack, "Denial of Universal Material Needs and Aversion to the Homeless"


Philosophers (with links to their web pages)

Abimbola, Kola
Agada, Ada
Ajari, Norman
Allen, Anita L.
Alston, Kal
Anderson, Jackie (1942-2016)
Anderson Jr., Luvell E.

Anderson, Sybol Cook
Ani, Emmanuel
Appiah, Kwame Anthony
Arah, Benjamin
Archer, Avery
Archampong, Charles Benjamin Kwabena (1940-2012)
Asike, Joseph
Asouzu, Innocent

Attoe, Aribiah David
Bailey, Julius
Baker, Thomas Nelson, Sr. (1860-1940)
Bamikole, Lawrence Ojo
Banner, William A. (1915-2013)
Beckles-Raymond, Gabriella
Bell, Derrick (1930-2011)
Belle, Kathryn Sophia
Bello, A.G.A.

Berteaux, John
Bewaji, John Ayotunde Isola

Bey, Marquis
Bidadanure, Juliana
Bidima, Jean-Godefroy
Bierria, Alisa
Birhane, Abeba
Birt, Robert E.
Boaheng, Paul
Bodunrin, Peter (1936-1997)
Boni, Tanella
Botts, Tina

Bowden, Chelsea
Boxill, Bernard R.
Bright, Liam Kofi
Brown, Lee M.

Buffington, Lina
Burton, Roxanne
Butler, Broadus N. (1920-1996)
Carew, George
Carter, Jacoby A.
Cassell, Lisa R.
Cavers-Huff, Daseia (1961-2007)
CheeMooke, Robert A. (1939-2010)
Cherry, Myisha
Chieck, Yual
Chirimuuta, Mazviita
Clardy, Justin
Clune-Taylor, Catherine
Collins, Patricia Hill
Coleman, Nathaniel Adam Tobias
Coleman, Winson R. (1905-1984)
Cook, Joyce Mitchell (1933-2014)
Cooper, Anna Julia (1858-1964)
Cormier, Harvey
Crenshaw, Kimberlé Williams
Curry, Tommy J.
Daise, Benjamin
Darby, Derrick
Davidson, Maria del Guadalupe
Davis, Angela

Davis, Emmalon
Davis, Illya
Davis, LaChanda
Davis, Nena
Dawson, Clanton
Decker, Johnathan P.
Dent, Gina
DeVries, Sandra
Diagne, Souleymane Bachir
Donelson, Raff
Dotson, Kristie
Du Bois, W.E.B. (1868-1963)
Dunham, Jr., Albert Millard (1906-1949)
Eddins, Berkley (1926-2009)

Edelin, Ramona Hoage
Edwards, Tracy A.
Emagalit, Zeverin
Etieyibo, Edwin
Evans, Daw-Nay

Ewuoso, Cornelius
Eze, Chielozona
Eze, Emmanuel Chukwudi (1963-2007)
Eze, Michael Onyebuchi
Falaiye, Muyiwa
Fanon, Frantz (1925-1961)
Fara, Delia Graff (1969-2017)
Farr, Arnold
Ferguson, Stephen
Fields, Keota D.
Flowers, Johnathan
Foe, Nkolo
Fontaine, William (1909-1968)
Ford, Anton
Franklin, Todd
Frankowski, Alfred
Frye, Charles A. (1946-1994)
Fryer, Daniel
Garcia, Jorge
Garza, Mara
Gates, Henry Louis
Gbadegesin, Segun
Gbotokuma, Zekeh

Givhan, Anthony
Golden, Timothy Joseph
Golightly, Cornelius L. (1917-1976)
Gonzalez de Allen, Gertrude James
Goodin, Patrick
Gooding-Williams, Robert
Gordon, Lewis R.
Green, J. Everet
Greene, Nathifa
Greener, Richard T. (1844-1922)
Gutema, Bekele
Gyeke, Kwame (1939-2019)
Haile, James
Hall, Barbara
Hamilton, Adam
Hamilton, Eboni T.
Hardimon, Michael O.
Harding, Oswald
Harloe, Katherine
Harp, Randall
Harris, Kimberly
Harris, Luke C.
Havis, Devonya
Harris, Leonard

Hasan-Birdwell, Aminah

Hawkins, Orlando
Haynes, Patrice
Haywood, Tamara
Headley, Clevis
Healy, Patrick Francis (1834-1910)
Henning, Tempest
Henry, Paget
Hill, Charles Leander (1906-1956)
Hill, Jason
Hill, Renee

Hogan, Brandon
Holmes, Eugene C. (1905-1980)
Hood, Pamela M.
hooks, bell (1952-2021)
Hountondji, Paulin (1942-2024)
Ikuenobe, Polycarp A.

Imafidon, Elvis
Imbo, Samuel Oluoch
Irele, Dipo
Jackson, Myron Moses
Jaima, Amir
James, V. Denise
James, Joy
Jean-Marie, Vivaldi
Jeffers, Chike
Johnson, Charles R.
Johnson, Clarence Sholé
Johnston, Percy (1930-1993)
Jones, Gilbert Haven (1881-1966)
Jones, Janine
Jones, Jeffrey (1968-2020)
Jones, Richard A.
Jones, William R. (1933-2012)
Judy, Ronald A.T.
Kagabo, Liboire

Kalewold, Kal
Kalumba, Kibujjo M.

ka'Nobuhlaluse, Zinhle

Kaphagawani, Didier Njirayamanda
Karera, Axelle
Kebede, Messay
Kelbessa Workineh
Kelley, Anthony
Kelsey, George (1910-1996)
King, Preston T.
King, Rodmon
Kirkland, Frank
Kiros, Teodros
Kisolo-Ssonko, Joseph

Kumalo, Siseko
Kwame, Safro

Lamarre, Ashley
Lamola, John
Lawson, Bill
Leboeuf, Celine
Lebron, Christopher
Lewis, Dwight
Locke, Alain LeRoy (1885-1954)
Lott, Tommy L.
Lyskawa, Matthew
Maglo, Koffi
Maina, Wilson
Makinde, Moses Akin
Mangena, Fainos

Manzini, Zinhle
Marcano, Donna-Dale

Marriott, David. S.
Masolo, Dismas
Mason, Qrescent
Matthew, Dale
Mazrui, Ali A. (1933-2014)
Mbiti, John S.
Mbonda, Ernest-Marie
McAllister, Winston Kermit (1920-1976)
McBride, Lee
McClendon, John H.
McGary Jr., Howard
McClean, David (faculty profile), (personal web page)
McKenzie, Earl
McKinney, Richard (1906-2005)
McLaughlin, Wayman Bernard (1927-2003)
McLeod, Alexus
McPherson, Lionel K.
Menkiti, Ifeanyi A. (1940-2019)
Mensah, Shaeeda
Melton, Desiree
Migan, Darla
Miles, Kevin
Mills, Charles W. (1951-2021)
Mills, Kenneth (1931-1983)
Miranda, Dana

Modisakeng, Lemogang
Moody-Adams, Michele M.
Moore, Darrell
More, Mabogo P.
Morgan, Marcyliena
Mosley, Albert
Mubirumusoke, Mukasa
Mudimbe, Valentin Y.

Mungwini, Pascah

Murungi, John

Mutinda, Nzioki
Nash, Jennifer C.
Neal, Anthony
Ngosso, Thierry
Nlandu, Tamba
Nwaneri, Ndidi
Nya, Nathalie
Nyasani, Joseph (1936-2016)

Nzegwu, Nkiru
Obi, Augustine
Ocaya, Victor
Ochieng, Omedi
Ochieng'-Odhiambo, Frederick
Oguejiofor, J. Obi
Ogungbure, Adebayo Anthony
Oke, Ronke
Okeja, Uchenna
Okolo, Chukwudum
Okonda, Benoît Okolo

Okpanachi, Anthony Idoko

Ojelade, Joel
Oladipo, Olusegun (1957-2009)
Oluwole, Sophie (1935-2018)
O'Neal, Brittany
Oniang'o, Clement
Oruka, Henry Odera (1944-1995)

Osei, Joseph
Osei-Frimpong, Irami

Osha, Sanya
Oshana, Marina
Outlaw Jr., Lucius T.
Oyewumi, Oyeronke
Paris, William
Paul, Elliot
Perina, Mickaella L.
Piper, Adrian
Pittman, John P.

Pollock, Darien
Preston-Roedder, Ryan

Radford-Curry, Blanche
Ramose, Mogobe
Ray, Keisha
Richardson, Kevin
Ricks, Vance
Roberts, Neil
Roberts, Rodney C.
Robinson, Cavin
Robinson, Juneko

Rogers, Melvin
Russell, Camisha
Savage, Reginald
Schroer, Jeanine Weekes
Scott, Damion
Scott, Jacqueline

Scott, Jordan
Scriven, Darryl
Sealey, Kris
Serequeberhan, Tsenay
Sharpley-Whiting, Tracy Denean
Shelby, Tommie
Shelton, LaVerne
Shorter-Bourhanou, Jameliah

Simpson, Anika
Simpson, Celena
Simpson, Lorenzo

Sinkler, Georgette
Smaw, Eric
Smith, Subrena
Sodipo, John Olubi (1935-1999)
Souffrant, Eddy
Spearman, Darian
Spencer, Ayanna
Spencer, Quayshawn
Stewart, Lindsey
Stone, Brad Elliott
Sundstrom, Ronald
Táíwò, Olúfémi

Táíwò, Olúfémi O.

Tangwa, Godfrey B.
Taylor, Kenneth Allen (1954-2019)
Taylor, Paul
Teffo, Lesiba Joseph (Joe)
Thalos, Mariam
Terry, Brandon M.
Thiam, Cheikh
Thomas, Laurence
Thomas, Michael
Thompson, Stephen L.
Thompson, Winston
Tolliver, Joseph
Toole, Briana
Torrey, John
Tshivhase, Mpho
Tucker, Travis
Tuggle, Melvin
Tunstall, Dwayne
Valentine, Desiree
Vanterpool, Rudolph V.
Vest, Jennifer Lisa
Wade, Maurice
Wafula, Muyila Jackson
Wamala, Edward
Wambui, Betty

Ware, Lawrence

Warren, Calvin
Washington, Johnny
Washington, Natalia

Watson, Charles H.
Weaver, Christopher
West, Cornel

Whittaker, Nicholas
Wiggins, Forrest Oran (1907-1982)
Williams, Al-Yasha
Williams, Samuel Woodrow (1912-1970)
Wills, Vanessa

Wilson, Max (1924-1988)
Wilson, Yolonda
Wingo, Ajume
Wiredu, Kwasi
Woldeyohannes, Tedla
Wonderly, Monique
Woodson, Andrew
Yancy, George D.

Zack, Naomi
Zimeta, Mahlet


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Nicolai Hartmann's Theory of the Relation between Being-There and Being-So

The distinguished German philosopher Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950) investigates the relation between being-there and being-so in the second part of his Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie (1935, Toward the Foundation of Ontology).

      The Grundlegung (the Foundation) is the first of a four-volume series by Hartmann, dealing with ontology. The other volumes of the series are Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit (1938, Possibility and Actuality), Der Aufbau der realen Welt (1940, The Construction of the Real World), and Philosophie der Natur (1950, Philosophy of Nature). Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit is the only one of these volumes that has, as of 2013, been translated into, and published in, English.

      The Grundlegung is divided into four parts: (1) Vom Seinenden als Seienden überhaupt (Of "That Which Is" as "That Which Is," in General), (2) Das Verhältnis von Dasein und Sosein (The Relation between Being-There and Being-so), (3) Die Gegebenheit des realen Seins (The Givenness of Real Being), and (4) Problem und Stellung des idealen Seins (The Problem and Position of Ideal Being).

      Hartmann distinguishes between ways of being, modes of being, and aspects of being. Ways of being (Seinsweisen) include ideality and reality. Modes of being (Seinsmodi) include actuality, possibility, and necessity (and their negative counterparts, nonactuality, impossibility, and contingency). Aspects of being (Seinsmomenten) include being-so (Sosein) and being-there (Dasein).

      Hartmann also distinguishes between being and “that which is,” and thus between the ontological and ontic dimensions of philosophical inquiry. The difference between being (Sein) and “that which is” (Seiende) corresponds to the difference between truth and the true, actuality and the actual, reality and the real. The being of “that which is” may have many different particularizations of its way of being.¹

      The distinction between being and "that which is" also corresponds to the distinction between being-there and "that which is there" (Daseiende), and between being-so and "that which is so" (Soseiende). 
      The central question with which ontology is concerned, “What is being qua being?” cannot therefore be confronted without also confronting the question, “What is ‘that which is’ qua ‘that which is’?”      

      In all of “that which is,” there are aspects of being-there and being-so.² Being-there and being-so are interconnected and mutually complementary aspects of being. There is no being-there without being-so, and no being-so without being-there.³

      The being-there of “that which is” is constituted by the fact “that it is,” while the being-so of “that which is” is constituted by “what it is,” i.e. by its quiddity. Thus, being-there is the “that,” and being-so is the “what” of “that which is.”

      There is also being-there in being-so, and being-so in being-there. Being-there “in” something is the particular form of being-there of all being-so, while being-so is the being-there of something “in” something. However, being-there and being-so are not substances in which “that which is” inheres; rather, they are aspects or "moments" of being.⁴

      Being-there and being-so are indifferent to each other, insofar as it makes no difference to being-there whether being-so turns out in one way or another, and insofar as it makes no difference to being-so whether being-there turns out in one way or another.⁵ However, being-there and being-so are also not indifferent to each other, insofar as they are aspects of the same particular being and therefore share the same (ideal or real) way of being. Real being-there is always that of a real being-so, and real being-so is always that of a real being-there.⁶ Being-there and being-so can be indifferent to each other only if they belong to different ontological spheres, i.e. if being-so belongs to the ideal sphere and being-there belongs to the real sphere, or vice versa.

      Hartmann explains that the epistemological basis of the (misleading) appearance of separation between being-there and being-so is that real being-so may be a priori or a posteriori knowable, while real being-there is only a posteriori knowable. Thus, the boundary between aprioristic and aposterioristic knowledge does not correspond to the (apparent) boundary between being-there and being-so. From real being-so, aprioristic as well as aposterioristic knowledge is possible, while from real being-there, only aposterioristic knowledge is possible. Conversely, aposterioristic knowledge is possible from the being-so, as well as from the being-there, of “that which is,” while aprioristic knowledge is possible only from the being-so of “that which is.”⁷

      Aprioristic and aposterioristic sources of knowledge are also ways of givenness of “that which is.”⁸ Thus, there is a threefold superimposition of, or boundary relation between, (1) ways of givenness (aprioristic or aposterioristic) (2) ways of being (ideal or real), and (3) moments of being (being-there or being-so). Aprioristic knowledge is possible from ideal being-so, from ideal being-there, and from real being-so. Aposterioristic knowledge is possible from real being-so, and from real being-there. Real being-there can only be an object of aposterioristic knowledge. Ideal being (ideal being-so and ideal being-there) can only be an object of aprioristic knowledge.⁹

FOOTNOTES

¹Nicolai Hartmann, Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, Second Edition (Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1941), pp. 40-41.

²Ibid., p. 92.

³Ibid., p. 128.

⁴Ibid., p. 134.

⁵Ibid., p. 112.

⁶Ibid., p. 114.

⁷Ibid., pp. 144-145.

⁸Ibid., p. 145.

⁹Ibid., p. 148.

E.J. Lowe's Four-Category Ontology

E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology (2006) is an attempt to answer the question of what are the fundamental categories of being, as well as the question of what are the basic distinctions between them. Lowe explains that ontological categories are kinds of being.¹ The distinctions between ontological categories include the distinction between universals and particulars, and the distinction between substances and non-substances. Thus, there are four basic ontological categories: substantial universals (kinds), substantial particulars (objects), non-substantial universals (attributes), and non-substantial particulars (modes).

      Substantial universals are instantiated by substantial particulars, and non-substantial universals are instantiated by non-substantial particulars. Kinds are instantiated by objects, and attributes are instantiated by modes (or “tropes”). For example, a particular tomato is an instance of the kind, “tomato,” and a particular redness (e.g. the redness of a particular tomato) is an instance of the attribute, “redness.”²

      Lowe explains that objects (individual substances) are particular instances of kinds (substantial universals). Modes (property or relation instances) are particular instances of attributes (property or relational universals).

      The relations between the four basic ontological categories can be schematized as an “ontological square,” in which the category of “kinds” is in the upper left corner, the category of “objects” is in the lower left corner, the category of “attributes” is in the upper right corner, and the category of “modes” is in the lower right corner. Kinds are characterized by attributes, and are instantiated by objects. Attributes are exemplified by objects, and are instantiated by modes. Objects are characterized by modes (ways of being, or particular instances of properties and relations). Thus, there are three basic kinds of relations between members of the four basic ontological categories: instantiation, characterization, and exemplification.³

      Lowe admits that there are at least two basic assumptions made by the four-category ontology: that universals exist, and that there is a basic distinction to be made between substantial and non-substantial universals.⁴

      A problem that must be addressed by the four-category ontology is that of whether there can be second- or higher-order kinds of being, as distinguished from first-order kinds of objects. Lowe recognizes this problem, and he explains that according to his definition of “kinds” as universals that are instantiated by substantial particulars, kinds are instantiated by objects and not by other kinds (substantial universals). An ontological category, such as “kinds,” is a kind of being, but it is not a kind in the sense that a kind of object is a kind. However, the counter-argument can also be made that “kinds” as an ontological category can be instantiated not only by kinds of objects, but also by kinds of modes, properties, and relations.

      Another problem is that of whether kinds, attributes, and modes may also be made objects (of perception, thought, observation, and investigation). If kinds, attributes, and modes themselves may be made objects, then objects may not be able to be defined exclusively as instances of kinds.

      Another problem is that of whether there may be second- or higher-order properties and relations (properties of properties, and relations of, or between, relations). According to Lowe’s definition of attributes as universals that are instantiated by non-substantial particulars, attributes are instantiated by modes (property or relation instances), and not by other attributes (property or relational universals).

      Another problem is that of whether the instantiation of kinds or attributes is any different from their exemplification. Particular instances of kinds or attributes may be individual examples of those kinds or attributes. For example, if a particular tomato instantiates the kind, “tomato,” then it also exemplifies it. If a particular redness (e.g. the redness of a particular tomato) instantiates the attribute, “redness,” then it also exemplifies it. On the other hand, a particular tomato may exemplify the property of “redness” without actually instantiating it (because the property of “redness” may be instantiated by the redness of that particular tomato, rather than by the tomato itself). What then is the nature of the difference between instantiation and exemplification?

      Lowe recognizes all these problems, and he attempts, with varying degrees of success, to resolve them. His four-category ontology is a very thought-provoking attempt to define the nature and kinds of being, and it is a brilliantly conceived and clearly formulated effort to advance our understanding of the categorical construction of reality.

    

FOOTNOTES

¹E.J. Lowe, The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 20.

²Ibid., p. 22.

³Ibid., p. 23.

⁴Ibid., p. 28.